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C hapter 1 
Introduction
This thesis is on reasoning about multi-agent systems. It provides a logic-based 
account of the specification and verification of multi-agent systems, in terms of 
time, action and knowledge. This chapter describes the general area of multi­
agent systems, the motivation for this research, the methods chosen, and con­
cludes with an overview of the thesis.
M ulti-A gent System s R esearch What are Multi-Agent Systems? A Multi- 
Agent System (MAS) is a system that consists of multiple interacting agents. An 
agent is an entity that could act on its own or on behalf of another entity. We may 
call them intelligent agents, or rational agents, if the agents could observe, think 
and direct their activities to achieve goals. There are generally four characteristics 
of MASs [100]: firstly, each agent has incomplete information or capabilities for 
solving the problem; secondly, there is no global system control; thirdly, data 
is decentralized; and fourthly, computation is asynchronous. For comprehensive 
surveys of MASs, refer to [98, 74, 100].
One could easily associate agents with human beings, and associate a MAS 
with a team or community. Human beings are indeed an important source of 
our inspiration and motivation. For instance, the ultimate goal of RoboCup, 
a successful initiative for the research in Robotics and Artificial Intelligence, is 
stated as follows:
By mid-21st century, a team of fully autonomous humanoid robot 
soccer players shall win the soccer game, comply with the official rule 
of the FIFA, against the winner of the most recent World Cup.
From http://www.robocup.org.
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The robot soccer players are agents. In order for a robot team to actually 
play a soccer game, various technologies must be incorporated including: sensor- 
fusion, multi-agent communication and collaboration, planning and strategy ac­
quisition, real-time reasoning, robotics, design principles of autonomous agents, 
etc [99, 62]. In the broader area of multi-agent systems research, the study also 
involves knowledge representation of beliefs, desires and intentions, cooperation 
and coordination, organization, communication, negotiation, distributed problem 
solving, multi-agent learning, and so on.
This thesis focuses on the specification and verification of multi-agent systems 
using a logic-based approach. So, what is the motivation of this research, and 
why did we choose a logic-based approach? The first question is addressed in 
Section 1.1, and the second question in Section 1.2.
1.1 T im e, A ction  and K now ledge in M A S
In this section, we show that ‘Time’, ‘Action’, and ‘Knowledge’ are three im­
portant aspects for reasoning about multi-agent systems, with several relevant 
examples.
System s C hanging O ver T im e What is time? There are a lot of philosoph­
ical debates on the nature of time. But these debates are not the subjects of this 
thesis. We simply take the following view: time is part of a fundamental intellec­
tual structure (together with space) within which humans sequence and compare 
events.
In our daily life, we use time to record past activities or events, and to plan 
or organize future ones. Similarly, when we study multi-agent systems, we also 
want to use time to sequence and compare changes of the systems. Conceptually, 
time, like space, may be continuous, and this may even lead to some controversial 
debates, such as in Zeno’s Arrow Paradox:
“If everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that 
which is in locomotion is always occupying such a space at any mo­
ment, the flying arrow is therefore motionless. ”
Aristotle, Physics VI:9, 239b5
But here, we adopt the following view: time is discrete and systems change one 
step at a time. This view is a pragmatic one, because in practice we usually refer
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to discrete time points when we talk about a system. For example, we say “The 
train leaves platform 1 at 5pm” or “The dinner starts at 7pm”. Moreover, in 
multi-agent systems research, the agents are usually computational systems, in 
which instructions are executed step by step. Therefore this view naturally fits 
the modelling of changes in such systems.
We assume that a multi-agent system is in certain state at each discrete time 
point. The granularity of the time points may depend on the subjects that we 
model. For example, in the University of Liverpool, PhD students and their 
supervisors have to complete a progress review on an annual basis, and students 
are allowed to be transferred to the next year only after positive feedback, while 
the research meetings between students and supervisors are on a monthly or a 
weekly basis. Once we fix the granularity of time, the changes of the system then 
are modeled as transitions from one time point to another.
Now the questions are how could we represent states of a multi-agent system 
and the transitions between them, and how to express the desired properties that 
we want such systems to have.
A gents H aving Pow er To A ct A multi-agent system evolves over time and 
the changes come from the actions made by the agents. So the agents must have 
the power to act, and they will typically be interested in how to act effectively, 
i.e., in such a way as to achieve their goals. The agents may have conflicting 
goals, so their power to act may also depend on how other agents act.
To illustrate these aspects, we introduce the game of Student vs. Teacher [79] 
as follows.
E xam ple 1.1 (Student vs. Teacher). There is a student and a teacher. They are 
playing a game as shown in the following diagram.
S A
The student is located at position S and wants to reach the position of escape, 
E, but the teacher wants to prevent him from escaping. Each line segment is a 
link that can be traveled. The teacher starts first and they play in turn. At each 
round of the game, the teacher can cut one connection anywhere in the diagram, 
while the student can and must travel one link still open to him at his current
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position. The game stops if the student escapes in E  (in which case he wins) or 
he cannot move anymore (in which case he loses). Question: does the student 
have a way to win this game?
The answer is no if the teacher plays smartly. If the teacher first cuts a link 
between A and E, then no matter whether the student goes to A or B, the teacher 
can then cut the link from E to that position, and in the next round cuts the 
last link from E. So there is no link from any other position to E, therefore the 
student cannot escape. We can say that the teacher has a strategy to win this 
game.
But if the teacher does not play smartly in the first round, then he might lose. 
For example, if the teacher first cuts the link between S and A, then the student 
has no choice but go to B and subsequently gets a winning strategy. The strategy 
can be described as follows: if the teacher cuts any link but the B-E link, then 
the student wins through this B-E link; if the teacher cuts the B-E link, then the 
student goes to A, and because there are two links between A and E, no matter 
which link the teacher cuts in the next round, the student can always reach E.
There are situations in which agents not only compete but also collaborate 
with each other. For example, in football, the members of one team compete 
with those of the other team; within the same team, members work together to 
send the ball into the other team’s goal. In the current global economy, countries 
are competing with each other; but to slow down global warming, countries have 
to collaborate as well, e.g. cutting greenhouse gas emissions together.
The questions are how can we model the single agent’s strategy as well as the 
strategy of a group of agents, and how can agents reason about their coalition 
powers.
A gents’ Know ledge Evolving Over T im e In many scenarios, agents do not 
necessarily have complete information of the whole system. Therefore to represent 
and reason about incomplete information is essential too. The term information 
is generally understood as “facts provided or learned about something or some­
one” . In this thesis, we assume that the information that agents acquire through 
observation and learning is always accurate. For instance, in our earlier example, 
if the teacher makes an action lcut A-B link’ then the student will observe the 
same action. Of course, in general, this assumption does not necessarily hold. For 
example, the speedometer on your bicycle may tell you that the current speed is
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25 km per hour, but due to measurement errors, the real speed is probably not 
exactly the same number. This relates to a choice of modelling. If the measure­
ment error is negligible, then we could simply treat the measurement reading as 
an accurate one; but if it may have a non-trival impact on the system, then we 
could add more parameters to describe it.
We refer to accurate or truthful information as knowledge. In particular, 
we distinguish two kinds of knowledge: one is about the facts of the system 
environment or agents, and the other is about the knowledge of other agents’ 
knowledge, which is also called higher-order knowledge. For instance, suppose 
there are two agents A and B and a lamp in the waiting room; the agent B just 
comes out from that room, hence he might know the status of the light. But 
agent A only observes that B is coming out and A is not able to peek into the 
room. Now we say that agent B knowing whether the lamp is on or off, refers 
to the first type of knowledge. Agent A knowing whether agent B knows that 
fact, is higher-order knowledge. Sometimes higher-order knowledge can be very 
subtle, and plays an important role in agents’ decision making. We illustrate 
this by the coordinated attack problem, a well-known problem in the distributed 
systems folklore. The problem is described as follows (Page 176, [23]).
E xam ple 1.2 (Coordinated Attack). Two divisions of an army, each commanded 
by a general, are camped on two hilltops overlooking a valley. In the valley awaits 
the enemy. It is clear that if both divisions attack the enemy simultaneously 
they will win the battle, while if only one division attacks it will be defeated. As 
a result, neither general will attack unless he is absolutely sure that the other 
will attack with him. In particular, a general will not attack if he receives no 
messages. The commanding general of the first division wishes to coordinate a 
simultaneous attack (at some time the next day). The general can communicate 
only by means of messengers. Normally, it takes a messenger one hour to get 
from one encampment to the other. However, it is possible that he will get lost in 
the dark or, worse yet, be captured by the enemy. Fortunately, on this particular 
night, everything goes smoothly. How long will it take them to coordinate an 
attack?
So General A must send a messenger to General B with a message like “let 
us attack at 6 am!’. Suppose General A did so, and the message was indeed 
delivered, what should General B do? B did know A’s proposal, but he could 
imagine that A had no information so far on whether the message had been
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delivered, therefore; A did not know that B knew this proposal already. Hence, 
at that time point, B could not make a decision to attack the enemy, as A would 
definitely not attack the enemy. Then B had to send a messenger back to inform 
A that the earlier message had been delivered. Suppose B did so and the message 
was delivered successfully, should A decide to make an attack? Not really, because 
A could imagine that B did not know whether the second message was successfully 
delivered, although A knew that B knew the first message already. Therefore, A 
must send another messenger to inform B that the second message was received 
by A. So it is easy to conclude that no matter how many messages are passed 
between A and B, they could not attain enough high-order knowledge to ensure a 
simultaneous attack; therefore no successful coordination was possible. In other 
words, they need infinitely many successful deliveries of messages to attain the 
knowledge for this attack, which is of course not possible in practice.
One may ask why the two generals do not simply make a telephone call? It 
is not possible in this example, as they can only rely on the messengers. But 
if a telephone call is indeed allowed and the generals could do it without being 
noticed by the enemies, then they will be able to coordinate an attack. The 
higher-order knowledge they will obtain from the telephone call is called common 
knowledge. In this example, common knowledge is essential for two generals to 
make life-or-death decisions. Also, the example shows that knowledge can evolve 
over time, e.g. via communication among agents.
Now, the questions are how we can represent such different knowledge modali­
ties and actions of communication, and how agents can reason about these knowl­
edge and actions.
So far we have looked at three important aspects of multi-agent systems, and 
asked relevant questions. In the next section, we are going to introduce the 
methods to address these questions.
1.2 L ogic-based M ethods and Formal V erifica­
tion
Logic-based M ethods We use logic-based methods for reasoning about multi­
agent systems. A logic usually consists of three parts:
• Language (Syntax): well-defined strings of symbols to serve as a language 
to express the properties of the systems;
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• Semantics (Model theory): mathematical models which characterise the 
system and give meaning to the language.
• Deduction system (Proof theory): a set of formulas and rules to deduce a 
specific set of formulas which are called theorems.
There are several advantages of using logic-based methods in multi-agent systems 
modelling.
• First, the well-defined logical language is more precise and unambiguous 
compared to unstructured natural language.
• Second, by having rigorous mathematical models of multi-agent systems, 
the underlying assumptions can be nailed down to precise terms so that 
there will be no confusion in studying such systems.
• Third, the well-defined semantics enables us to specify precisely what prop­
erties hold for the models, and may help us understand why some properties 
fail in such models.
• Last, by using axiomatic deduction systems, we could single out what are the 
principles underlying a particular system, and what are the consequences 
of such principles.
In particular, we will study multi-agent systems with two classes of logical 
frameworks. The first class is that of temporal logic, and the second class is that 
of epistemic logic. A detailed review on these logics is given in Chapter 2.
Form al V erification As with every study or research, we do this research with 
some purpose. One important purpose is of course, the theoretical understanding 
of multi-agent systems, but ultimately, we would like our study to be practically 
useful as well. For that reason, we want to verify multi-agent systems based 
on our logical approaches. This leads to the formal verification of multi-agent 
systems.
As the designer of a system, one wants to know whether the designed system 
behaves as desired. A popular way of doing that is through simulation and 
testing, which are standard methods in software engineering. But there are two 
main limits for such methods. First, simulation and testing only explore some of 
the possible behaviors and scenarios of the system, leaving some bugs unexplored;
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this is not acceptable for mission critical systems, as witnessed in the failure of the 
Rocket Ariane 5 Flight 501 in 1996, which was caused by computer software bugs1. 
Second, simulation and testing use natural language to describe the specifications 
of the system, leaving potential misunderstandings to the test conductors.
To overcome such limits, several approaches to formal verification have been 
proposed over the years. There are roughly two classes of approaches. One is 
theorem proving, which is related to proof theory mentioned earlier; and the other 
is model checking, which is related to the model theory. In this thesis, we focus 
solely on model checking.
Pioneering work in model checking of temporal logics was done by Clarke, 
Emerson and Sifakis et al. [17, 66] in the 1980s. For that reason, Clarke, Emerson, 
and Sifakis shared the 2007 Turing Award.
Model checking is the process of checking whether a given model satisfies a 
logical specification, represented as a logic formula, through exhaustive enumer­
ation (explicit or implicit) of all the states reachable from the initial states of 
the system and the transitions that connect them. Formally, a model checking 
problem can be stated as follows: given a desired property which is expressed as 
a logic formula g>, and a model M  with a state s in M, decide whether M , s f= g>.
The model checking process typically involves three main steps:
• M odelling The first step is to translate a specification of a system de­
scribed in natural language into a formalism that is accepted by a model 
checking tool. The usual tasks involved are abstracting key components 
and eliminating irrelevant details. The judgment of whether some details 
are irrelevant or not depends on the design objectives.
• Specification The aim of this step is to produce formal specifications, 
normally in the form of logic formulas, to represent the desired properties 
that the systems should hold. This also involves logical abstractions, as the 
logical language is more rigid than the natural language.
• V erification This step usually does not need human involvement except in 
the situation that the model is too large to be handled by the computer. In 
that case, one may need rework in the Modelling and Specification steps.
This complete procedure will be shown in the case studies in Chapters 4 and 
6 of this thesis.
1URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariane_5-Flight-501
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Compared with other approaches, there are several clear advantages of the 
model checking approach. First, model checking is fully automatic and exhaus­
tive, so the full process will need no human intervention, and no states will be 
left out. Second, model checking tools may produce a counterexample when the 
design does not satisfy a property, which may lead to great insights on why the 
property fails. Third, the model checking process can handle very large state 
spaces that cannot be possibly handled by human beings.
However, there is also a major disadvantage in the model checking approach. 
As the number of components or agents in a system increases, the number of states 
of the system may increase exponentially. This is usually refereed to as state ex­
plosion problem. There was a breakthrough, when McMillan et al. [14, 54] first 
used a symbolic representation for state transition graphs, so that much larger 
systems could be handled. The main insight was to use a symbolic representa­
tion based on Bryant’s ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) [13]. OBDDs 
provide a canonical form for Boolean formulas that is often substantially more 
compact than conjunctive or disjunctive normal form; very efficient algorithms 
have been developed for manipulating them. Such techniques are also used in the 
model checking tools for multi-agent systems [68, 27].
1.3 O verview
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides a logical background for the work that is going to 
be presented. It first introduces temporal logics from a single-agent perspective, 
and then from a multi-agent perspective. In the single-agent perspective, we 
have Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) and Computational Tree Logic (CTL). 
The former assumes that a system changes over time deterministically, in the 
sense that there is only one possible outcome for a system to transit from one 
state to another state; and the latter assumes that a system changes over time 
non-deterministically. In the multi-agent perspective, we have Alternating-time 
Temporal Logic (ATL), which is a generalization of CTL. In ATL the changes of a 
system are determined by the agents’ actions. The thesis then goes on to intro­
duce epistemic logics, which are the logical frameworks of knowledge. Epistemic 
Logic (EL) deals with the agents’ knowledge and higher-order knowledge, includ­
ing common knowledge. We also present two extensions of EL. One is Temporal 
Epistemic Logic (TEL), which addresses the temporal changes of a system in ad­
dition to the agents’ knowledge. The other is Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL),
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which also models the changes of a system but more concretely through actions, 
compared to the modelling of the changes caused by the flow of time in TEL. A 
literature review is provided, as well as the definitions of languages and semantics 
for these logics.
The main contributions of this thesis are presented in the next four chapters, 
from Chapter 3 to Chapter 6.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are focused on the verification of games in the 
Game Description Language (GDL), a declarative language used in General 
Game Playing Competition. The aim of the competition is to provide a platform 
for researchers to develop general purpose game playing systems, which shall have 
more flexibility compared to dedicated game playing systems such as the famous 
Chess-playing system Deep Blue. While GDL is specifically designed for describ­
ing games, we also see it as a language to describe a class of multi-agent systems. 
A practical problem for a designer of multi-agent systems using such a language 
is to check whether the system indeed always behaves as desired. On the other 
hand, there are a few logical frameworks to reason about games; a representative 
one is the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Therefore, Chapter 3 inves­
tigates the connections between GDL and ATL. It first demonstrates that GDL 
can be understood as a specification language for ATL models. Subsequently it 
shows that it is possible to succinctly characterise GDL game descriptions di­
rectly as ATL formulas, and that, as a corollary, the problem of interpreting ATL 
formulas over GDL descriptions is EXPTIME-Complete. Then in Chapter 4, 
this link is explored more practically. In particular, two main contributions are 
made. First, characterising a class of playability conditions which can be used 
to express the correctness of the games specified in GDL. Second, building an 
automated tool that uses an ATL model checking tool to verify the playability 
conditions for the games described in GDL. The feasibility of our approach is 
demonstrated by a case study on the game called Tic-Tac-Toe.
Chapters 5 and 6 are focused on the modelling of multi-agent systems with 
incomplete information. In particular, a study of correspondence between Dy­
namic Epistemic Logic (DEL) and Temporal Epistemic Logic (TEL) is made. 
These two logical frameworks are capable of modelling multi-agent systems with 
agents’ knowledge and change. However, there is an apparent difference in terms 
of model checking: in DEL the interpretation of a dynamic epistemic formula is 
over a state model, which represents a static view of a multi-agent system; while 
in TEL, the interpretation of a temporal epistemic formula is over an interpreted
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system, in which the full history of a system is unfolded. Chapter 5 tries to 
link DEL and TEL, showing that DEL can be embedded into a variation of TEL. 
We then proceed in Chapter 6 to give a study of model checking knowledge dy­
namics with three state-of-the-art model checkers for multi-agent systems. We 
first discuss the role of protocols in model checking processes, and proceed with 
case studies of two problems. With the Russian Cards Problem, we show how 
to use model checking tools to specify and verify communication protocols, and 
how dynamic epistemic modelling and temporal epistemic modelling compare in 
practice. With the Sum And Product Problem, we are able to show an important 
feature supported by the dynamic epistemic model checker DEM O, but not by 
the temporal model checkers MCK and MCMAS. We also compare the model 
checking results of different variants of this problem, and discuss the influence of 
model checking time by different representations of a same specification.
Finally Chapter 7 gives a conclusion of this research and provides some ideas 
for further research.
Sources of Materials
Chapter 3 and 4 are based on collaborations with Prof. Wiebe van der Hoek and 
Prof. Michael Wooldridge. The main work of Chapter 3 was presented in [82] 
at the Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI’07) which took 
place at Beijing, in August 2007. Chapter 4 is yet to be published. Chapter 
5 is joint work with Dr. Hans van Ditmarsch and Prof. Wiebe van der Hoek; a 
preliminary version [90] was presented in the Workshop of Formal Approaches to 
Multi-Agent Systems (FAMAS’007), which took place at Durham, in September 
2007. Chapter 6 has two main sources: one is a paper [91] published in the Journal 
of Logic and Computation jointly with Dr. Hans van Ditmarsch and Prof. Rineke 
Verbrugge; the other is a paper [93] published in the proceedings of MoChArt 05 
(Model Checking in Artificial Intelligence) jointly with Dr. Hans van Ditmarsch, 
Prof. Wiebe van der Hoek and Prof. Ron van der Meyden. The contributions and 




This chapter presents the temporal and epistemic frameworks that form the basis 
of this thesis. We assume that the readers have a basic knowledge of propositional 
logic.
2.1 Tem poral Logics
2.1.1 Introduction
Temporal logic is a formalisation of time. It is developed mainly from two 
traditions. The first is a philosophical tradition, which is rooted in the analysis 
of temporal aspects of natural language; therefore it is sometimes referred to as 
tense logic. An important milestone in contemporary temporal logic was first 
laid by A. Prior in his book Time and Modality [65] in 1957. Prior’s approach 
treated time with modalities, which are expressions broadly associated with no­
tions of possibility and necessity. Suppose we have a proposition “It is sunny” 
(call it proposition p); although the meaning of this proposition is constant in 
time, the truth value of this proposition may change over time, especially in a 
place like Liverpool. With the modalities like ‘always’, ‘eventually’, we can have 
such statements: “it is always sunny” , “eventually it is sunny”. They can be 
expressed in our logical language as Dp and ()p  respectively. The meaning of 
these statements depends on their interpretation on the structures that represent 
time. More details will be provided in the next section.
The second is a computational tradition. The motivation is to apply formal 
tools to the verification of computer programs, or more broadly computer systems. 
This area was created by computer scientists, A. Pnueli and Z. Manna et al. [64,
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51, 52], and further developed by E. Clarke and E. A. Emerson et al. [17, 15]. In 
[64], Pnueli proposed a unified approach to program verification, which applies 
to both sequential and parallel programs. The main proof method suggested was 
that of temporal reasoning, in which the time dependence of events is the basic 
concept. The programs are in a certain state in each time instance, and the 
correctness of the programs can be expressed as temporal specifications, such as 
“□ -ideadlock” meaning the program can never enter a deadlock state. In [17], E. 
Clarke and E. A. Emerson invented the method of model checking.
There are many temporal logics proposed since then. We list three categories 
that are concerned with this thesis:
• Linear-time Temporal Logics (LTL)
• Computational Tree Logics (CTL) - an example of Branching-time Temporal 
Logics
• Alternating-Time Temporal Logics (ATL)
The main difference between LTL and CTL is their view of time flows. LTL 
considers a time flow as a chain of time instances, while CTL views a time flow 
as a tree branching to the future, i.e., in each time instance, there may be several 
future instances. ATL, with multi-agent perspective, is a generalisation over 
CTL. We proceed with an introduction of structures of time and then present the 
languages and semantics of LTL, CTL and ATL in subsequent sections.
2.1.2 Structures of Tim e
Basic Tem poral Fram es and  E x tra  P ro p erties
Time is a basic component of the measuring system. We use it to sequence 
events, to compare the duration of events, and more importantly to organise our 
activities. One can view a flow of time as an object consisting of separate time 
instances and certain structures.
D efinition 2.1. A flow of Time is a frame: (T, R) such that R is binary relation 
over T. Here elements in T are called time instances, and R is called precedence 
relation; if a pair (s, t ) belongs to R, we say that s is earlier than t, written as 
sRt.
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This is just a basic frame, which may not meet our intuition about time. For 
example, iRi is allowed in the basic temporal frame, but our intuition tells us 
that time t should not be earlier than itself. To avoid such problems, we could 
add further restrictions on the precedence relation. Here are some first-order 
properties1 representing various restrictions:
• Irreflexivity: V:r(-i(:rR2:));
• Transitivity: \/xyz(xRy A yRz —> zRz);
• Linearity: Vxy(xRy V yRx V x = y)\
• Seriality: Vx3y(xRy)\
• Density: Vxy(xRy —> 3z(xRz A zRy)).
Irreflexivity says that x cannot precede itself. Transitivity says that if a time 
instance x precedes y and y precedes z, then x precedes z. Linearity says that 
for two time instances, either one precedes the other, or they are equal. Seriality 
says for any time instance, there is always a future time instance. Density says 
that for two time instances, there is always a time instance in between.
There are also some properties that can only be defined in second-order, in­
volving quantification over sets of instances in time, such as:
• Continuity: “Every subset with an upper bound has a supremum(i.e. a 
lowest upper bound)” .
The combinations of these properties define various temporal frames. For 
example, with transitivity and irreflexivity, we can define a temporal frame that 
is not circular; with linearity and transitivity, we have a linear temporal frame. 
Notice that the natural number frame (N, <) and real number frame (R, <) are 
linear temporal frames; while the former is discrete, and the latter is continuous.
T em poral Fram es from  S ta te  M achines
Apart from our intuition of what ‘real time’ should be, there is another perspective 
from computer science. In a computational perspective, time is not continuous, 
but discrete, as computation is made step by step. It is reasonable to assume 
that a computer or a machine is in a particular state in each time instance. A
1Vx means “For all x in the domain” , and 3x means “There exists an x in the domain” .
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Figure 2.1: A deterministic state machine
Figure 2.2: A non-deterministic state machine
binary relation among these states indicates possible transitions from one state to 
another. We require that for every state, there is at least one possible transition. 
The reason to ensure this is because we assume that machine time is infinite, i.e. 
computations do not stop. This is not to say that we cannot have a stopping 
state, in which a machine stops to operate. We can just have such a state that it 
only transits to itself.
Definition 2.2 (Finite State Machine). A finite state machine is a frame:
(S, R), where S is a finite set of states of a machine, and R is a binary relation 
over S such that for every s E S, there exists s' € S with sRs', i.e. R is serial.
There are two types of finite state machines: deterministic and non-deterministic. 
If for each state, there is exactly one transition either to another state or to itself, 
then it is a deterministic state machine; otherwise, it is a non-deterministic state 
machine.
Exam ple 2.1. Figure 2.1 represents a deterministic state machine, and Figure
2.2 represents a non-deterministic state machine.
It was mentioned that a main difference between LTL and CTL lies on their 
different view on time flow. This difference can be shown by unwinding the
• ----------................................................>
So Si s2 s2
Figure 2.3: The result of unwinding the state machine in Figure 2.1
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Figure 2.4: The result of unwinding the state machine in Figure 2.2.
state machines in the above examples. Here ‘unwinding’ is a process to make a 
state machine into a linear or branching structure without altering the transition 
relations between the states. The result of unwinding the state machine in Figure
2.1 from the state So is presented in Figure 2.3, which shows a linear structure. 
The result of unwinding the state machine in Figure 2.2 from the state So is 
presented in Figure 2.4, which shows a branching structure.
For these frames, we define a key concept called computation, which is intu­
itively a linear-time line or a branch in the branching-time tree.
D efin ition  2.3. Given a temporal frame (S, R), an sq-computation is an infinite 
sequence of states X — sq, s\, S2, ■ • •, such that for any i € N, s,Rsj+i. We denote 
Si as A[i].
It is easy to see that in Figure 2.3, So, Si, S2, S2, • • • is a computation starting 
with s0, and in Figure 2.4, Si, s2, s2, • ■ ■ is a computation starting with sj.
Now we give a generic definition of a temporal model.
D efinition 2.4. Given a set of atomic propositions P, a temporal model M is a 
tuple (IF, V) where F  =  (S, R) is a temporal frame, and V is a function from S to 
p(P), the power set of P.
I f  F  is a linear-time temporal frame, we call M a linear-time temporal model, 
and if F  is a branching-time temporal frame, we call M a branching-time temporal 
model.
Given these models, we need languages to talk about them. In the following 
sections, we will present three temporal languages and give their interpretations 
to respective temporal models.
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2.1.3 Linear-time Temporal Logic
The language of Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) is an extension of proposi­
tional logic with temporal modalities.
Definition 2.5 (LTL Language). The language of Linear-time Temporal Logic in 
Backus Naur Form (BNF) is as follows:
p  ::= p | -up \ p  A ip | O p \  pUip
where, p is a propositional atom.
The abbreviations T, _L, V, —* and are defined as usual. We can define the 
following abbreviations for two temporal modalities (}p  ::= T U p  and Op  ::=
The formulas with temporal modalities have the following intuitive meanings.
• O p  : in the next time step p  will be true;
• pUip  : p  will be true from now until ip]
• Op : always in the future from now, p  will be true;
• (}p  : at least once in the future, p  will be true.
We now give a formal semantics of this language with respect to linear-time 
temporal models.
D efinition 2.6 (LTL Semantics). Given a linear-time temporal model M , a state 
s, and an s-computation \ ,  we have:
M ,s  \= p 
M, s f= -ip 
M ,s \= p  A ip 
M ,s  [= O p  
M ,s  f= pU  ip
— p € V(s)
=  not M ,s  \= p  
=  M ,s  \= p and M ,s  \= ip 
=  M, A[l] |= p
= 3j  e N(M, A\j ] |= ip and VO < i <  j , A[z] (= p )
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C om plexity
Given the language and semantic of a logic, there are two types of problems that 
we are interested in: the model checking problems and the satisfiability problems. 
A model checking problem is: given a model M, a state s, and a formula <p, 
determine whether M ,w  \= ip. A satisfiability problem is: given a formula </?, 
determine whether there is a model M , a state s, such that M, w \= <p. These 
definitions are general, and they can be tailored to LTL case just by restricting 
M  to be a linear-time model and <p to be an LTL formula.
Complexity theory measures the difficulty of problems in terms of the re­
sources required to solve them. Such measure is a function of the size of the 
input. The complexity of both the model checking problem and the satisfiability 
problem in LTL is PSPA C E-C omplete [72],
2.1.4 Com putational Tree Logic
Computational Tree Logic (CTL) was first introduced by Clarke and Emerson 
[17] in 1981. It considers branching-time temporal models, so that there can be 
multiple paths starting from one state. The language introduces symbols A and 
E with meaning “for all paths”, “for some path” respectively.
D efinition  2.7 (CTL Language). The language of CTL in BNF is as follows:
ip ::= p | -up | <p A ip | AOip | AplA if \ EpU ip
where p is a propositional atom.
The abbreviations T, ± , V, —> and <-> are defined as usual. We can define the 
following abbreviations for more temporal modalities:
• E O tp '■'■= - iA O - 1
• E <fip ::= ETU ip;
• AD<p '■'■= - 'E ^ - i<p\
• A(}ip ::= A T U <p\
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Figure 2.5: A system of which the starting state satisfies A pU  ip
Definition 2.8 (CTL Semantics). Given a branching-time temporal model M , 
and a state s, we have:
M ,s  |= p 
M ,s  |= -><p 
M, s (= <p A ip 
M ,s\=  A O p  
M ,s \= ApUip
M , s  \= Ep U  ip
p G V(s)
not M ,s  \= p
M ,s  \= p  and M, s |= ip
for all s-computation A, M, A[l] f= p
for all s-computation A, 3j G N, M, A[7] [= ip and
VO < i <j,X[i] h  <P
for some s-computation A, 3j  G N, M, A[y] |= ip and 
VO <  i < j,X [ i} h  <P
Intuitively, A O p  is true in s if ip is true in the next state of all the paths 
starting from s; ApUip  is true in s if for all the paths starting from s, the formula 
pU  ip is true in s; similarly, E is for the existence of one path. We illustrate the 
idea for CTL formula ApU ip  with Figure 2.5.
Com plexity
The first algorithm for CTL model checking was presented by Clarke and Emerson 
[17] in 1986. Their algorithm was polynomial in both the size of the transition 
system and the length of the formula. A survey on model checking temporal logics 
including CTL can be found in [18, 16]. The complexity of the model checking
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problem in CTL is PTIME-Complete, and the complexity of the staisfibility 
problem in CTL is EXPTIME-Complete [18, 16].
2.1.5 A lternating-tim e Temporal Logic
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) was first proposed by R. Alur, T. Hen- 
zinger, and O. Kupferman [5, 6]. It generalises two varieties of temporal log­
ics: linear-time temporal logic, which assumes implicit universal quantification 
over all paths that are generated by system moves; and branching-time temporal 
logic, which allows explicit existential and universal quantification over all paths. 
ATL offers selective quantification over those paths that are possible outcomes 
of games, such as the game in which the system and the environment alternate 
moves.
In [33], V. Goranko and G. van Drimmelen gave a sound and complete ax- 
iomatisation of ATL, and shown that when considering formulas over a fixed finite 
set of players, the decidability problem is EXPTIM E-Complete. ATL in [6] is 
only for reasoning about complete information games, while in [85], W. van der 
Hoek and M. Wooldridge extended ATL with an epistemic component, which can 
deal with incomplete information games.
Language and  Sem antics
We introduce the language and semantics of the ATL in [6]. The key construct 
in ATL is ((C)) Tip, where C is a coalition, (a set of agents), and T p  a temporal 
formula, meaning “coalition C can act in such a way that T p  is guaranteed to 
be true” . Temporal formulas are built using the modalities O , □, and U , where 
O means “in the next state” , □  means “always” , and U means “until” .
D efin ition  2.9 (ATL Language). Given a set of agents Ag, and a set of atomic 
propositions $ , the language of ATL is given in BNF as follows:
p  p \ ^ p  \ p  Aip \ ((C))Op  | ((C))Op \ ((C))plhP
where p £ $  is a propositional variable and C C Ag is a set of agents.
ATL has a number of equivalent semantics; since moves, or actions, play such 
a prominent role in game playing, we use Action-based Alternating Transition 
Systems following [6].
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Definition 2.10 (ATL Model). An Action-based Alternating Transition System 
(A.ATS) is a tuple
*4= {Q, qo, Ag, Acu . . . ,  Acn,
where: Q is a finite, non-empty set of states; qo G Q is the initial state; Ag = 
{1 , . . . ,  n} is a finite, non-empty set of agents; Aci is a finite, non-empty set of 
actions, for each i G Ag, where Ac, fl Acj =  0 for all i ^  j  G Ag; p : Aca9 —> 2*3 
is an action precondition function, which for each action a G Ac^g defines the set 
of states p(a) from which a may be executed; r  : Ac\ x • • ■ x Acn x Q Q is a 
partial system transition function, which defines the state r(a, q) that would result 
by the performance of a from state q -  note that, as this function is partial, not 
all joint actions are possible in all states (see the precondition function above); $  
is a finite, non-empty set of atomic propositions; and tt : Q —> 2$ is a valuation 
function, which gives the set of atomic propositions satisfied in each state: if 
p G 7r(q), then this means that the propositional variable p is satisfied in state q.
It is required that AATSs satisfy the following coherence constraints: (Non­
triviality) agents always have at least one legal action -  Wq G <5, Vi G Ag,3a  G 
Aci s.t. q G p(a); and (Consistency) the p and r  functions agree on actions that 
may be performed: Vq, Va =  (alt ■ ■ ■ , an), (a, q) G dom r  iff Vi G Ag, q G p(a,).
Given an agent i G Ag and a state q G Q, we denote the options available 
to i in q -  the actions that i may perform in q -  by options(i, q) =  {a | a G 
Aci and q G p(a)}. For a coalition C, we define options(C, q) =  (J{options{i, q) \ 
i G C}. An action profile for a coalition C — {q, ■ • •, 4} Q Ag in state q is a 
tuple of actions (ac i,. . . ,  ack), where ac9 G options(ij, q) for each j  G [l..fc]. We 
then say that a strategy for an agent i G Ag is a function a, : Q —* Ac, which must 
satisfy the legality constraint that ofiq) G options(i, q) for all q G Q. A strategy 
profile for a coalition C =  { h , . . . ,  4} C Ag is a tuple of strategies (cy,. . . ,  afi), 
one for each agent i G C. We denote by Ec the set of all strategy profiles for 
coalition C C Ag\ if oc  G E c and i G C, then we denote i ’s component of ac  by 
olc . Given a strategy profile ac  6 E c and state q G Q, let out{ac, q) denote the 
set of possible states that may result by the members of the coalition C acting 
as defined by their components of ac  for one step from q:
out(ac, q) =  {<?' | r(a , q) =  q' where (a, q) G dom r  and alc (q) =  a* for i G C }
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Notice that the set out(aAg, q) is a singleton because we assume that when 
all agents choses their actions, a unique outcome is determined. Also, out(-,-) 
only deals with one-step successors, and we interchangeably write out(&c, q) and 
out(Acc, q), where Acc is an action profile of coalition C in state q. The idea is 
that for the one-step future, a strategy carries the same information as an action.
A q0-computation is an infinite sequence of states A =  qo, q i,__  Given u G N,
we use X[u] as the state indexed by u in the computation A.
Given a strategy profile <jc  for some coalition C, and a state q G Q, we define 
comp (ac, q) to be the set of possible runs that may occur if every agent i G C 
follows the corresponding strategy cr j , starting when the system is in state q G Q. 
That is, the set comp(crc, q) will contain all possible ^-computations that the 
coalition C can “enforce” by cooperating and following the strategies in oc-
comp(ac, q) = {A | A[0] =  q and Vu G N : A[u +  1] G out(ac, A[u])}.
Again, note that for any state q G Q and any grand coalition strategy a^g, the set 
comp(aAg, q) will be a singleton, consisting of exactly one infinite computation.
D efinition 2 . 1 1  (ATL Semantics). Given an AATS A  and a state q, we have,
A, q |= p iff p G 7T(q) (where p 6 $ j;
A, q |= -V iff A, q ^  <p;
A, q \= A ip iff A, q (= ip and A,q\=
A, q |= ((C)) Oip iff3crc G £ c , such that VA G comp(ac, q), we have A, A[l] |= p;
A,q  1= ((C))Ckp iffBac  € £ c , such that VA € comp(ac, q), we have A, A[u] |= <p 
for all u G N;
A,q\=  ((C))ipUip iffBoc  G such thatVX G comp(ac, q), there exists some 
u GN such that A, A[it] \= ip, and for all 0 < v < u, we have A, A[w] }= p .
The abbreviations T, _L,V,—> and <-> are defined as usual. And ((C))(ftp 
is defined as ((C))TU<p. For readability, we omit set brackets in cooperation 
modalities, for example writing ((1 )) instead of (({!}))•
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Complexity
The complexity of the model checking problem in ATL is PTIME-Complete [6], 
and the complexity of the satisfiability problem in ATL is EXPTIME-Complete 
[21, 97]. These results are based on the assumption that the game models are 
given explicitly as mathematical structures. The complexity might be different if 
the game models are represented differently. R. Alur [2] et al. developed a model 
checking tool called MOCHA to specify and verify multi-agent systems with ATL. 
In MOCHA, the game modes are represented in the form of reactive modules 
and such representation is much more compact than the explicit representation. 
In [80] W. van der Hoek et al. showed that the complexity of the model checking 
ATL with respect to reactive modules representation could be exponential in the 
size of the reactive modules and the length of the formula.
Alternating Bisimulation
We now give an equivalence relation between two AATSs, called Alternating 
Bisimulation. The purpose is to characterise the A ATS structures that can not 
be distinguished by ATL formulas. Here by ‘distinguish’, we mean there exists an 
ATL formula such that it is true in one structure but false in another structure. 
The following definition is based on [4].
Definition 2.12 (Alternating Bisimulation). Let A \ — (Qi, qi, Ag, Ac} ,. . . ,  Ac\, 
Pi,Ti,<f>,7Ti) and A 2 = (Q2,q2,A g ,A c } ,. . . ,A c l ,p 2,T2, $ , 7r2) be two A A T S ’s. 
Then a relation 1Z C Q1 x Q2 is called an alternating bisimulation ifH q\q2 and, 
for every two states t\ and ¿2 for which TZtit2,we have:
• Invariance: For all p G p G 7r(ii) iff p G 7r(i2) •
• Zig: For every coalition C C Ag, and every aclc  G options (C ,ti) , there 
exists ocq G options(C , tff) such that for every t̂  G out{ac2c , tff), there is a 
t[ G out(aclc , ti) so that 7Zt}^.
• Zag: For every coalition C C Ag, and every ac2c  G options(C ,^ ); there 
exists ac}; G options(C, t\) such that for every t[ G out(aCc, t\), there is a 
12 G out{ac2c , tff) so that 7Zt}^.
Note that the set of agents in both structures are the same, while the actions 
in both structures do not have to be the same, since in ATL, one cannot directly 
refer to actions in the object language. We have:
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T heorem  2 . 1  ([4]). Let A \ and A 2 be such that there is an alternating bisimu­
lation 7Z between them, with TZqiq2. Then, for all ATL formulas <p:
A i, q i\= V  A 2,q2 ^ (p
2.2 E pistem ic Logics
2.2.1 Introduction
Epistemic logic is a formalisation of knowledge. Its philosophical root can be 
dated back to Ancient Greece with epistemology. While philosophers since Aris­
totle have discussed Modal Logic, it was C.I. Lewis who introduced the first 
symbolic and systematic approach to the topic in 1912 (see [47]). Modal logic 
continued to mature as a field, reaching its modern form in 1963 with the work 
of S. Kripke [46]. Many papers were written in the 1950s on a logic of knowledge, 
but it was von Wright’s book An Essay in Modal Logic (1951) [96] that is seen 
as a founding document.
Hintikka’s Seminal work Knowledge and Belief [41] is the first book-length 
work to suggest using modalities to capture the semantics of knowledge. Since 
then, many philosophers have been interested in further developing the notions of 
knowledge and belief using possible world semantics, which is also called Kripke 
semantics, due to the contribution of S. Kripke [46].
In the late 1980s, there was a merge of temporal frameworks and epistemic 
frameworks [35, 23]. This development was originally motivated by the need to 
reason about communication protocols. One is typically interested in what dif­
ferent parties to a protocol know before, during and after a run (an execution 
sequence) of the protocol. It brought multi-agent systems into perspective, as 
different parties can be typically modeled as agents. This interest in change of 
knowledge over time is already eminent in this area for twenty years. Fagin, 
Halpern, Moses and Vardi’s seminal Reasoning about Knowledge [23] is a culmi­
nation of several earlier papers in this area, and also incorporates Halpern and 
Vardi’s 1986 paper [35] The Complexity of Reasoning about Knowledge and Time.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic studies what kinds of events are responsible for 
change of knowledge in a multi-agent setting. A quizmaster may publicly an­
nounce the winning lot, or whisper it in the ear of his assistant. Both result in 
a change of knowledge for everybody present, although the change is different in
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either case. Where belief revision [1] is interested in describing the effect of ex­
pansion, contraction and revision of a belief set of one agent, dynamic epistemic 
logic treats all of knowledge, higher-order knowledge, and its dynamics on the 
same level, and it gives a fine-tuned analysis of the way the revision is brought 
about, ranging from a private insight by one agent to a public announcement in 
a group.
Unlike temporal epistemic logics, where the meaning of a temporal shift only 
appears from the underlying model, in dynamic epistemic logic this change is 
specified ‘directly’ in the dynamic operators. Starting with a few somewhat iso­
lated contributions in the late 1980s [63, 76], the area strongly developed from the 
late 1990s onward [30, 10, 92]. A general theory only now and partially emerges. 
We will base our treatment of dynamic epistemic logic on [92].
In the following, we will first introduce epistemic logic with its most popular 
semantics: possible world semantics. Then we present two extensions of epistemic 
logic, namely temporal epistemic logic, which extends it with time; and dynamic 
epistemic logic, which extends it with actions, or events.
2.2.2 Basic Epistem ic Logic
Possible W orld M odel
The basic idea of possible world semantics is simple: apart from the current world, 
we could consider different possible worlds; if something is known, then it must 
be true in all the worlds that we consider possible. This can be illustrated by the 
following example.
Exam ple 2 .2 . Suppose that Alice’s forehead is painted with either a white or 
black dot. But she cannot see her forehead so she does not know which color it 
is; in other words, she considers both cases possible.
Here we give a formal definition.
Definition 2.13 (Possible World Model). Given a set of atomic propositions P 
and a set of n agents, a possible world model is a tuple ( W, R\, • ■ ■ , Rn, n), where 
W is a finite non-empty set of worlds (states), Ri is a binary relation, and n is a 
valuation function from W to p(P).
Possible World Models are also called Kripke Models. Let us go back to 
Example 2.2. In Figure 2.6 is a graphic representation of the Kripke model
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associated with this example. We have two possible worlds: one is indicated by a
black dot, the other by a white dot. The white-dot world is underlined, indicating 
the current world. Alice considers that the other world is also possible, indicated 
by the arrow from right to left. Of course, Alice also considers the current world 
possible, so there is a reflexive arrow on it. Moreover she could imagine that 
she could be in the other world, therefore we have a reflexive arrow on the 
black-dot world, and a left-to-right arrow as well. In other words, Alice could 
not distinguish these two worlds, which, as we call, are in a same equivalence 
class. Suppose, we have a proposition p that says “Alice has a white dot on the 
forehead” . It is easy to see that p is true in the white-dot world, and false in the 
black-dot world. Accordingly in Figure 2.6, the white-dot world is labelled with 
p indicating p is true in this world.
Language and  Sem antics
D efinition 2.14 (EL Language). Given a set of agents Ag, the language of Epis- 
temic Logic (EL) is as follows, in BNF,
where, i £ Ag, B C Ag.
Since we consider Multi-Agent Systems, we assume there are always two or 
more agents in Ag, i.e. \Ag\ >  2.
Figure 2.6: A Kripke model for Example 2.2
</?::= p I -up I ip A ip I Ki(p \ CBg>
D efinition  2.15 (EL Semantics). Given a Kripke model ( W, R\, ■ ■ ■ , Rn, n), and 
a possible world w, we have:
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M ,w  \= p 
M ,w \=  -><p 
M ,w  |= <p A ip 
M ,w  f= Ki<p 
M, w \= CbP
p € 7r(s)
not M ,w  \= <p
M ,w  [= p  and M, w (=
for all v € W such that wRiV, M, v (= p
for all v G W such that wR*Bv, M ,v  (= p
where R*B is the transitive and reflexive closure o f\J ieB Ri.
Similar to the relations in temporal models, the relation R in a Kripke model 
can also have more constraints. Here we mention three:
• Reflexivity: \/x(xRx);
• Symmetry: Vxy(xRy —> yRx);
• Transitivity: Vxyz(xRy A yRz —> xRz).
For any relation R, if reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity all hold, then we 
call R an S5 relation, or an equivalence relation. In the rest of this thesis, we 
give S5 relations a special symbol It will be specifically used in the models 
of knowledge.
Complexity
The complexity of the model checking problem in EL is PTIME-Complete and 
the complexity of the satisfiability problem in EL is EXPTIME-Complete [37].
2.2.3 Temporal Epistem ic Logic
The central notion in the work of Fagin et al. [23], is that of an interpreted system. 
When compared to Kripke (possible worlds) models, interpreted systems have at 
least two appealing features: a natural accessibility relation between domain 
objects, that can be summarised as ‘each agent knows its own state’, and an 
equally natural notion of dynamics, modelled by runs. The accessibility relation 
as we know it from the possible worlds model is in this case grounded; it has a 
direct and natural interpretation, as follows. In an interpreted system, the role of
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possible worlds is performed by global states, which are constituted by the agents’ 
local states and the state of the environment. Each agent knows exactly its own 
local state: two global states are indistinguishable for an agent if his local states 
are the same. Secondly, an interpreted system defines a number of runs through 
such global states (i.e. a sequence of global states). Each run corresponds to a 
possible computation allowed by a protocol. In an object language with temporal 
and epistemic operators one can then express temporal properties such as liveness 
(i.e. something will eventually happen), and temporal epistemic properties such 
as perfect recall (i.e. the agents remember what have happened).
The temporal epistemic logic proposed in [23] is based on linear-time struc­
tures. Rather than linear-time, one may consider branching time logic, and apart 
from synchrony (i.e. the agents know what the time is) and perfect recall, one 
may consider properties with or without assuming a unique initial state, and with 
or without the principle of no learning (i.e. the agent will not learn anything that 
will allow him to distinguish two states that he could not distinguish before). 
Varying only these parameters already yield 96 different logics: for a comprehen­
sive overview of the linear case we refer to [34], and for the branching time case, 
to [87]. Moreover, apart from the interpreted systems stance there have been 
several other and related approaches to knowledge and time, like the distributed 
processes approach of Parikh and Ramanujam [58].
In te rp re te d  System
We formally define an interpreted system I  for n agents.
D efin ition  2.16 (Interpreted System). A global state s is a tuple s — (se, S\ , . . . ,  sn 
where se is the state of the environment and where for i = 1 . . .  n, Si is the local 
state of agent i. The set of global states of interest will be denoted Q. A run 
over Q is a sequence of states, or, rather, a function r from time N to global 
states. The pair (r , m ) consisting of a run and a time point is also referred to as 
a point. Let r(m) = s be the global state at time m in run r, then with ri(m) 
we mean local state s*. An interpreted system 1  — (71, ir) over Q is a system 
TZ of runs over a set Q of global states with a valuation 7r which gives (r, m ) a 
subset of atoms in Q that are true in (r, m). Two points (r, m) and (r', m') are 
indistinguishable for i, written (r ,m ) (r ',m '), if r^m ) — r[(m').
With the definition of interpreted systems, we can formally define perfect recall 
and synchrony. Perfect recall means that if the agent considers run r' possible at
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the point (r, n), in that there is a point (r', n ') that the agent cannot distinguish 
from (r, n), then the agent must have considered r' possible at all times in the past 
(i.e., at all points (r, k ) with k < n). Synchrony means that if agent considers 
a point (r', n') possible at the point (r, n), then these two points must have the 
same clock value, i.e. n' — n.
Language and  Sem antics
D efinition 2.17 (TEL Language). Given a set of agents Ag, the language Tem­
poral Epistemic Logic TEL is as follows, in BNF,
p  ::= p | ->p | p  A ip | K p  \ CBp  | Ov? | pUip
where, i £ Ag, B  C Ag
We interpret the language of LTL over the synchronous interpreted systems, 
which are the interpreted systems satisfying synchrony property. The reason to 
use synchrony is that the interpreted systems we are going to use in the following 
chapters will be synchronous. Please refer to [23] for a more general semantics.
D efinition 2.18 (TEL Semantics over Synchronous Interpreted Systems ). Given 
a synchronous interpreted system 1 , a run r, and a time point m, we have:
(X, r, m) (= p 
(X, r, m) \= - v  
(X, r ,m )  |= p  A ip 
(X, r, m) f= Kip 
(X, r, m) f= CBp
(X, r, m) 1= O p  
(X, r, m) \= pU  ip
p € 7r(r(m))
not (X, r, m) |= p
(X, r ,m ) \= p  and (X, r, m) \= ip
for all runs r' such that r'(m) =  rj(m) : (X, r ', m) (= p  
for all runs r' such that there is a line of runs r°, r 1 ■ • • rk 
r° — r , r k — r',V j3i £ 5 (rf (m) =  rf+1 (m)) : (X, r1, m) \= p  
(X, r, to +  1) \= p
3to' > to : (X, r, to') [= ip and Vm < to" < to' : (X, r, to") f=
C om plexity
The complexity of model checking problem in TEL is PSPACE-Complete [95]. 
For more results on temporal epistemic model checking, refer to [84, 83, 48, 80].
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The complexity of satisfiability problem in TEL over the synchronous interpreted 
system is EXPTIME-Complete [35]. The complexity of satisfiability of several 
temporal epistemic logics allowing the combination of different properties such as 
synchrony, perfect recall, no learning etc are discussed in [35].
2.2.4 Dynam ic Epistem ic Logic
Our treatment of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is based on [92]. The main 
new features introduced, compared to epistemic logic, are in two aspects. The 
first is in syntax; it adds a new type of modality, called action modalities, which 
allows us to express properties with actions explicitly. The second relates to the 
semantics; it adds a new semantic structure called action models.
Language
D efinition  2.19 (DEL Language). The logical language £ del of Dynamic Epis­
temic Logic is inductively defined as
(p q \->ip \ (ip A tp) \ Ki<p \ CBp> | [M,w]<p
where q is a propositional atom, i is an agent, and B is a group of agents.
Sem antics
To capture a static view of a multi-agent system, we use state models. They are 
essentially possible world models. Here is the formal definition.
D efinition  2.20 (State Model). A state model M for n agents is a structure
( i, • • • , ~ n, tt)
where W is a finite non-empty set of states, is an equivalence relation on IV, 
and 7r is a valuation function from W to p(P).
The introduction of action models is based on this insight: just like agents 
have uncertainty about possible worlds, they can also have uncertainty about 
possible actions. Moreover, instead having valuation for worlds, we can have 
preconditions to actions, indicating the conditions that they could be executed.
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D efinition 2.21 (Action Model). An action model M for n agents is a structure
(W ,~ 1 , . . . ,~ „ ,p re )
where W is a finite non-empty set of action points, is an equivalence relation 
on W, and pre : W —> £ qel Is a precondition function that assigns a precondition 
pre(w) to each w G W.
Let MOD be the class of state models and ACT the class of £ del models. 
Then £oEi_-update is an operation of the following type:
(8> : MOD x ACT MOD.
The operation ® and the truth definition for C are defined by mutual recursion, 
as follows.
D efinition 2.22 (Update, Truth). Given a state model M and an action model 
M, we define
M  <g> M 
as




(w, w) (w',w ') G R' ::=
{(w,w) | w e  Wa/ , w G Wm,M  K , pre(w)}, 
km (w),
w w' G Rm , w ~ ì w' G Am,
and where the truth definition is given by:
M ,w  j= p 
M ,w  f= ->ip 
M ,w  \= ip A tp
p G VM(w)
not M ,w  (= (p
M ,w  |= (p and M ,w  ip
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M ,w  \= Kiip 
M ,w  f= Cb<P 
M, w |= [M, w]<p ::=
f o r  a ll w ' w ith  w  w ' M , w ' \= g>
f o r  a ll w 'w ith  w  ~*B w 1 M , w '  \= <p
M , w  |= pre(w) im p lie s  M  ® M, (w , w) f= ip
where is the reflexive and transitive closure o f{Ji€B .
P ub lic  A nnouncem ent Logic
A public announcement is an action which informs the whole group of agents 
with a public message. Public Announcement Logic (PAL) is an extension of 
standard multi-agent epistemic logic with dynamic modal operators to model 
the effects of public announcements. It was originally proposed by Plaza [63]. 
Plaza used a different notation, without dynamic modal operators, and did not 
incorporate common knowledge. Later milestones, with common knowledge and 
also involving further generalizations, are by Gerbrandy et al. [30] and Baltag et 
al. [10 ].
Here we treat PAL as a special case of DEL, since the public announcements 
can be modelled using action models. In the following, we give the language of 
PAL and its semantics.
D efinition 2.23 (PAL Language). The language of Public Announcement Logic 
is inductively defined as
p  q \ -up \ (ip A i p )  \ Ki<p \ CBip \ [<p]̂
where q is a propositional atom, i is an agent, and B is a group of agents.
Like the language of DEL, the language of PAL is also interpreted over state 
models. Moreover, a singleton action model with universal access for all agents 
represents a public announcement. To be more specific, an action model
(M0,w0) =  (({w0} ,~ i,- -  - ,~„,p re),w 0)
where {(w0,w0)} for 1 < * < n and pre(w0) =  <p, represents a public
announcement of <p. In DEL, formula [Mo,wo]'i/) stands for ‘after executing action 
(M0,w0) it holds that while in PAL, formula [M0,w0]^ stands for ‘after public
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announcement of p  it holds that ip\ We simplify the representation of [M0, w0}ip 
to
For the semantics, it basically follows from that of the DEL. We only mention 
the case with [p\ip.
M ,w  \= [p]^ ::= M, w f= p  implies M  ® M0, (w , w0) f= p
where (M0, w0) =  (({w0} ,~ i, ■ • • , pre), w0) with {(w0,w0)} for 1 <  i < n 
and pre(wo) =  P-
Complexity
As for as I know, the complexities of the model checking and satisifibility problems 
in DEL are still under investigation, but some concrete results in PAL have been 
made. In [50], C. Lutz showed that the complexity of the satisifibility problem 
in PAL is EXPTIM E-Complete.
2.3 Sum m ary
This chapter provided a logical background for the work that is going to be 
presented. It first introduces temporal logics from a single-agent perspective, 
and then from a multi-agent perspective. From the single-agent perspective, 
Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) and Computational Tree Logic (CTL) were 
introduced. From the multi-agent perspective, Alternating-time Temporal Logic 
(ATL) was introduced. It then turned to epistemic logics, which are the log­
ical frameworks of knowledge. Epistemic Logic (EL) was firstly introduced to 
deal with the agents’ knowledge and higher-order knowledge, including common 
knowledge. Two extensions of EL were then introduced. One is Temporal Epis­
temic Logic (TEL), which addresses the temporal changes of a system in addition 
to the agents’ knowledge. The other is Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), which 
also models the changes of a system but through actions. Chapter 3 and 4 will 
be related to ATL; Chapter 5 and 6 will be related to TEL and DEL.
Chapter 3
Bridging GDL and ATL
3.1 In troduction
Game playing competitions, particularly between humans and computers, have 
long been part of the culture of artificial intelligence. Indeed, the victory of Deep 
Blue over then world champion chess player Gary Kasparov in 1997 is regarded 
as one of the most significant events in the history of AI. However, a common 
objection to such specialised competitions and dedicated game playing systems 
is that they explore only one very narrow aspect of intelligence and rationality. 
To overcome these objections, in 2005 AAAI introduced a general game playing 
competition1, intended to test the ability to play games in general, rather than 
just the ability to play a specific game [61, 28]. Participants in the competition 
are computer programs, which are provided with the rules to previously unknown 
games during the competition itself; they are required to play these games, and 
the overall winner is the one that fared best overall. Note that the participant 
programs were required to interpret the rules of the games themselves, without 
human intervention or interpretation. The Game Description Language (GDL) is 
a special purpose, computer processable language, which was developed in order 
to define the games played by participant programs. Thus, a participant must be 
able to interpret game descriptions expressed in GDL, and then play the game 
autonomously.
Since GDL is a language for defining games, it seems very natural to investi­
gate the problem of reasoning about games defined in GDL. Just as the designer 
of a computer communications protocol might want to use model checking tools
1URL: http://games.stanford.edu
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to investigate the properties of the protocol (ensure it is deadlock-free, etc [18]), 
so the GDL game designer will typically want to investigate the properties of 
games. In addition to checking protocol-like properties such as deadlock-freeness, 
the fact that GDL is used for describing games suggests a whole new class of 
properties to check: those relating to the strategic properties of the game being 
defined, such as the properties showing whether a particular agent or a coalition 
of agents have a strategy to win.
One formalism for reasoning about games that has attracted much interest is 
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) (see Section 2.1.5). The basic construct 
of ATL is the cooperation modality, ((C))tp, where G is a collection of agents, 
meaning that coalition C can cooperate to achieve <p; more precisely, that C 
have a winning strategy for p. ATL has been widely applied to reasoning about 
game-like multi-agent systems in recent years, and has proved to be a powerful 
and expressive tool for this purpose [6, 32, 59, 60, 86, 81].
The aim of this chapter is to make a concrete link between ATL and GDL. 
Specifically, it shows that GDL descriptions can be interpreted as specifications 
of an ATL model, and that ATL can thus be interpreted over GDL descriptions.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce the Game 
Description Language, and the construction of game models from GDL descrip­
tions. In Section 3.3, we show it is possible to translate a propositional GDL 
description into an ATL formula that is equivalent up to alternating-bisimulation, 
and which is only polynomially larger than the original GDL description. As a 
corollary, we are able to characterise the complexity of ATL reasoning about 
propositional GDL games: the problem is E X P T I M E - C o m p l e t e .
3.2 G am e D escrip tion  Language and G am e M od­
els
GDL is a specialised language, intended2 for defining games [28]. A game de­
scription must define the states of the game, a unique initial state, and the players 
in the game (“roles” in GDL parlance). For every state and every player, the 
game description must define the moves (a.k.a. actions) available to that player 
in that state, as well as the state transition function of the game -  how moves
2Please note that GDL can also be used as a specification language for a large class of 
multi-agent environments (see [70]).
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01 (role xplayer) 54 (<- (legal ?v (mark ?x ?y))
02 (role oplayer) 55 (true (cell ?x ?y b))
03 (init (cell 1 1 b)) 56 (true (control ?w)))
57 (<- (legal oplayer noop)
11 (init (cell 3 3b)) 58 (true (control xplayer)))
12 (init (control xplayer))
13 (<- (next (cell ?m ?n x)) 61 (<- (goal xplayer 100)
14 (does xplayer (mark ?m ?n)) 62 (true (line x)))
15 (true (cell ?m ?n b)))
77 (<» terminal
28 (<« (next (control oplayer)) 78 (line x))
29 (true (control xplayer))) 79 (<* terminal
30 (<* (row ?m ?x) 80 (line o))
31 (true (cell ?m 1 ?x)) 81 (<* terminal
32 (true (cell ?m 2 ?x)) 82 (not open))
33 (true (cell ?m 3 ?x)))
Figure 3.1: A fragment of a game in the Game Description Language
transform the state of play. Finally, it must define what constitutes a win, and 
when a game is over. The approach adopted by GDL is to use a logical definition 
of the game. We introduce GDL by way of an example (Figure 3.1): a version 
of “Tic-Tac-Toe” . In this game, two players take turns to mark a 3 x 3 grid, 
and the player who succeeds in placing three of its marks in a row, column, or 
diagonal wins.
GDL uses a prefix rule notation based on LISP. The Tic-Tac-Toe game 
in Figure 3.1 consists of 82 lines. The first two lines, (ro le  xplayer) and 
(ro le  oplayer), define the two players in this game. The following in i t  lines 
(lines 03-12) define facts true in the initial state of the game (all the cells are 
blank, and xplayer has the control of the game). The following rule (line 13-15) 
defines the effect of making a move: if cell(m, n) is blank (c e ll  ?m ?n b), and 
xplayer marks it, then in the next state, it will be true that cell(m, n) is marked 
by x: (c e ll  ?m ?n x). The next rule (line 28-29) says that if the current state 
is under the control of xplayer, then the next state will be under the control of 
oplayer. Lines 30-33 define what it means to have a row of symbols (we omit a 
number of related rules). The leg a l rule (line 54-56) defines when it is leg a l for 
a player ?w to perform a mark action. The goal rule (line 61-62) defines the aim 
of the game: it says that the xplayer will get a reward of 100 if it brings about 
a line marked by x. The final, term inal rules (line 77-82) define when the game 
has ended.
Overall, a GDL description consists of a list of such rules, and the semantics 
of these rules are similar to logic programming languages. Certain operators in 
a GDL description have a special meaning: ro le  (used to define the players
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of the game); i n i t  (defining initial facts); le g a l (defining pre-conditions for 
actions); and goal (defining rewards for agents). An additional operator, tru e , 
is sometimes used, to make explicit that a particular expression should be true 
in the current state of the game.
While GDL in [28] permits predicates such as (c e ll  ?m ?n b), we simplify this 
by allowing only nullary predicates, i.e. propositions. We can do this via instan­
tiation of the predicates, i.e. replacing variables with their values. For example, 
variables like ?m, ?n are replaced by elements in their domain {1,2,3}. Thus 
(c e ll ?m ?n b) is instantiated as (c e ll 1 1 b), (c e ll  12  b), ■ • •, (c e ll  3 3 b). 
It is easy to see that the rule in (line 13-15) is replaced by 9 rules with no 
predicates, and in general, there will inevitably be an undesirable blow-up in the 
number of rules when translating from arbitrary predicate form; nevertheless, the 
translation is possible, a point that is implicitly used in what follows. We refer 
to (c e ll 1 1 b) as a nullary predicate, or an atomic proposition. We will refer to 
our fragment of GDL as propositional GDL in the remainder of this thesis.
In what follows, we will formally define the interpretation of GDL descrip­
tions with respect to game models. As GDL is based on Datalog, a logical 
programming language, we begin by introducing Datalog.
3.2.1 D atalog Programs
Datalog is a query and rule language for deductive databases that, syntactically, 
is a subset of P rolog [19]. GDL uses Datalog as a basis to specify game rules. 
As we mentioned above, we deal with propositional GDL. Accordingly we only 
introduce the propositional fragment of Datalog. We will give the syntax and 
semantics of Datalog rules, and then illustrate how to build a game model from 
a GDL description, based on the Datalog semantics.
Definition 3.1 (Datalog: Language, Rules and Programs). The basic unit of 
the Datalog Language consists of a set of atomic propositions II =  {p, q ,. . .} .  
Let £(II) be the set of literals over II: I(Jl) =  II U {->p | p G II}.
A Datalog rule is of the form  (<i= p ,£ i,. . .  ,£n) where p G II and £* £ 
£{Il) (i < n). I f the displayed rule is called r, we call p its head (p =  hd(r)) and 
the body of r, bd(r), is the set { t \ , . . .  ,£n}- Note that a body can be empty.
A Datalog Program is a set of Datalog rules.
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D efinition 3.2 (Dependency Graphs for DATALOG Programs). Let a Datalog 
program A  be given. Its Dependency Graph T>Q{A) is a labelled directed graph 
(II, lab+, lab~), where
• II ¿5 the set of atoms in A; Each atom serves as a node in the graph.
• lab+(p, h) (i.e. an edge from p to h labelled with +) iff there is a rule r  G A 
with h = hd{r) and p G bd{r).
• lab~(p, h) iff there is a rule r G A with h = hd(r) and ->p G bd(r).
A model for a DATALOG program is a set of atomic propositions.
D efinition 3.3 (Models for Datalog Programs). Given a Datalog program 
A, E C II is a model of A  if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
• ff  (<= P) G A, then p G E;
• if («4= p, bd) G A and pos(bd) C E and neg(bd) fl E =  0, then p G E, where 
pos(bd) is the set of positive literals in bd and neg(bd) is the set of negative 
literals.
Notice that there can be several models for a given Datalog program. For 
example, the program {(<*= p,q),(<= q,~<p)} has two models: {p} and {p, q}. 
But for some DATALOG programs, there is a unique model.
D efinition 3.4 (Stratified and Acyclic Datalog Programs). A Datalog pro­
gram A  is called stratified if its dependency graph VQ(A) contains no cycles with 
a ” label. An atom p is said to be in stratum i G N if the maximum number 
of edges labelled on any path ending at p G VQ{A) is i. A rule r G A is 
of stratum i if hd(r) is in stratum i. A Datalog program A  is called acyclic if 
VQ(A) contains no cycles.
D efinition 3.5 (Datalog Semantics). Given a stratified Datalog program A, 
we define its model s = DPMod(A) as follows. First of all, let to = {p \ (•<= 
p) G A}. Suppose ti is defined, initialise ŝ  to t, and, as long as there is a rule 
(<= p , i i , . . . ,  i n) in stratum i such that ŝ  \= i\  A • • • AI n, add p to Si. After this, 
put ti+i = Si. I f the maximum stratum of A  is k, put s = 4+ 1 -
Stratification guarantees that, when computing a model for A, whenever we 
have a literal ->q in the body of a rule r, we will consider all rules r' with hd(r') =
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q before considering r. A is acyclic iff there is a level mapping /  : ¿(11) —► N for 
which f(p ) = f(->p) and for every rule (<S= p,£x, . . .  ,£n) in A, f(p ) > /(¿¿), for 
all i < n.
T heorem  3.1 ([8]). The model s defined in Definition 3.5 is a unique model for 
A, and it does not depend on the particular stratification.
D efinition 3.6 (Completion of A). Given an acyclic DATALOG program A , the 
completion of A  is a set of formulas CP( A) as follows. Let the definition D{A, p) 
of p be the set of rules r in A  for which hd(r) = p. Then let
cp(p) =  (p «-» V  / \  M (r))
r£l>(A,p)
where bd{r) — {£\, • • • ,£n} and / \  bd(r) = £\ A • • • A £n; for every empty body 
bd(r), f\bd(r) — T. Note that, if p does not occur as a head in any rule in 
A, we have cp(p) =  ->p. Finally, the Clark completion CP(A) of a Datalog 
program A  over II is simply {cp(p) \ p € II}.
Theorem  3.2. Let A  be an acyclic program, and II be the set of atoms in A. 
For all p € II, we have
p e  DPMod(A) iff CP(A)\=clp,
where DPMod(A) is the unique model of the stratified program A , and the set 
CP(A) is the Clark completion of A  and (=c; denotes consequence in classical 
logic.
3.2.2 GDL Game Descriptions
We now formally define GDL game descriptions.
D efinition 3.7 (GDL Syntax). Let a primitive set of proposition symbols Prim — 
{p, q- • •}, a set of agents Ag, a set of actions Ac, a set of strings S, and a set of 
integers [0..100] be given. The set of atomic propositions of GDL, AtQDL, is the 
minimal set satisfying the following conditions: Prim C AtcDL/ a special atom 
term inal € Atom.,' for two strings S !,s2 € S, (d is t in c t  S! s2) € AtcDLi for 
every agent i  € Ag and action a e Ac, (leg a l i  a) G AtcDL/ for every agent i  
and an v integer in [0..100]), (goal i  v) € AtcDL-
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The set of atomic expressions AtExprGDL of GDL, is the minimal set satis­
fying the following conditions:
• for p € A t GDL, {p, ( in it  p), (next p), (true p) } C AtExprGDL;
• for every agent i  and action a, { (role i) , (does i  a)} C AtExprGDL.
LitAtGDL is {p, (true p), (not p),(not (true p)) | p € AtGDL}. LitExprGDL is 
AtExprGDL U LitAtGDL.
A game description specifies the atoms from AtGDL that are true, either in 
the initial state, or as a result of global constraints, or as the effect of performing 
some joint actions in a given state.
D efinition 3.8 (GDL Game Descriptions). A GDL game descriptionT is a set 
of DATALOG rules r of the form  3 (<= (h )(ei). . .  (em)) where h, the head hd(r) of 
the rule, is an element of AtExprGDL and each ej (i € [1 ..m\) in the body bd(r) of 
r is a literal expression from LitExprGDL. I f m = 0, we say that r has an empty 
body. We can split every game description T into four different types of rules 
where:
• rrole contains all claims of the form (<= (role x)). They specify the agents 
in the game.
• Tinit is a set of initial rules of the form (<= ( in it  p)), which has an empty 
body and its head represent an initial constraints of the game.
• rglob is a set of global rules of the form (<= (p) (ei) . . .  (em)), where 
P € AtGDL CLnd each body e* (i € [1.,m\) is from  LitAtGDL-
• Tnext is a set of next rules of the form (<= (next p )(e i) . . .  (em)) where each 
ei(i E [l..m]) is from LitAtGDL or of the form  (does i  a).
3.2.3 GDL Game M odels
Given a GDL game description, we specify how to compute the corresponding 
game model. In general, a game model can be seen as a game tree, where a set of 
nodes represent states of the game, and a labelled edge from one state to another
3We do not allow disjunction in the body of a GDL rule as in [28]. A rule like (<t= (h)(ei Ve2 )) 
can be replaced by its equivalence, two rules (<= (h)(ei)) and (-*= (h)(e2 )).
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represents a transition from one state to another caused by the performance of 
actions/moves by players.
We will shortly consider how to compute such game states from game descrip­
tions.
For the description of Game Models G, our approach is equivalent to that of
[28]. Instead of roles we will refer to a set Ag =  { 1 ,... ,  n} of agents or players. 
Given the set of atomic propositions AtoDL, a Game Model is a structure:
G =  (S, s0, Ag, Ac1} ■■■ , Acn,r , 7r)
where S  is a set of game states; So G S  is the initial state of G] Ag denotes the 
set of agents, or players in the game; Aci is the set of possible actions or moves 
for agent r  : Ac\ x • • • x Acn x S —> S  is such that r ( ( a i , . . . ,  an), s) = u , 
means that if in game state s, agent i chooses action a,, (i < n), the system will 
change to its successor state u -  we require all states, except the initial state, 
have only one predecessor; and finally, 7r : S —> 2At(3DL is a valuation function, 
which associates with each state the set of atomic propositions in AtQDL that are 
true in that state. We will often abbreviate an action profile (a i , . . . ,  an) to a. 
(Note that we do not include the subset T C S  included in the game models of 
[28]. This subset is supposed to denote the terminal states: we can obtain this 
set in G by simply collecting all the states that satisfy term inal.)
Now we specify when a game model G is a model for a game description T; 
this makes precise the informal description of [28], and in fact represents a formal 
semantics for GDL.
We compute the game model GMod(T) for a game description T as follows. 
The main idea is that every state s € S  of GMod(T) is associated with the 
unique model under the stratified semantics of some DATALOG Program A that is 
derived from T. In particular, let 6(Tglob) be derived from r giob by replacing every 
occurrence of tru e  p by p. Since we assume that A does not contain i n i t  or next 
in any body of any rule, ¿(Pgiob) is indeed a Datalog Program. Also, let ¿(Tinit) 
be {<̂ = p | (<= i n i t  p) 6 Tinit}- The set Ag of agents, and Ac, of actions for agent 
i in GMod(T) are immediately read off from T: Ag — {i \ (<= (ro le  i)) S r roie} 
and Act — {a | ( leg a l i  a) occurs in T}.
In the following, we construct S, r , and 7r step by step.
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• First, we define the initial state s0. Put
7r(s0) =  DPMod(6(Tinit) (J 6(rglo*))
• Next, suppose a game state s E S  has already been defined. If this is not 
a terminal state, i.e. te rm inal ^  7r(s), each agent should have at least one 
legal action available. An action a, is legal for agent i in state s, if and only 
if ( leg a l i a±) E 7r(s). If te rm inal ^  7r(s), we define, for every profile of 
legal actions (a\, • ■ • , an), a successor u of s by first computing the atoms 
that need to be true due to r next.
F r((a i,. . . ,  an), s) — {<= p | 3 («i= (next p) (ei) ■ • • (em)) € r next&
7r(s) U {(does i  a j  | i E Ag} |=ci ei A • • • A em}
So, Fr((a i,. . . ,  an), s) computes those atoms that need to be true in the 
next state (the F  is for ‘forward’), given that each agent 1 performs a 
Now we add:
u =  r ( ( a i , . . . ,  an), s) & tt(u) =  DPMod(Fr ((a i,. . . ,  an), s) U i ( r glob))
• Iteration: we repeat the above procedure to all the descendants of the initial 
state, until we reach all the terminal states.
Note that atoms of the form (does i  a*) are not added to the game model 
GMod(r ) ,  as they are only used to calculate different successors for a given game 
state s. So, they incorporate a kind of hypothetical reasoning of the form: “sup­
pose player i were to do a», what would be the resulting next state?”
We illustrate the above procedure partially by the following example related 
to Tic-Tac-Toe.
E xam ple 3.1. Suppose that we already have a propositional version of the GDL 
description presented in figure 3.1, i.e. all the variables have been instantiated. As 
(co n tro l xplayer) € <5( r init), we use r glob and get (leg a l xplayer (mark 1 1 )) 
E 7r(so), and (lega l oplayer noop) 6 7r(so)- We also see that te rm inal ^  7r(so), 
because the bodies of all the global rules with head te rm ina l cannot be satisfied. 
Thus we have an action profile a =  (mark 1 l,noop). It is easy to verify that 
(c e ll  1 1 x) and (con tro l oplayer) E Fr{d,So), due to the next rules.
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We can now compute a game model from a GDL game description. Next we 
give meanings to the literal atomic propositions in LitAtGDL and the GDL rules 
with respect to such game models.
Definition 3.9 (GDL Semantics). Let G = (S, So, Ag, Aci, ■ ■ ■ ,Acn,T,n) be a 
game model derived from a game description T. Let {¿i,. . . ,  4} =  Ag' be a set 
of agents C Ag, each ix with an action ax (x < k). Then we say that t is an 
ix : al t . . . ,  ik : ak successor of s if there is a choice for any agent j  in Ag \  Ag' 
for an action bj from Acj such that r ( ( c i , . . . ,  cn), s) = t, where cv = ax if 
v — ix E Ag1, and cv — bj if v — j  E Ag \  Ag'. For any state s E S, p € AtQDLj 
we have:
• G,s [=gdl P Iff P € n(s);
• G,s |=Gdl not p iff G ,s ¡£Gdl p;
• G, s =̂gdl tru e  p iff G ,s  |=Gdl P/
• G, s 1=gdl not (tru e  p) iff G, s =̂gdl tru e  p; 
and, for any rules in Tinit U r giob U r next, we have,
• G |=gdl (<= ( in i t  p)) iff G, s0 Hgdl P;
• G Hgdl (<= (p) (ej) — (em)) iff Vs : (Vt E [1 ..to] : G ,s  1=Gdl e<) => 
G, s Hgdl p ;
• G (=gdl («= (next p )(e i) . . .  (eTO)(does U a j  . . .  (does i k ak)) iff Vs, t :
(Vi E [l..m] : G, s [=gdl and t is an ii : ai, . . .  4  : successor of s)
=> G, t [=GDL P-
Note that we do not interpret the rules in r role as the agents are already fixed 
with the game model.
3.3 Linking G DL and ATL
Prom previous sections, we can see that GDL and ATL are intimately related 
at the semantic level: GDL is a language for defining games, while ATL gives 
a language for expressing properties of such games. The difference between the 
two languages is that GDL takes a relatively constructive, internal approach to



















Figure 3.2: The relation between a GDL description of a game Fgdl and its 
related ATL-theory r atl ■
a game description, essentially defining how states of the game are constructed 
and related by possible moves. In contrast, ATL takes an external, strategic view: 
while it seems an appropriate language with which to express potential strategic 
properties of games, it is perhaps not very appropriate for defining games.
In this section, we answer the following question: how complex is it to interpret 
a property, represented by an ATL formula, over a game represented by a GDL 
description? We do this by building two links between GDL and ATL:
• On the semantic level, every GDL description T has an ATL model associ­
ated with it.
• On the syntactic level, every GDL description T has an ATL theory associ­
ated with it.
Let us now be more precise about the links between GDL and ATL (see 
Figure 3.2). We start from any game G with GDL description Tgdl- On the 
semantic level, we use stratified semantics and the tree representation of [28] to 
construct a unique model Gr from Tcdl- This model has a natural associated 
ATL-model A t =  ^¡em(Gr). In Section 3.3.1, we will show Tsem. On the syntactic 
level, we provide a translation Tsyn that transforms the GDL specification Tgdl 
into an ATL theory Tatl =  ^¡^ (T gdl)- In Section 3.3.2, we will describe our 
tool that implements Tsyn. We further show that this transformation is correct, 
in the following sense: all ATL-models satisfying TAtl are bisimilar to A t- So 
FAtl can be said to characterise the ATL-theory of the game G. And, one has, for 
any GDL-formula 7 , that Gr |=gdl 7 iff ^¡em(G'r) |=atl Tsyn(7 ), where [=gdl 
denotes the semantics of GDL and |=atl denotes the semantics of ATL.
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We now explore these two links in more detail.
3.3.1 Tsem: From GDL Game M odels to  ATL Game M od­
els
Suppose that we have already constructed a game model G from a GDL descrip­
tion T, using the methods in Section 3.2.3. It is not yet possible to interpret an 
ATL formula on this model G. In this section, we transform G into an A ATS, 
the ATL game structure on which we can interpret ATL formulas.
Given a GDL game model G =  (S, So, Ag, Aci, ■ ■ ■ ,Acn,T,Tr) and a set of 
atomic propositions AtcDL, we can define an associated A ATS, A g = {Q, qo, Ag, 
ACi U {fini} ,. . . ,  Acn U {finn},p, r ',  $ , id), with the same sets of agents Ag such 
that $  is constructed from AtQDL in the following manner.
D efinition 3.10 (Translation t and tQid). Define a translation t : AtcDL —♦ AtATL, 
where we associate every atom in Atom, with an atom in AtATL-
¿(p) ::= p ¿(goal i  v) ::= goal(i,v)
¿(legal i  a) ::= legal(i, a) ¿(term inal) ::= terminal
¿ (d is tin c t Si s2) ::= distinct(sj, s#)
Let t0id be as follows: tM (p) ::= p0id-
We add four types of atomic propositions to $.
i. atoms representing the current state of the game: for every p in AtcDL, add 
¿(p) to <f>.
ii. atoms representing the previous state of the game: for every p in AtcDL, 
add t0id(p) to <f>.
iii. atoms representing actions that are done in the transition from previous 
state to current state: add atom done(i, a) to <f> for each (does i  a).
iv. atoms distinguishing the initial and end states of the game: add init for 
initial state and a special atom zj_. It denotes a special ‘zink state’, z, which 
we add to A g in order to make it a proper A ATS. The idea is that z is 
the only successor of every terminal state and itself. ;
The other elements of A g are:
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• Q = S  U {z}, where z is a zink state, and g0 — s0;
• p : Aca9 —* 2^ is the action precondition function, which agrees, for each 
agent, with legal(i, af), i.e., p(af) — {q | q |= atl legal(i, af) A  ^terminal, q G 
Q}. Moreover, pifini) =  {z} U {q \ q |=atl terminal, q G Q}, for every 
agent i.
• r ' : Ac\ x • • • x Acn x Q —> Q is based on r . We keep all the mappings in 
r  and add these: r '((fin i,. . .  ,finn), q) =  z, for all q € {z} U {q \ q |= atl 
terminal, q & Q}',
• 7r' : Q —> 2i> is such that 7r'(g) is the minimal set satisfying the following 
conditions:
-  init € 7r(g0) , and Zj_ € 7t(jz) ,
-  Tr'(q) D (i(p) | p G Tr(q)} for all q G Q \  {z},
-  Vg, q' G Q \  {z} and an action profile a = (ai,- • • , an) such that 
q' =  r'(a, q), we require Vi G Ag, done(i, af) G tt\ q'), and {t(p)old | 
p G 7r(g)} C Tr'(q'). Moreover Vi G Ag, done(i,fini) G 7r'(z).
Our intuition behind n' is that each state, except go and z, has exactly one 
done-proposition for each agent to record the action made in its unique predeces­
sor, and a set of p0u to record the atomic propositions that is true in that same 
predecessor.
Given a game description T, we have two game models G and A g- To show 
that they correspond in all the games rules in T, we first define a translation from 
GDL rules to ATL formulas.
D efinition 3.11 (Translation from GDL rules to ATL formulas). Let T be a GDL
game description. A translation from any GDL rules in r init U rglob U Tnext to 
ATL formulas 7Z : GDL —► ATL is defined as follows:
• IZ(<= ( in i t  p)) ::= init —> t(p)
• K(<= (p)(ei) • • • (eTO)) ::= (())D(-'Zj. A f t(e i)  A • • • A K(em) -> t(p))
• 71(4= (next p)(ei) . . .  (em)(does a t ) . . .  (does i k ak)) ::= (())D(-.zi A
7Z(ei)A- ■ -A7l(em) -* (({iu . . .  ik})) O (t(p)Adone(iu a^A-■ -Adone(ik, ak)))
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w h e r e  t  : AtcDL ► Aîatl i s  a s  in  D e f i n i t i o n  3 .1 0 ,  a n d  f o r  a  GDL e x p r e s s i o n  
&i, w e  s t i p u l a t e :  7Z ( e i )  t ( p) i/ e* =  p o r  true p, a n d  T Z (e i)  ::= ->i(p) i f
ej =  not p o r  not (true p).
Now we are ready to show that two game models G  and A g  of game descrip­
tion T do correspond in all the games rules in T.
Theorem 3.3. L e t  V  he a  GDL g a m e  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  G  — G M o d ( T )  be i t s  g a m e  
m o d e l ,  a n d  A g  he th e  a s s o c i a t e d  AATS s t r u c tu r e .  F o r  e a c h  r u le  r  6 r init U 
r giob U T next , eac/i s  € S  a n d  a l l e 6 AtExprGDL, w e  h a v e
G ,  s  1=gdl e iff A g , s |=atl Æ(e) a n d  G  [=gdl r  iff A G (=atl T l { r )
P ro o f . Let a game description F, its game model G  — (S , So, A g ,  A c \ ,  • • • , A c n , r, 7r), 
and its associated AATS, A g  =  { Q , So, A g ,  A c i L i { f i n i } , . . . ,  A c nU { f i n n } ,  p ,  t ', $ , n')  
be given.
Step 1: to show G ,  s  [=gdl e iff A g , s [=atl 7£(e), we just need to show 
it holds for four different cases, namely e = p , tru e  p , not p , or not (tru e  p). 
Here we only show the last case e =  not (true  p), as other cases are very similar.
By GDL semantics (Definition 3.9), G ,  s  (=gdl not (true p) iff G ,  s  =̂gdl P- 
And by the semantic translation T sem, G ,  s  =̂gdl P iff A g , s ^ atl P- Then by 
T l, A g , s ^ atl P  iff A g , s Hatl H ( n o t  (true  p)).
Step 2: to show G  =̂gdl t  iff A g (=atl 72.(r), we show it is the case for three 
type of rules in r init U r giob U r next.
• Case: r  =  (4 =  ( in i t  p)).
We have G  [=gdl (•$= ( in it  p)) iff G ,  s0 (=gdl P iff A g , s0 |=atl P ■ Since 
init is only true in So of A g, we have A g, «o |=atl p  iff Vs 6  Q ( A g , s (=atl 
init —> p )  iff A g (=atl init —> p  iff A g [=atl 7£(r).
• Case: r =  (<=  (p)(ei). . .  (em)).
We have,
G  (=gdl r  
iff
Vs € 5 (Vi e  [l..m](G, s (=gdl e») => G , s  [=gdl p) 
iff
Vs € S'(Vi 6 [1..to](Ag, S [=atl ft(et)) =*• AG, s (=Atl p )  
iff b y Q ^ S ' U l z }  and the fact that z±  is only true in 2
by GDL Semantics 
by Step 1
3.3. LINKING GDL AND ATL 61
Vs G Q ( A g , s |= atl K ( e i )  A • • • A 1 Z (e m ) A =>• .4 g > s  |= atl P 
iff
Vs G <5M g, s |= atl ^ ( e i )  A • • • A H (e ra) A ->z± -► p) 
iff
|= atl « » □ (^ (e i) A • • • A TZ(em ) A -izx -> p) 
iff
A g Hatl 7?.(0-
Case: r =  (<= (next p )(e i ) . . .  (em)(does a t) . . .  (does i k ak)).
We have,
G  f=GDL r
iff by GDL Semantics
Vs, t  G S (Vi G [l..m](G, s H=gdl e¿) and t  is an ii : a i , . . .  i* : ak successor of
S =¿* G, t  [=GDL P)
iff by Step 1
Vs, t  G 5 (Vi G [l..m](.4G, s [=atl ^ ( e¿)) and t  is an ii : al t . . .  ik : ak 
successor of s =ï A g , t  (=atl Æ-(p))
iff by the construction procedure of A g
Vs, t  G S'(Vi G [1 ..m\(AG, s |=atl 7£(e¿)) and t is an ix : . . .  ik : ak
successor of s =t- A g , t  |=atl t(p) A d o n e ( i i , ai) A • • ■ A d o n e ( i k , ak)). 
iff
Vs G 5 (Vi G [l..m](.ÄG, s |=atl fc(e¿)) =>■ -4 g , s (=Atl (({ii, • • • *fc}))0(í(p)A
d o n e ( i i ,  ai) A ■ • • A d o n e ( i k , a k ) ) )
iff
Vs G S (A g, s (=atl ^ (e i)A - • -AU{em)) -* «{ ii , . . .  4}))0(i(p)A done(ii, ai)A 
• • ■ A done(ik, ak))
iff b y Q  =  i!?U{z} and the fact that zx is only true in z
Vs G <2(-4g; s (=atl A 72.(ei) A • • • A TZ(em)) —> (({ii,. . .  i*}))0(i(p) A 
d o n e ( i i ,  ai) A • • • A d o n e ( i k , a k)) 
iff
-4 G (=atl (())□(“ ' a
^(e^A- • -A T Z (em ) -> «{ i i , . . .  ifc})) O (i(p)Adone(ii, a^A- • -Ad o n e ( i k , a k) ) )  
iff
-̂ •G 1=ATL 7?-( 0 ‘
□
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3.3.2 Tsyn: From GDL Descriptions to  ATL Theories
Now we turn to the syntactic level of the correspondence. Given a GDL de­
scription T, we translate it into an ATL-theory Tatl which characterises the same 
game. Here by ’same game’ we mean this. From the description T, we can derive 
a game model GMod(T), and hence a unique A ATS A gm0<i{ r)- And for TatL) 
there might be several AATSs that satisfy it. They all amount to the same in 
the sense that there is no ATL formulas that can distinguish these AATSs and 
A.GMod(T)- We will prove this formally later by showing that there is an alternating 
bisimulation between them.
Given T, we define the ATL theory Tatl as a conjunction of ATL formulas:
rATL = INIT A MEM A ONEJDONE A LEGAL A STRAT A TERM
First INIT is to characterise the initial state. Next, MEM is to remember the 
previous state; ONEJDONE and LEGAL are to make sure that for each non­
terminal state, there is a legal action selected by each agent. Combined with 
MEM, ONEJDONE and LEGAL, STRAT is to compute the current state 
given the old state and the actions have been made. Finally, TERM ensures all 
terminal states will go to the the special state 2 .
A state corresponds to a set of atoms which are true in that state. These 
formulas force atoms to satisfy the wanted constraints among the states. Here 
by ‘force’, we mean the following. Suppose we want to make an atom true, say 
p, in the initial state qo, and false in all subsequent states i.e. in Q \  {c?o} - This 
can be expressed as a constraint among states CONS(p) ::= qo G it(p) A \/ql G 
Q(<li 7̂  Qo & 7r(p )). We can use the formula ip(p) p A (()) O  (())IIHp to 
force a class of AATSs to satisfy the constraint CON(p). More precisely, it is 
the collection of AATSs A  that satisfy the following equivalence:
A, qo H atl <p{p) iff CONS(p) holds for A.
We now explain Tatl with more details. Let So = RPMod((i(rinit)U(j(rglob)), 
which gives the minimal set of atomic consequences (using the global rules) of all 
( in i t  p) expressions. We want an ATL formula that characterises the full initial 
state. Consider:
INIT = init A (()) O  (())□ ~>init A PSo A ->poUi A Ndone A ->z±
Po id € A tATL
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where
Pso = / \ p A  / \  -ip,
p€5o p̂ So
and
Ndone = f \  A  ~1done(i, a).
i€Ag a€AciU{fini}
This ensures that the special atom init is true in the initial state, and is false 
everywhere else, and that the truth values of the other atoms in the initial state 
of GMod(T) are reflected properly. It also ensures that all the old— and done— 
propositions are false, since there is no previous state, and this is not a z state.
The intended use of an atom p0id is that it records the old, i.e. previous, truth- 
value of p. This is captured by the principle M EM :
M E M  =  (())□ A  ((¿(p) a terminal —> (())O t(p)0/d)A
peAtGDL
(-d(p) A -Iterminal —*■ (())O-d(p)oid))
The following constraint makes sure that for all non-initial states, one action 
is done by each agent:
ONE-DONE =  (())D(->*mi —► X O R aeAciU{fim}done(i,a))
ieAg
where XOR is the exclusive OR operator, a Boolean operator that returns a value 
of TRUE only if just one of its operands is TRUE.
One assumption for playing GDL games is that each agent must play legal 
moves. This is captured by the following principal:
LEG A L =  (()>□ A  A  (legal(i, Oi)A-iterminal <-»• ((X)) O done(i, Oj))
i€Ag,Oi£Aci X={i},Ag
This principle says that, when an action a* is legal for agent i, and the current 
state is not a terminal state, then agent i should have a strategy to enforce it, 
and vice versa.
Let òdi, ÒCÌ2, ••• be variables over possible bodies of rules, that is, sets of liter­
als, but not including any (does i  a). We assume that atoms like (does i  a) only 
occur in rules which have a head of the form next p. This is their intended use:
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to enable players to compute the next state, given the moves of all players. Let 
P £ AtQDL- Now suppose that all the rules r in T with hd(r) € {(p), (next p)} 
are the following:
n  : •$= (P) bdx
4= (P)
rh ■ <= (P) bdh
Si : (next p) bd[ (does i u au ) .... (does m̂i )
Sfc : <= (next p) K (does i kl akl) ... . (does imk -̂nik)
We map all these rules for p to an ATL formula <p(p). For this, we first translate 
the symbols from GDL to those of ATL using the functions t and taid defined in 
Definition 3.10. For convenience, we denote t(bdi) as the translation of all the 
expressions in bdi by f, and similar for t0id{bdj). For each atom p G AtoDL, we 
can now define an ATL constraint MIN(p), as follows:
MIN(p) =  t(p)
(Vi<ft ¿(H) v y ^ k(told(bd') A done{ih ,ah ) A • • • A done{ijm, aJm)))
And if p does not occur in a head of any rule in T, we define MIN{p) =  ->p.
The semantics of stratified program T is now captured by the following con­
straint:
STR A T =  (())□ / \  (-iinit A ->z± -> MIN(p))
pCAtQDL
When a terminal state is reached, no further ‘real’ moves are played by agents, 
i.e. they always play the fin, actions:
T E R M  =  (())□ yy (terminal V z±) <-» (0 )0  («j. A done(i, firii)))
ieAg
In section 3.3.1, we have shown that we can conceive a GDL game model as an 
AATS. The following is essentially a soundness result for our transformation. 
Let T be a game description, and G = GMod(T) be its game model with initial 
state So! -Ag is the corresponding AATS. We have:
■A-g, «0 ( = a t l  T a t l
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In the following, we add a requirement resulting in uniform AATS structures:
(uni) Vs 6 QVC C AgVacVs', s" G out(ac, s)V* € CVa G Aci :
(done(i, a) G 7r(s') done(i, a) G 7r(s"))
This requirement says that, in the outcome states of a coalition C executing a 
strategy, for the agents in C, the related done propositions are uniformly true or 
false. Notice that A gmo<i (v) satisfies this requirement.
Lemma 3.1. Satisfiability checking with respect to a uniform AATS is in Exp- 
Time.
Proof. It is shown that checking the satisfiability/validity of ATL formulas with 
respect to AATS is in EX PTIM E [97]. The uniform AATS is a subclass of 
AATS, and we can apply similar method to show that satisfiability/validity of 
ATL formulas with respect to uniform AATS is also in EX PTIM E. □
Note that the translation of the GDL description Tgol into the ATL specifi­
cation Tatl can be done in polynomial time.
Now we prove an important result: every model for Tatl ls alternating- 
bisimilar to AGMod{T)-
Theorem 3.4. Let G = GMod(T) be the model for a game description T, and 
let A \  =  (Qi, qi, Ag,{Aci\i G Ag}, pi, T\, <3?, Try) be its associated AATS structure. 
Let A 2 =  (Qi, Q2, ^ 9 , {Acj|i G Ag},p2, T2, 4», 7T2) be an uniform AATS that satis­
fies Tatl- There exists an alternating bisimulation IZ between A \ and A 2, with 
LZqxqi.
Proof. We define a relation IZ C Q1 x Q2 as follows,
IZz\Z2 iff ni(zi) = 7̂ ( 22).
We show that IZ is an alternating bisimulation which connects qi and q2.
By INIT, one could easily check that 1Zqj q2.
Suppose we have established IZziZ2 for some z\ G Q\ and Z2 £ Q2 (see Fig­
ure 3.3). It is easy to see that IZ satisfies the invariance condition in definition 
2.12. We need to show that it satisfies both the Zig and Zag conditions in 
definition 2.12 as well.
We first show the Zig condition. In the case that A \, Zi ]=atl terminal, the 
only actions available to the agents are the fini actions, and this will leads to




U\ =  out(acc, z\)
n
a'
A2, z2 -------- ---------
U2 =  out(acc, z2)
Figure 3.3: Alternating bisimulation between A i and A 2
the unique z state. The condition is then easy to complete. In the following, 
we suppose A \, z\ ^ atl terminal. By assumption, we then also have A 2, z2 ^ atl 
terminal. Take an arbitrary coalition C, with a joint action aclc  G options{C, Zi), 
and consider U\ — out{aclc , z i )  C Qx in A \. We need to find ac2C G options{C, z2) 
such that for every u2 G out{ac2c , z2), there is a u\ G U\ so that IZuiU2.
It follows from ac^ G options(C, zi) that A \,z x |=atl legal(i,aj) for all i G 
C ,aj G acj.. Therefore, A 2,z^ [=atl legal(i,aj) for all i G C, af G acxc . And 
by LEGAL, we have A 2, z2 |= atl {(i)) O  done(i, a}) for all i G C. So, for each 
i G C, there is acf G options(i, z2) such that for all x G out{acf, z2) C Q2, 
A 2, x [=atl done(i, a}). Let ac2c  be an action profile that consists of a2 for all 
i G C and U2 — out(ac2C) z2) C Q2. It is easy to see that for all x G U2, we have 
A 2, x [=atl done(i, a}) for i G C. We pick an arbitrary Uz G U2. We are done if 
we can show that there is a u\ G U\ for which TZuiWz.
By ONEJDONE, there is one and only one done(i, a) true in Vq for each 
i G Ag. We already know A 2, |=atl done(i, a}) for i G C, and we assume 
A 2, u2 |=atl done(j, bj) for all j  G A g \ C. As u2 is a successor of we have 
A 2, z2 [=atl {{Ag)) O  done(j, bj) for all j  G Ag \  C, and by LEGAL, we have 
A 2, z2 |=atl legal{j, bj) for all j  G A g \C ,  hence A \, zx [=Atl legal{j, bj) for all 
j  G A g \ C . We collect the actions a] for i G C, and bj for j  G Ag \  C to make 
a complete action profile a.
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Now go back to A \  and consider u\  =  o u t { a , z \ ) .  We claim that this u\  is 
the state we are looking for: it satisfies A \ , U i  (=atl P iff -4.2, u 2 |=atl P, for 
all p € i  By MEM, we have p0id G n i ( u i )  iff p0id G n 2( u 2) for all p0id G <I>. 
By ONE_DONE, we have d o n e ( i , a , i ) G n \ ( u i )  iff d o n e ( i , a i ) G 7t2(u2) for all 
d o n e ( i ,  a , )  G $.
We now claim:
Vp G AtGDL, G ,  ui [ = g d l  P iff A i, ui 1=atl i(p) iff -42, vq |= atl t ( p) (3.1)
The first ‘iff’ immediately follows from Theorem 3.3, and we will use it to know 
’why’ a certain atom is true in G ,  u \ .  Since u\  — o u t  ( a ,  z \ ) ,  we know that in G ,  
we have u\  =  r(a , zi), i.e. ui  is calculated from T as D P M o d ( F r ( a ,  z { )  U i( rglob)).
We distinguish two cases:
• Either there is no rule r G Fr(a, Zi) U ¿ ( rglob) with hd(r) =  p. Then p 0 
D P M o d ( F r ( d ,  z i)u £ (rgiob)) and hence G ,  u\ ^= g d l  P, and, by Theorem 3.3, 
A i, u\ [=atl ~*P- Now consider the axiom STRA T, which says that M/Ar(p) 
is true everywhere in A2 except the initial state and the zink state. In case 
that p does not appear in the head of any rule in T, M I N ( p) =  ->p, which 
implies that «42, u 2 |=atl ~>p, as desired. Otherwise, p must appear in the 
head of some rule r G T. Since in this case we assume this is not so for 
5(rgiob), the only way to make p  true, using M I N { p), is that we have some 
hd,'p  generated by some rule
Sj : (<= next(p) bd'■ does(j1; ajJ • • • does(jm, ajn))
for which A 2, u2 |=Atl to id(bd')  A d o n e ( j i ,  an ) A . . .  d o n e ( j m , ajm). And by 
ONE-DONE, we know that for any i  E Ag, the only action bi for which 
-42, uq [=atl d o n e ( i ,  bi) is true is bi — a l . By MEM, since A 2, u2 [=atl 
t 0id(bd!j), we have that A 2, z2 [=atl bd). Using the induction hypothesis we 
get A i ,  z \  |=atl bd). Now looking at Ai as a game model G  for T, we see 
that (<i= p) G Fp(a, zi), contradicting our assumption that there is no rule 
in Fr(a, z \ )  U i(T giob) with p as a head.
• Or, for some rule r  G F r ( a ,  zi)u5(rglob), we have h d { r )  =  p. We distinguish 
two sub-cases:
-  r  G F r ( a ,  Z\). It follows that r = (■$= p). Since u\  — D P M o d ( F r ( a ,  zi)U
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¿(Tgiob)), we have G ,  U\ [=atl P- It also follows from r £  Fr(a, z i ) ,  that 
G , 2iU{does 1 ajA- • -Adoes n an} [=atl bdl(r')Abda(r') for some next 
rule r' in the form of (4= next(p) bdl bda), where bdl is the literal part 
of this rule, and bda is the action part. This means that ax £  a for all 
does x ax € bda. By construction of G ,  we have G , z \  (=gdl bdl(r'), 
and, by Theorem 3.3, we have A \ , z \  |=atl t(bdl(r')) which gives, 
by the induction hypothesis, A \ , z ^  |=atl t ( b d l ( r ' ) )  and, by MEM, 
A 2 , u2 Hatl t0id(bdl{r')). By choice of u2, we also have A 2, u2 (=atl 
done(\,ai) A ••• A done(n, an), thus A 2,u 2 [=atl t0id.{bda(r')). By 
MIN(p), we then have A 2, u2 [=atl P-
-  r £ ¿(Tglob) and r  ^ Fr(a,s). Now we consider a level mapping 
/  : e(AtcDL(r)) —► N. We claim for all n £  N,
/(x ) =  Tl =£• (G, U\ |= G D L  x ^  A \ ,  u \ HaTL % ^  A 21 Vq Hatl 
We do induction on /(p).
* Base case: / ( p) =  0. There must be a global rule (<= p) in 
<5(rgi0b), thus G, ui [=gdl P and Ai, ux [=atl P■ And by MIN(p), 
we have A2, ua (=atl P- This proves the claim.
* Induction step: Suppose / ( p) =  k + 1, and the claim proven for
all q with / ( q) < k. We have to show that G, U\ ¡=atl p O  
Ai, ui [=atl P A2, U2 |= atl P• The fact G, ux |=Gdl P is true
if and only if there exists a rule r — (•*= p bd) £  ¿(rgiob) such
that G, ui (=gdl bd. For any atom q £  bd, f(q ) <  k + 1, so by 
induction hypothesis, we know that G, u\  |= atl q <=> A\, Ui (=atl 
q <*=>• A 2 , U2 |= atl q, for all q £  bd. It follows that G, u\ |= atl 
bd <=> A \,u i  [=atl t(bd) A 2,'W2 |= atl t(bd). And by M IN(p), 
we have G, Ui |=gdl P if and only if A2, u2 |= atl P-
We now show the Zag condition.
Take an arbitrary coalition C  and with a joint action ac2c and consider U2 — 
out{ac2c , Z2 ) C Q 2 in A2- Pick an arbitrary Va 6 U2, we apply ONEJDONE, 
so for i £  C , we have an unique done(i, al) true in u2- Due to the uniform 
requirement, we have that for all u £  U2 and all i £  C ,  A2, u (=atl done{i, a}).
Take a j  into aclc , we have an action profile for C .  And let U\ =  out(a.clc , z i ) .
We want to demonstrate that for every ui £  U\ there is a u2 £ U2 for which
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TZui u2. Choose ux G U\ arbitrarily. Let a be the action profile for which ux = 
out{a,zx), it is easy to see that in G this means that ux =  r{a ,zx), i.e., ux =  
DPMod(Fr (a, zx) U(j(rgiob)). Now we have A i, zx |=atl legal(j, a j) for j  € A g \C  
and aj G a. And by assumption, A 2, ¿2 [=atl legal(j,aj) as well. Hence, by 
LEG A L, we have A 2, z2 |=atl (0)) O  done(j, aj) for every j  G A g \ C. For each 
done{j, a j ) ,  we can find an action aj in A 2 such that for all u G out(aj, Z2 ) , we 
have A 2, u [=atl done(j, aj). We collect aj for all j  G A g \ C, and combine them 
with aj for all i € Ag, then we get a complete action profile a'.
Now let U2 =  out(a', z2), and we claim that this is the one to complete lZuxu2. 
The proof that Vp G A tGDL, G, zx 1=g d l  P  iff A x,u x (=Atl P iff A 2, Va Hatl P is 
very similar to the proof of (3.1) above. □
One way of interpreting the result above is as follows: GDL can be viewed as a 
model specification language, suitable for use in a model checker [18]. This gives 
rise to the formal decision problem of ATL model checking problem over GDL 
game descriptions, which can be described as follows: Given an ATL formula (p 
and a GDL game description T, is it the case that AcMod(r) f=ATL
Theorem 3.5. ATL model checking over propositional GDL game descriptions 
is E X P T I M E - C o m p l e t e .
Proof. Membership in EX PT IM E  follows from Theorem 3.4 and Lemma 3.1. 
Given game description T, and ATL formula <p, construct Tatl, and then check 
whether Tatl A -up is not satisfiable; the correctness of this procedure follows from 
Theorem 3.4. The fact that ATL unsatisfiability is in E X P T IM E  is from [21, 97].
EXPTIM E-hardness may be proved by reduction from the problem of de­
termining whether a given player has a winning strategy in the two-player game 
PEEK- Ga [73, p.158].
An instance of PEEK-G4 is a quad:
(A4 , X2, X3, ip)
where:
• X x and X 2 are disjoint, finite sets of Boolean variables, with the intended 
interpretation that the variables in X x are under the control of agent 1, and 
X 2 are under the control of agent 2;
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• X3 C (Xi U X2) are the variables deemed to be true in the initial state of 
the game; and
• ip is a propositional logic formula over the variables X\ U X2, representing 
the winning condition.
The game is played in a series of rounds, with the agents i € {1,2} alternating 
(with agent 1 moving first) to select a value (true or false) for one of their variables 
in X i, with the game starting from the initial assignment of truth values defined by 
X3. Variables that were not changed retain the same truth value in the subsequent 
round. An agent wins in a given round if it makes a move such that the resulting 
truth assignment defined by that round makes the winning formula </? true. The 
decision problem associated with PEEK- G 4 involves determining whether agent 
2 has a winning strategy in a given game instance (Xi, X2, X3, ip). Notice that 
PEEK- G 4 only requires “memoryless” (Markovian) strategies: whether or not an 
agent i can win depends only on the current truth assignment, the distribution 
of variables, the winning formula, and whose turn it is currently. As a corollary, 
if agent i can force a win, then it can force a win in 0(2]>Xl[jX2̂) moves. Given an 
instance (X\, X2, X3, </?) of PEEK-G4.
Encoding PEEK- G4 in GDL is a straightforward exercise in GDL program­
ming, and the question of whether there exists a winning strategy is directly 
encoded in an ATL formula to model check (see [80]). □
Note that, although this seems a negative result, it means that interpreting 
ATL over propositional GDL descriptions is no more complex than interpreting 
ATL over apparently simpler model specification languages such as the Simple 
Reactive Systems Language [80].
3.4 Sum m ary
There is much interest in the connections between logic and games, and in partic­
ular in the use of ATL-like logics for reasoning about multi-agent systems. This 
chapter investigated the connections between ATL and the Game Description 
Language (GDL), a declarative language intended for defining games. We first 
demonstrated that GDL can be understood as a specification language for ATL 
models, and subsequently that it is possible to succinctly characterise GDL game
3.4. SUMMARY 71
descriptions directly as ATL formulas, and that, as a corollary, the problem of in­
terpreting ATL formulas over GDL descriptions is EXPTIM E-Complete. This 
chapter provides a theoretical foundation for the next chapter. We will show that 
our work can be applied to formal verification of GDL specifications: the GDL 
game designer can express properties of games using ATL, and then automatically 
check whether these properties hold of their GDL specifications.
CHAPTER 3. BRIDGING G D I AND ATL
Chapter 4
P layability  Verification for 
G am es in GDL
4.1 In troduction
Apart from the theoretical interest in drawing a link between ATL and GDL, 
and characterising the complexity of interpreting ATL formulas over GDL de­
scriptions, which was explained in Chapter 3, we now want to explore this topic 
more practically.
Our purpose is perhaps best explained by analogy with the literature on tem­
poral logic for reactive systems [22]. Temporal logics, in various forms, have 
been used for reasoning about reactive systems for several decades, and a large 
literature has been established on classifying the properties of such systems via 
temporal formulas of various types; probably the best-known classification is that 
of liveness and safety properties, although many more properties have been clas­
sified [52, 53, p.298]. Our ultimate aim is, in much the same way, to use ATL 
to derive a similar classification of game properties and to verify them using 
model checking tools. Note that ATL is, of course, a temporal logic, and we 
might expect the classification to include liveness and safety properties and sim­
ilar; but the more novel aspect of the classification, (and, crucially, the part of 
the classification which simply cannot be done in conventional temporal logic) is 
a classification of strategic properties of games. To be more specific, we try to 
answer the following questions: •
• What are the conditions which characterise when a given GDL description 
defines a (meaningful) game? We refer to these properties as playability
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conditions. Although some useful playability conditions have been discussed 
in the GDL literature [28], these conditions are in fact very basic.
• How can we check whether a game specified in GDL satisfies such playa­
bility conditions?
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 4.2, we give a systematic clas­
sification of GDL playability conditions, and show how these conditions may be 
characterised as ATL formulas. This classification extends the discussion and 
formalisation of playability conditions given in [61, 28] considerably. In sec­
tion 4.3, we describe GDL2RML, an implemented tool for model checking of 
ATL properties over GDL descriptions. In Section 4.4, we present a case study 
of a game specified using GDL and analyse it using ATL model checking via the 
GDL2RML translator. A brief summary is given in Section 4.5.
4.2 C haracterising P layability  C onditions in ATL
When we design a game, there are qualities or properties that we wish the game 
will have. Some are quite subjective, such as ‘breathtaking’, ‘fun’, etc.; some are 
more objective, such as ‘terminal’, ‘turn-based’ etc. Here we will focus on the 
objective properties, and more specifically we would like to characterise them for­
mally. Here by ‘characterising’ we mean the properties will be expressed precisely 
and unambiguously in ATL logical formulas. A GDL game description satisfies 
such a formal property if and only if the ATL game model that arises from such 
description satisfies this property under ATL semantics.
We begin our top-level classification of game properties by distinguishing be­
tween properties relating to the coherence of a game and those relating to its 
strategic structure. We assume to have a stock of state atoms SAt =  {p, q ,. . . }  
(in Tic-Tac-Toe, an example would be (c e ll  1 2 x)), old atoms OAt =  {p0id I 
p E SAt} and done atoms DAt =  {done(i, a) \ i E Ag, a E Aci}. Throughout this 
chapter, unless stated otherwise, properties that we discuss are evaluated in the 
beginning of the game.
4.2.1 Coherence Properties
Roughly, coherence properties simply ensure that the game has a “sensible” in­
terpretation. To illustrate what we mean by this, we introduce a vocabulary of
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atomic propositions that we use within game property formulas. These propo­
sitions play an analogous role to propositions such as ati{i) in the temporal ax­
iomatisation of programs [31, p.70].
• turrii will be true in a state if it is agent i ’s turn to take a move in that 
state;
• legal(i, a) will be true in a state if action (move) a is legal for agent i in 
that state;
• hasJegaLmovei will be true in a state s if agent i has at least one legal 
move in that state;
• terminal will be true in a state if that state is terminal, i.e. the game is 
over.
• wiui will be true in a state if agent i has won in that state;
• losei will be true in a state if agent i has lost in that state;
• draw will be true in a state if the game is drawn in that state;
Note that the specific interpretation of these atomic propositions will depend 
on the game at hand, but they will typically be straightforward to derive. In 
the context of GDL, we might have wini =  goal(i, 100), losei =  goal(i, 0) and 
draw = f \ ieAg goal(i, 50).
Now that we have such a vocabulary in place, we can start to define specific 
properties. Perhaps the most important question is whether a game is “balanced”, 
in that all players have in some sense an equal chance to win. As it turns out, 
this apparently intuitive property is surprisingly hard to define, but we will see 
various notions of balancedness in what follows.
From the perspective of designing a game, the general game playing compe­
tition [28] suggests the following criteria to be a necessity: it should first of all 
be playable: every player has at least one move in every non-terminal state. We 
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The second of these relate to terminal states. In a finite extensive game, the 
terminal states are exactly those in which no player can perform a move. This 
signals a fundamental difference with ATL, where computations are by definition 
infinite. We can bridge this gap by letting a terminal state in a game correspond 
with a ‘zink-state’, from which transitions are possible, but only to (copies of) 
itself. So, our first property says that a terminal state really is terminal: once 
we reach a terminal state, nothing subsequently changes. For all properties only 
involving state atoms, we have:
The above property involves a scheme ip, and as such it would lend itself more 
naturally for the theorem proving paradigm, rather than that of model checking. 
However, we can deal with this as follows. Every agent i has an action noop at 
his disposal. This is helpful to define turn-based games, by the following.
Let p be a state atom in SAt. We assume that state atoms cannot be changed 
by the players’ noop actions. So true state atoms still remain true and false atoms 
remain false if all agents do noop actions, i.e. do nothing. This is captured by the 
following property:
where l is a literal.
Now, we can establish (GameOver) by imposing the following, from which 
(GameOver) would then follow by induction over ip:
((})D((terminal A ip) —> (())D(terminal A <p)) (GameOver)
(Q)0 (tumi <-*■ -ilegal(i, noop)) (Turn)
(No Change)
ieAg
{{))0(terminal —>(()) O {())\3(terminal A done(i, noop))) (Ind)
i€Ag
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Next, we often have that a state is terminal if the game is either won or drawn.
(())□ ((drawW \J  wirii) —*• terminal) 
ieAg
Note that we may or may not have the converse implication, as we can specify 
more subtle results using goal(i,x).
There will typically be some coherence relation between vririi, losei, and draw 
propositions, although the exact relationship will depend on the game. For ex­
ample, the following says that a draw excludes a win.
(())□(draw —> -iwirii) (Draw)
ieAg
Finally, one might add conditions like termination, which says that a game 
will eventually end:
(())§ terminal (Termination)
4.2.2 Fair Playability Conditions
All of the above conditions only take the coalition modalities with empty set of 
agents, i.e. of the form (Q)Tip. Recall that ((C))T<p means that the agents in C 
can choose a strategy such that no matter what the agents in Ag \  C do, Tip 
will hold. In particular, (()) Tp  then means that no matter what the agents in Ag 
do, T<p will hold. Thus these conditions define invariants, i.e. safety properties, 
over games. Such properties could thus be specified using conventional temporal 
logics, eg. Computational Tree Logics, and verified using conventional temporal 
logic model checkers. We now turn to a fundamentally different class of properties 
-  those relating to the strategic structure of a game; as we argued above, such 
properties cannot be specified using conventional temporal logics, whence our 
interest in logics such as ATL for this purpose.
In general, the kinds of properties we might typically hope for in a game relate 
to “fairness”1 -  intuitively, the idea that no player has an inherent advantage in
The term “fairness” is already used in a technical sense in the temporal logic/verification 
community, to mean something related but slightly different. Here when we talk about fairness,
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the game. In fact, it turns out to be rather hard to give a useful formal meaning 
to the term, let alone to capture such a meaning logically. Nevertheless, there 
are some useful fairness-related playability conditions that we can capture.
We first define the notion of winnability. A game is strongly winnable iff:
“for some player, there is a sequence of individual moves of that player 
that leads to a terminal state of the game where that player’s goal 
value is maximal. [28, p.9].
Formally, strong winnability may be captured as follows. Notice that this can 
not be expressed in CTL if the number of agents in Ag is more than one.
V ((0)0 win, (Strong Winnability)
i€Ag
The Strong Winnability is too strong for games involving multiple players, as if it 
would hold in the initial state, then perfect play by that player would guarantee 
a win by that player, which makes the game inherently unfair. So, we have a 
more relaxed requirement, called weak winnability, for multi-player games:
“A game is weakly winnable if and only if, for every player, there is 
a sequence of joint moves of all players that leads to a terminal state 
where that player’s goal is maximal.” [28, p.9].
We capture this as follows:
/ \  {(Ag))^}wini. (Weak Winnability)
ieAg
In general game playing, every game should be weakly winnable, and all single 
player games are strongly winnable. This means that in any general game, every 
player at least has a chance of winning.
One might also impose “Weak Losability” , which would be like the property 
(Weak Winnability), but with wini replaced by lose,: at least, in principle, every 
player could lose.
we are appealing to the everyday meaning of the term, rather than the technical meaning as 
in [24].
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There are many other notions of fairness one can impose on a game. We say 
a game is fair if no player can lose without himself at least being involved. To 
put it another way, a player can only lose with less than perfect play.
4.2.3 Characterising Different Games
The notions we just discussed can be considered as examples of minimal require­
ments to call a system a “meaningful game” . We show how ATL can be used to 
characterise different kinds of games. In fact we have already seen such a gen­
eral property: our (Strong Winnability) is in the literature known as determinacy 
of the game. Other examples would include (Sequential): everywhere, the next 
state is determined by one agent. In ATL, such a situation is called turn-based 
([6]). Although the characteristic formula refers to arbitrary ip again, it can also 
be related to (())0(XORi€Agtum i), together with (Turn) and (Ind).
In many sequential games, the order in which to take turns is crucial, and 
although [20, page 56] claims that ‘y°ung children are obsessed with making sure 
that they go first in any and every game that they play’, sometimes, rather than 
a first-mover advantage, there is a second-mover advantage (like cutting a cake 
and choosing a piece) or an advantage to enter the game in any specific round. 




« » □ « M s» O v -  V «<»Ov>) (Sequential)
ieAg
ze{ o ..io o } j Ç A g \ { i } , x > y >0
Second-mover advantage might be defined as follows:
f \  ((-'turni A (0 )0 turrii) —> ((i))(fadvi)
¿6 Ag
(Second-mover advantage)
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Other examples include (Zero-sum) (here given for a two-player game):
(<())0{terminal —► ((wirii A lose2)XOR{draw\ A draiv^XOR^losei A wm2))
(Zero-sum)
Note that although we currently have modelled the outcome propositions as 
booleans, one can do this easily with numbers as well, enabling also easy repre­
sentations of constant-sum games.
Finally, we have the following characterises one-shot strategic form games 
with symmetry payoffs:
Strategic A Symmetry(x, y) (Strategic Symmetry)
I,J/6{0..100}
where,
turrii A (()) O  terminal (Strategic)
i€Ag
(({Ag)) O  {goal(l, x) A goal{2, y)) -*• {(Ag)) O  (goal(l, y) A goal{2, x))
(Symmetry(a;, y))
Note that, since we assume that all Aci and Ac} are disjoint when i ^  j ,  in 
(Symmetry(:r, y)) agents do not need to be able to ‘swap actions’, they only need 
swap outcomes.
4.2.4 Special Properties for Tic-Tac-Toe
We now consider properties specific to our running example, Tic-Tac-Toe. For this 
game, we denote the players with Xplayer and Oplayer, respectively. The atom 
tumi says that it is player Vs turn: turnt <-> {-¡terminal A {{i))0->done{i, noop)),
i.e., it is player Vs turn if it is not in a terminal state, and he can assure to have 
done anything else than a noop action. Let c{i,j,w )  (with 1 <  i , j  < 3 and 
w € {o ,x ,b})  abbreviate cell{i,j) = w (‘cell{i,j) shows currently symbol w’). 
Finally, XOR denotes exclusive or.
Now, our game designer may want to verify that the property that certain 
configurations on the board will never be reached (e.g., (iCell) expresses the 
invariant that we don’t have two o’s and one x in the game in the first row and
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only blanks everywhere else -  recall that the player who starts is Xplayer). Such 
properties need not be about invariants, but can also be, for instance, about the 
progress in the game, or about persistence of written cells or non-written ones 
(Persistence^)) (saying that a written X  is persistent over any move, a non- 
written X  is persistent under any move of the other player(s)). Using our atoms 
that recall what is true in the previous state, we can even specify the exact effect 
of any action: (Write(a:)) says that wherever we are in the game, saying that it 
is x ’s turn is equivalent to saying that in every next state, there is exactly one 
cell that is written with an x now, but was blank before.
(())D-i(c(l, 1, o) A c(l, 2, o) A c(l, 3, x) A f \  c ( i,j , b) (iCell)
i^i
(())□( A (c (i,j, x) -► (Q )O c(i,j,x)) A (“itumXplayer
A  h c ( i , j ,x ) -* ( ( ) )0 -> c ( i ,j ,x ) ) ) )  (Persistence(x))
l<ij'<3
(())□ (tumxplayer (()) O XORi<i¿<3(c(i, j , x) A c (i,j , b)old)) (Write(x))
Regarding game playing, of course it is interesting to know what parties can 
achieve, in a given game. (A designer of) player i might in particular be in­
terested whether the following instantiation of (Strong Winnability) holds: is it 
the case that ((i))()>wini? In Tic-Tac-Toe, no player is guaranteed a win, i.e., 
(Strong Winnability) is not true for Tic-Tac-Toe. Indeed, for most interesting 
games, (Strong Winnability) does not hold.
Let happy(C) — / \ i€C(wirii\/ drawi). For instance, (Coalition) expresses that 
coalition C has some reason to cooperate: by doing so, everybody is reasonably 
happy, while there is no subset of C that guarantees that. As another example, 
(R(i, a)) considers whether a is a reasonable move for i: that is, it cannot achieve 
less than what it currently can achieve, by performing a. This is an example of 
a property one might want to check in several states of the game, not just the
root.
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((C))0 happy((7) A -i \ /  ((C)) <> happy (C )
C ' C C
happy(i) A turrii A ((i))0(done(i, a) A happy(i))
(Coalition) 
(R(i, a))
4.3 T he G D L2R M L Translator
In this section, we describe our work on how to verify the games in GDL using 
an ATL model checker. The main purpose of our work is to show a method using 
existing ATL model checking tools on the verification of GDL games, rather than 
developing a model checking tool from the scratch. In this way, we can add value 
to the work that has been done by other people.
We built a translator, GDL2RML, from GDL descriptions to representa­
tions in the Reactive Modules Language (RML). RML is the model description 
language of the ATL model checker MOCHA. Using GDL2RML, we can verify 
properties expressed in ATL via MOCHA.
In the following subsections, we first introduce MOCHA and RML, then ex­
plain the design of the GDL2RM L translator, and finally discuss the correctness 
and evaluation of the GDL2RM L translator.
4.3.1 M OCHA and RML
The ATL model checker we use is MOCHA, which was developed by Alur et al. 
[7, 2], some of whom are also the inventors of ATL. To our knowledge, this is by far 
the standard model checking tool for ATL. It has been applied in the verification 
of various systems, such as the shared-memory multiprocessor systems [39], the 
asynchronous processes [3], and the dataflow processors [38]. The practical model 
checking complexity using MOCHA was studied in [80].
The model description language of MOCHA is the Reactive Modules Lan­
guage (RML), which is rich enough to model systems with heterogeneous com­
ponents: synchronous, asynchronous, speed-independent or real-time, finite or 
infinite state, etc. Here we briefly introduce RML. An RML specification con­
sists of a set of modules. A module can be seen as an agent; it consists of a set 
of variables and a set of rules to define the evolution of the variables that are 
controlled by the module. The input variables are called external variables, and
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atom xyz 
controls x 
reads x, z 
awaits y 
init
[] true -> x ’ :=0 
[] true -> x ’ :=1 
update
[] y ’=true & z = false -> x ’:=x+l 
[] y ’=true & z = true -> x ’:= x 
[] y ’=false -> x ’:=x-l 
endatom
Figure 4.1: An example of an atom
the output variables are called interface variables. A module controls its interface 
variables and its private variables. Within a module, the basic construct is an 
atom. A simple example of an atom is given in figure 4.1.
This definition has three parts: 1) a declaration of the variables that are 
controlled, read, or awaited; 2) an i n i t  part; and 3) an update part. An atom 
can write the variables that it con tro ls , read the ones it reads or it awaits. 
The primes besides the variables refer to their values in the next round. Here, 
awaiting the value of a variable y means it reads the value that y will receive 
in the next round, which is determined by another atom. For instance, in the 
example, the next value of x is evaluated using the current value of z, and after 
the next value of y is specified. The i n i t  part initializes the value of x by a 
set of guarded commands starting with a ' [] ’. A guarded command statement 
consists of two parts: a guard, that is a boolean expression specifying when the 
guarded command can be executed, and a list of commands, used to specify 
the next value of the controlled variables. If several guards are true, the system 
randomly chooses an associated command. The next part is different to the i n i t  
in two ways: first, it can repeatedly execute after the first round, while i n i t  only 
executes in the first round; second, it can take boolean expressions with variables 
as guards, while i n i t  can only have the guard tru e .
The state of a system at one time point is completely captured by the valua­
tions of the variables that the system controls. The evolution of the state of the 
system is decided by the initial state and the update commands in each atom.
84 CHAPTER 4. PLAYABILITY VERIFICATION FOR GAMES IN GDL
4.3.2 D esign of the GDL2RM L Translator
Given a GDL description, how can we obtain a representation in RM L which 
characterises the same system (game structure)? Basically, we have to take care 
of this for a state and the change of a state. Both in GDL and RML, a state is 
represented by a set of propositions or variables. And for the change of a state, 
GDL uses a set of rules in a logical programming language, while RML uses 
guarded commands. GDL rules are different from RML guarded commands in 
two ways: 1) a GDL rule can specify the value of one proposition or variable 
only, but an RML guarded command can specify more than one; 2) all GDL 
rules will be executed if their conditions are true, but only one RML guarded 
command will be executed within the same atom on any given round.
In RML, we need to specify which propositions or variables belong to which 
module, where modules can be seen as agents. So the main tasks of our GDL2RM L 
translator are:
• to specify the roles in GDL as modules in RML,
• to specify the propositions controlled by each module,
• to specify the initial state and the corresponding update mechanism.
We cut a GDL description F into four parts: Trole, Fimt, Tnext, Pgi0b, where 
r ro/e is a collection of the rules with keyword role, Tinit is a collection of the rules 
with keyword init, Tnext is a collection of the rules with keyword next, and Pgi0b 
contains the rest. Our GDL2RM L translator is written in Java, and processes 
the rules in these four categories as follows.
Roles For every rule in r ro;e, we associate it with a module; moreover, we in­
troduce a special module called Gmaster, which takes the same responsibility as 
the game master in the General Game Playing competition (GGP) [28]. The 
main duties of the Gmaster are: to serve the players with the current game 
board state, to read the actions of the players, and to update the board state 
accordingly. The behaviour of Gmaster is deterministic, and it will not influence 
the outcome of a game. In terms of ATL, we have that, for any coalition C ,
((C U {Gm}))<}(/? <-> ((C))()(p. This justifies why we left out Gmaster Gm in our 
analysis in Section 4.2.
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Propositions and Variables Each player module controls their own action 
variables, and all the rest are controlled by the Gmaster. In other words, the 
players decide about their move, and all its consequences are then determined. 
To be more specific, we use a variable D0NE_X for each player X, and the scope 
of this variable is easily identified by the clauses with keywords ’does X ’ in 
Tnext- For example, in the Tic-Tac-Toe game in Figure 3.1, we have a clause 
(does xplayer (mark ?m ?n)), so we add MARK_1_1, . . . ,MARK_3_3 to the do­
main of DONE_XPLAYER, given that the scope of ?m and ?n are determined by the 
context. The reason to choose a DONE prefix is related to the update mechanism, 
which will be introduced shortly.
The propositions for the Gmaster module are directly obtained from T. For 
example, we have in Figure 3.1 a rule (<= te rm inal ( lin e  x )), so we take 
TERMINAL and LINE_X as propositions. Theoretically, we can represent the state 
using only propositions, but to make our representation more efficient, we choose 
some variables to have a richer domain. This will be explained in more detail in 
the case study in section 4.4.
The Initial State As we mentioned earlier, a state is a full characterization of the 
system in a particular time point. In T¿„a, GDL specifies the propositions that 
are true initially, but not necessary all the propositions that are true, as some 
global rules in Tgi0b might make some propositions true as well. For example, 
suppose Ti consists of the following two rules: ( in i t  p) and (<= q p). In the 
initial state, we first know p is true, and then know that q is true by the global 
rule (<= q p). So we need to do some computation, w.r.t Tinit U r s;0&, to get a 
complete picture of the initial state. But RML does not make it possible to do 
computations for the initial state, as all the guards in the init part can only be 
true (see Figure 4.1).
We have two design choices here: either we figure out all the initial values of 
the variables and then specify their values directly using [] tru e  -> x ’ : =value 
in RML, or we add an extra round to allow the modules’ update part to compute 
the full initial state. We take the later approach, as we want to delegate all the 
work of constructing the game system to MOCHA. Therefore, we introduce a 
special variable p re in i t ,  the idea being that we make p r e in i t  true initially and 
then false always afterwards. If we call this special state produced by RML the 
‘pre-init’ state, the real init state is then the computed successor of the pre-init 
state. In the example of Ti above, p would be true in pre-init, and p and q in
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init. We make sure that there is only one init state. In the following, when we 
refer to the “init state” , it should be understood that we are not referring to the 
pre-init state.
The Update Mechanism In RML, state changes are made via the update 
construction, which is specified with keyword update. There are two types of 
update rules in GDL, namely Tgi0b, which gives constrains globally, and Tnext, 
which talks about the future. Accordingly, we have to deal with both of them in 
RML.
For the rules in Tgi0b, we add one rule in the atom which has the head of 
the rule as a controlled variable. And we use primed versions of the variables 
as they all update in the same round, and the ones in the guards are updated 
earlier than those in the commands. The dependency requires that there is no 
circularity, and this is checked by MOCHA automatically. Here is an example 
from Figure 3.1: for the GDL rule (<= terminal (line x )), we have an update 
rule in RML: LINE_X’ -> TERMINAL’ :=true, which says that if LINE_X is true 
in the next round, then TERMINAL is true in the next round as well. Note that 
LINE_X is an awaited variable.
For the rules in Tnext, we also add one rule in the atom which has the head of 
the rule as a controlled variable. For example: a GDL rule
(<= (next(cell 1 1 x)) (does xplayer (mark 11)) (cell l i b ) )  
can be translated to an update rule:
CELL_1_1=B & DONE_XPLAYER’=MARK_1_1 -> CELL_1_1’:=X.
This rule says if the Cell(l,l) is blank currently, and Xplayer marks Cell(l,l), 
then in the next state, the Cell(l,l) becomes X.
How does the whole system evolve? In GDL, the players (roles) make a choice 
and the game master uses them to update the state, according to the Tgi0b and 
Tnext rules. This continues until a terminal state is reached. In RML, we will 
do the same thing, but an important question here is how to record the players’ 
actions in a state. For example, suppose in the current state, player X is allowed 
to make a move MARK_1_1. Shall we have a proposition D0ES_X_MARK_1_1 to 
indicate that player X will make this move in next state? No, because (1) this 
would cause the current state to only have one successor, and (2) we do not
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intend to say that X does the MARK_1_1 move in the current state, but only 
like to reason hypothetically what would happen if he would make that move. 
The fact that X makes a certain move should be recorded in the successor state 
associated with that move, and not in the current state. Therefore, we introduce 
the D0NE_X variable for each player X, to record the actions made by X in the 
previous round. The update process in RML starts as follows: all the D0NE_X 
variables are given a value in the players’ module, and then the Gmaster module 
uses the rules from Fnext to specify the variables in the head of these rules using 
the update construct, and finally Gmaster does the same with rules translated 
from Tgi0b. For instance, the effect of X performing a MARK_1_1 move is captured 
by the following atom in the module Gmaster.
update
[]DONE_Xplayer’=MARK_l_l & CELL_1_1=B -> CELL_1_1':=X 
[]D0NE_0player’=MARK_1_1 & CELL_1_1=B -> CELL_1_1>:=0 
[]~(CELL_1_1=B) -> CELL_1_1’ :=CELL_1_1 
[]~(DONE_Xplayer'=MARK_l_l | D0NE_0player’=MARK_1_1)
& CELL_1_1=B - >  CELL_1_1’ :=B
This says that if Xplayer’s chosen action is to mark Cell(l,l), and this cell is 
currently blank, it will become marked with X, and similarly for Oplayer and the 
symbol O. If Cell(l,l) was already not blank, it keeps its value, and, finally, it 
stays blank if it was blank and nobody wrote on it in this round.
4.3.3 Correctness and Evaluation
How can we ensure the correctness of the GDL2RM L translator? Here the 
‘correctness’ means that the original GDL description specifies the same game 
model as its GDL2RM L translation. In the previous chapter, we have formally 
defined the game models for the GDL descriptions. Ideally, we shall also define 
the game models of the RML descriptions, and formally prove that the game 
model of a GDL description T corresponds to the game model of the translation 
of T in RML. This requires a formalisation of RML with game semantics, which 
is out of the scope of this thesis. But we do have two approaches to ensure 
certain degree of the correctness. The first approach is to check whether all the 
propositions, variables and the rules have been mapped correctly. We get this
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level of assurance by checking the design of the GDL2RML translator. This 
might still prone to human errors, so we have a second approach, which is to use 
the model checker M OCHA to verify properties of the GDL2RM L translations. 
If the MOCHA results agree with the truth of those properties in the original 
game, then we get certain degree of assurance that our translation is correct. Of 
course when the M OCHA results do not conform the truth of those properties, 
this approach alone does not tell whether the original GDL description does not 
describe the game properly, or the GDL2RML translator is problematic.
As for the evaluation of the GDL2RML translator, we have tested it with 
a number of examples, such as Maze, Buttons and Tic-Tac-Toe, from the game 
depository2 of the General Game Playing Website. All these examples were trans­
lated within several seconds in a Dural-Core Linux Machine, and the verification 
results in MOCHA are all as desired. In the next section, we will present a 
concrete case study to show that our translation of Tic-Tac-Toe has produced 
desired results (see Fig 4.2). Compared with the programming-oriented brute- 
force method mentioned in [28], our method has two advantages. First, we do 
not need to write a program to expand the game models, as the model checkers 
automatically generate the game models from RML descriptions. Second, we can 
specify the properties in AT L in a more abstract way than specifying them in a 
programming language, so that we do not need to deal with the details in the level 
of game states. Our GDL2RM L translator is still a prototype tool; in theory, 
it shall automatically translate any GDL descriptions to RML descriptions, but 
in practice we still need to manually add some tags into GDL descriptions to 
reduce the numbers of variables in the translation, in order to reduce the model 
checking time in MOCHA.
4.4 Case S tu d y  and E xperim ental R esu lts
4.4.1 Introduction
In this section we do a case study in the context of the game of Tic-Tac-Toe using 
our GDL2RM L tool and MOCHA.
The game of Tic-Tac-Toe is often used as an example to introduce game 
complexity, which involves both state space complexity and game-tree complexity. 
For Tic-Tac-Toe, a simple upper bound for the size of the state space is 39 =
2URL: http://visionary.stanford.edu:4000
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19,683, as there are three states for each cell and nine cells. This is of course quite 
rough, since there are many illegal states, such as a state with all ‘X’ occupying 
the spaces. After removing these illegal states, we get 5,478 states. And when 
rotations and reflections of positions are regarded as identical, there are only 765 
essentially different positions. A simple upper bound for the size of the game 
tree is 9! =  362,880, as there are nine positions for the first move, eight for the 
second, and so on. After removing the illegal states there are 255,168 possible 
games; and when rotations and reflections of positions are considered the same, 
there are only 26,830 possible games3. Compared with the complexity of Chess4, 
the complexity of Tic-Tac-Toe is rather small. Nevertheless it has 26,830 possible 
games, which is not trivial.
Tic-Tac-Toe has been modelled and verified successfully by model checking 
tools; in [43], the SPIN model checker [42] was used, and the properties were 
expressed in LTL. One clear advantage of our approach is that we are able to 
verify a bigger class of properties, especially those can only be expressed in ATL.
4.4.2 Playability of Tic-Tac-Toe in M O CH A
For the translation from a GDL description to an RML description, we have 
illustrated the main idea in the previous section. What we want to stress here 
is the controlled variables for Gmaster. Most of them are boolean variables, and 
only a few can take multiple values, e.g., CELL_1_1 £ { B,X,0}. Alternatively, 
we can use three booleans: CELL_1_1_B, CELL_1_1_X, and CELL_1_1_0. Then 
the equivalent expression of CELL_1_1=X is
CELL_l_l_B=false & CELL_l_l_X=true & CELL_l_l_0=false.
We choose the former representation for the sake of compactness.
The general playability conditions are presented in section 4.2. Now we tailor 
them specifically for Tic-Tac-Toe. We select a few representative properties and 
give concrete representations that are accepted by model checker MOCHA. The 
purpose is to show how our work is used in practice.
3http: / /en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tic-tac-toe
4C. Shannon gave an estimation in [71] with the size of state space 1043 and the size of
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Coherence Properties The first coherence property we pick is Playability: 
(())□(-!terminal —> hasJegaLmovei)
i€Ag
For i — Xplayer, has-legal.movei can be represented as
( LEGAL_X_MARK_11 | LEGAL_X_MARK_12 | LEGAL_X_MARK_13 
I LEGAL_X_MARK_21 | LEGAL_X_MARK_22 | LEGAL_X_MARK_23 
I LEGAL_X_MARK_31 | LEGAL_X_MARK_32 | LEGAL_X_MARK_33 
I LEGAL_X_N00P)
The rest is straightforward.
The second coherence property is GameOver.
({))D((terminal A ip) (()}D(terminal A <p))
Let us look at an instantiation of <p: suppose tp here means that Xplayer wins. 
Its representation in MOCHA is
« » X ( « » G (  (TERMINAL&GOALX=glOO)=>«»G(TERMINAL&GOALX=glOO)))
Note that we have some small notional differences. Here X corresponds to O , 
G to □, & to A, and => to —>. The reason to have « » X  at the beginning is that 
we have an extra, “pre-initial” initial state. We have explained the reason to have 
such state in Section 4.3.2.
The third coherence property we pick is Turn:
(()}□(tiiTOj *-> -ilegal(i, noop))
The case with i being Xplayer is:
« » X  « »  G (turn=Xplayer <=> ~LEGAL_Xplayer_NOOP) .
The last coherence property we pick is Termination:
(Q)\) terminal
The MOCHA representation is straightforward: « »  X « »  F term inal, 
where F is the MOCHA notation for </■.
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Fairness Properties Now we pick two fairness properties:
V  ((i))^wirii(StrongWinnability) , and ((Ag))(}wini(WeakWinnability).
i€Ag i€Ag
The representations are
<<>>X(«Xplayer»F G0ALX=gl00 I <<0player>>F G0AL0=gl00) 
and
<<>>X(«Xplayer,0player»F G0ALX=gl00 & <<Xplayer,Oplayer»F G0AL0=gl00)
respectively.
4.4.3 Playing Tic-Tac-Toe via M odel Checking
Although our main motivation in this work is to consider the analysis of games 
from the view point of a game designer, it is also worth speculating about the 
use of our approach to play GDL games via Model checking. Let us suppose the 




Now it is Xplayer’s turn. The questions are:
i. Is there a winning strategy for Xplayer in the current state?
ii. If so, which move should Xplayer take?
There is indeed a winning strategy for Xplayer, namely, by marking the Cell(2 ,1) 
(see below). In that case, no matter how Oplayer responds, Xplayer can mark 
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We show that we can answer these questions via model checking.
First, “Xplayer has a winning strategy is expressed as ((Xplayer)) (}winxPiayer 
in ATL and as <<Xplayer»F G0ALX=gl00 in MOCHA. Given game model G, 
and current state s, the question 1 amounts to checking whether G, s [ = a t l  
((Xplayer))(}winxpiayer- In MOCHA, we can only check a property with re­
spect to the initial state, namely So, but we can get around using the following 
approach. We characterise a state s by a formula <p(s), so instead of check­
ing G,s [=atl ((Xplayer))S)winXpiayer, we can check G,s0 [=atl (())D(</j(s) -*• 
((Xplayer))^winxpiayer)- For the above example, ip(s) can be Cell(l, 1, X) A 
Cell( 1,2, 0)  A Cell(2,2, X )  A Cell(3,3, O) A f \ x ŷ=rest Cell(x, y, B ). We denote 
the MOCHA representation of (())D(<p(s) —> ((Xplayer)) ̂ }winXpiayer) as sXWin.
Now, suppose we got a positive answer to the question 1. To answer the ques­
tion 2, we use an action variable DONEX to guide the search for a proper move. 
The idea is to select a legal move for Xplayer, and then to check whether Xplayer 
still has a winning strategy under this move. If so Xplayer shall take it; if not, 
Xplayer will check the a different legal move; the existence of a winning strat­
egy guarantees that there is such a move. To be more specific, suppose Xplayer 
chooses mark(2,1), it is to check: G, s0 | = a t l  (())D(<p(s) —► ((Xplayer)) O  (DONEX 
= M A RK .2A  ((Xplayer)) 0  winXpiayer)) •
We denote the M OCHA version of this formula as ‘sXWin_by_mark2r. If the 
answer is positive, it means Xplayer’s move Mark.2.1 is indeed a move leading 
towards a winning position.
There is of course a question “what if there is no winning strategy in the cur­
rent position?”. We believe that it is interesting to explore a position evaluation 
function, which estimates the value or goodness of a position, and its connection 
with ATL properties; but we would leave this for further research.
4.4.4 Experim ental Results on Tic-Tac-Toe
Here we present experimental results to show that the analysis described above 
can be done in reasonable time with moderate computing resources. For these 
experiments, we ran MOCHA under Linux kernel 2.6.20 i686 with a Dural-Core 
1.8Ghz CPU and 2GB RAM. The table in Figure 4.2 gives timings for checking 
the various properties listed in the previous section.
These results indicate that our tool can generate correct results in a reasonable 







Strong Winnability failed 23sec
Weak Winnability passed 4min01s
sXWin passed lmin06sec
sXWin_by_mark21 passed lmin59sec
Figure 4.2: Verification results of Tic-Tac-Toe
respect to these results. In particular, it might be useful in future to consider 
investing some effort in optimising the translation process from GDL to RML, 
particularly with respect to the number of variables produced in the translation. 
Even moderate optimisations might yield substantial time and memory savings.
4.5 Sum m ary
This chapter has investigated the specification and verification of games described 
in GDL. In particular, two main contributions have been made. First, we have 
characterised a class of playability conditions that can be used to express the 
correctness of the games specified in GDL. Second, we developed an automated 
tool that can transform a set of GDL descriptions into RML specifications, and 
we can verify the playability conditions over these RML specifications using an 
off-the-shelf ATL model checker, MOCHA. In future research, we believe it is 
worthwhile to refine this work on formal verification of GDL descriptions. The 
main issues are likely to be the efficiency and scalability of our automated tools.
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Chapter 5
Bridging A ction  and T im e Logics
5.1 In troduction
This chapter provides a study of logical frameworks that not only deal with action 
or time, but also deal with knowledge of multi-agent systems. In particular we 
study a correspondence between Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) and Temporal 
Epistemic Logic (TEL). As shown in Chapter 2, these two logical frameworks 
are capable of modelling multi-agent systems with agents’ knowledge and its 
change. However, there is a large difference in terms of model checking: in DEL 
the interpretation of a dynamic epistemic formula is over a state model, which 
represents a static view of a multi-agent system; while in TEL, the interpretation 
of a temporal epistemic formula is over an interpreted system, in which the full 
history of a system is unfolded.
The presented frameworks interact both on the level of logical languages and 
on the level of semantic objects, and it is precisely this interaction that is the sub­
ject of the underlying investigation. Various results have already been achieved. 
The relation between Kripke models and interpreted systems has been investi­
gated by Lomuscio and Ryan in [49]. They focussed on an interpreted system 
named Hypercube System that corresponds to the cartesian product of all lo­
cal state values, and that has no dynamic features. In the correspondence, local 
state values become boolean propositional variables. Their approach suits Kripke 
models where all states have different valuations, which is not generally the case. 
A recent study by Pacuit [57] compares the history-based approach by Parikh 
and Ramanujam [58] to interpreted systems, with runs. This addresses the rela­
tion between Kripke models with histories consisting of event sequences (in our
96 CHAPTER 5. BRIDGING ACTION AND TIME LOGICS
case this primitive is derived and called a forest model) and interpreted systems. 
Pacuit handles partial observability of agents, when the agents perceive only some 
but not all of a sequence of events. He does not address in [57] the partial ob­
servability common in dynamic epistemics, where only an aspect of an event is 
observable, not the full event. Other recent work by van Benthem, Gerbrandy 
and Pacuit [12], rooted in older work [11, 77], gives a precise relation between 
temporal epistemics and dynamic epistemics. In their approach, each action w in 
an action model M corresponds to a unique labelled modality 0 ( m ,w ) ,  interpreted 
in a linear-time temporal logic, such that a dynamic epistemic formula of the form 
[M,w]<p (‘after execution of event ‘(M,w)’ it holds that p') is true in a Kripke 
model with epistemic accessibility relations, if and only if a temporal epistemic 
formula 0 ( m ,w )<P is true in an ‘enlarged’ Kripke model that is constructed using 
two copies of the former and an accessibility relation for 0(M,w)-execution that 
connects them. This is a forest that we will introduce later. We have straightfor­
wardly applied their elegant approach. Unlike them, we do not assume a protocol, 
but compute it based on the structure of a given formula.
Much recent work in model checking is based on temporal epistemics describ­
ing interpreted systems (MCMAS [69], MCK [27], and see also [75]), and some 
recent work is based on dynamic epistemics describing model updates (DEM O, 
[94]). Our work is intended to draw a connection between these two different 
model checking approaches.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 contains definitions on logical 
languages and semantics that we are going to discuss. Section 5.3 presents two 
translations, a syntactical one and a semantical one, from PAL (a special case of 
DEL) to NTEL (a variant of TEL); and then we prove a correspondence between 
PAL and NTEL. Section 5.4 extends the result from PAL to the more general case 
DEL. We give a summary of this chapter in Section 5.5.
5.2 Logical Prelim inaries
In this section, we present the logical preliminaries of our work. We introduce 
four structural primitives and two languages. The structures are: •
• state models, which are Kripke models with S5 accessibility relations repre­
senting agents’ knowledge about states;
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• action models, which are Kripke models with S5 accessibility relations rep­
resenting agents’ knowledge about actions;
• forest models, which are Kripke models with not just accessibility relations 
representing agents’ knowledge of states but also accessibility relations rep­
resenting state transitions;
• action-based interpreted systems, which are based on well-accepted inter­
preted systems.
The reason that we restrict the state models to have only S5 accessibility relations 
is because the framework we want to relate it to, namely that of action-based 
interpreted systems, has S5 for its accessibility relations. The first two models 
were introduced in Chapter 2, and the remaining two, forest models and action- 
based interpreted systems, will be defined soon.
The languages are those of dynamic epistemic logic and a variant of temporal 
epistemic logic which one could think of as ‘next-time temporal epistemic logic’. 
The former can be given meaning both on state models and on forest models; the 
latter both on forest models and on interpreted systems. As global parameters 
to both the languages and the structures we have a set Ag of n agents, and a 
(countable) set Q of atoms q, and to action-based structures, we assume a finite 
set of W of actions w.
5.2.1 Languages
As shown in Section 2.2.4, the language £ q e l  of Dynamic Epistemic Logic is 
inductively defined as follows
p q \ -<p \ (p A p) | K^p | CbP | [M,w]v?
where q E Q, i € Ag, B C Ag, and (M,w) a pointed action model. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that all points of all action models are differently 
named, so that we can associate a particular w with the pointed model (M,w) 
whenever convenient. For the special case of singleton action models with reflexive 
accessibility relations for all agents, i.e. public announcements, we write [p]ip 
where p  is the precondition (the announced formula).
The dynamic part of £ d e l  is the action modality and it can be seen as repre­
senting one time step. Now we want to connect it to a temporal language. Natu­
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rally, we could associate each action modality with a one-step temporal modality. 
We define the language of Next-time Temporal Epistemic Logic as follows.
D efinition 5.1 (Language £ n t e l )- Given a set of actions W, the language of 
Next-time Temporal Epistemic Logic £ n t e l  %s inductively defined as
<P "=  q | -'P \ (<£ A tp) \ \ CBp  | Ow P
where, q G Q, i G Ag, B C Ag, and w € W.
There are some differences with the temporal language £jEL(see Section 2.2.3), 
as the next-time temporal modalities here are labelled with actions. Also we do 
not need U (‘until’) operators in our investigation. We call ip an NTEL formula 
if <P € / I n t e l -
5.2.2 Structures
We first recap the key parts of the definitions of state models and action models 
introduced in Chapter 2.
A state model is a structure ( W, ~ i , . . . ,  ~ n, 7r) where W  is a domain of pos­
sible states, for each agent i, is an S5 accessibility relation between states 
expressing the states that are indistinguishable from each other for that agent, 
and where 7r : W  —> p( Q) is a valuation (or interpretation) that determines for 
each state which atoms are true in that state.
An action model M is a structure (W, ~ i , . . . ,  ~ m, pre) such that W is a domain 
of action points, and for each i 6 Ag, is an equivalence relation on W, and 
pre : W —► C is a precondition function that assigns a precondition pre(w) in 
language £  to each w 6 W.
We introduce a structure that adds an extra dimension to a state model.
D efinition 5.2 (Forest Model). Given a set of atomic propositions Q, a set of 
actions W, a forest model is a structure
{W , ~ i , . . . ,  {—>w| w G W },7f)
where
• W is a set of states;
• is an S5 accessibility relation of agent i for each i G Ag;
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• —>w is a binary relation on states expressing the execution of action w with 
an extra condition such that each state can only have at most one action 
predecessor, in other words, for each state w E W , if there is wi,w2 E W 
and w',w" € W such that W\ —v  w and W2 — w, then Wi = W2, and 
w' =  w";
• and 7T is a valuation function from W to p(Q).
We sometimes write a forest model as ( W, ~ i , . . . ,  ~ n, {—>w}, 7r) if W is c/ear 
/rom the context.
If we represent all states in IF in the form of (w, w1, . . . ,  wm) where w is a state 
and w1, . . . ,  wm is a sequence of executed actions, then w\ —>w w2 iff (w\, w) =  u^. 
For brevity, ((w, w1, . . . ,  wm), w) and («;, w1, . . . ,  wm, w) are treated as the same 
state.
In order to interpret the NTEL formulas, we extend the interpreted system 
(see Definition 2.16) with actions.
D efin ition  5.3 (Action-based Interpreted System). Given a set of atomic propo­
sitions Q, a set of actions W, an action-based interpreted system X — (IZ, {—>w 
|w E W},7r) over Q is a system IZ of runs over a set Q of global states with a 
valuation it  which decides for each point (r, m) a set of atoms P C Q that are 
true in (r, m). Two points (r, m ) and (r m ' )  are indistinguishable for i, written 
(r, m) (r ',m ’), if ri(m ) =  rf(m'). Two points in the same run (r, m) and
(r, m + 1) are connected by an action w € W, written as (r, m) —>w (r, m + 1).
5.2.3 Semantics
In the following, we give meanings to the formulas of the languages over the 
structures we have introduced. More specifically, we interpret DEL formulas over 
state models and forest models, and interpret NTEL formulas over forest models 
and action-based interpreted systems. This can be illustrated by the diagram in 
Figure 5.1.
Here we distinguish four different interpretations. |=sd denotes the interpre­
tation of a DEL formula over a state model; J=fd denotes the interpretation of 
a DEL formula over a forest model; |=ft denotes the interpretation of an NTEL 
formula over a forest model; and [=* denotes the interpretation of an NTEL 
formula over an action-based interpreted system. All these interpretations are
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Figure 5.1: Semantics of two languages over three models
defined similarly in terms of atomic propositions, logical connectives and knowl­
edge modalities, which have been introduced in Chapter 2. We focus on clauses 
of action executions, and the temporal connectives. For action executions, we 
also mention the special case of public announcement.
D efinition 5.4 (Semantics |=sd ). The semantics of [M,w]ip over a state model 
M is as follows,
M, w \=sd [M, \N\ip iff M, w |=sd pre(w) M  ® M, (w , w) [=*) ip 
where <8> is the update operation.
For the special case of public announcement, assuming that [ip\ corresponds to 
the action Wo in public announcement model M0, we have:
M, w \=sd [ip]ip iff M , w (=sd tp =s> M  <g> M0, (w, w0) Kd V>-
Note that this definition is essentially the same as what we have defined in 
Section 2.2.4. The following is new.
Definition 5.5 (Semantics f=fd ). The semantics of[M,w]ip over a forest model 
M is as follows,
M, w [=fd [M, w]ip iff M, w f=fd pre(w) => 3v s.t. w —>w v and M , v [=« ip
For the special case of public announcement, assuming [p\ corresponds to w, 
we have:
M, w (=fd [ip]ip iff M, w [=fd ip => 3v s.t. w —>w v and M, v |=fd ip 
This needs a bit more explanation. See the following example.
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E xam ple 5.1. Suppose we have a formula p —> [p]T. For any state model M 
and state w, we have M, w |=sd p —» [p]T. This is because if p is true in w, then 
a truthful public announcement could be made in w, and in the resulting state, 
T  is trivially true. But if we interpret this formula in a forest model, it can be 
false. A simple example would be a forest model M' with only one state w' such 
that p is true in w', and there is no action successors of that state. So we have 
M', w' ^fd [p]T, as the action relation corresponds to [p] is empty. This property 
of [=fd may seem a bit strange, as it may not directly fit the same expectation as 
in |=sd . Essentially, this is because we do not yet enforce any strong connection 
of an announcement modality and an action in the forest model. We will see later 
that formula p —■► [p]T does hold in a special class of forest models that relate to 
this formula (see Definition 5.10).
Next, we define the meanings of the formulas with ‘next-time’ temporal op­
erators in the following way.
D efinition  5.6 (Semantics [=ft ). The semantics of temporal formula Ow<P on 
a forest model M is as follows:
M, w |=ft Ow <P iff s.t. w —>w v and M, v |=ft <p
According to this definition, Ow^AOw_i(P is satisfiable, as one could imagine 
that there is a state w with two w successors in one of which p  is true and in the 
other p  is false. But we will show that this is not satisfiable in a special class of 
forest models in Definition 5.10.
Let J  =  (IZ, {—>w}, 7r) be an action-based interpreted system over a set Q 
of global states. “Runs r  and r' are equivalent to time m” means that the 
initial segments of r  and r' are the same from 0 to m, i.e., r(0) =  r'(0) up to 
r(m) — r'{m). Choosing the bundle semantics as in [87], we now define the 
meaning of Ow7> over an action-based interpreted system.
D efinition  5.7 (Semantics [=|t ). The semantics for Q wp on an action-based 
interpreted systems T  is as follows,
[1, r, m ) |=it Ow P iff there is a run r' that is equivalent to r to time m and 
r'(m) —>w r'(m  + 1) such that: (J, r', m + 1) |=;t p.
Note that this definition also shows a connection of action and time as in
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5.3 T he C ase o f P ublic A nnouncem ent
In this section, we deal with the case of public announcement action models and a 
fragment of C q e l  for public announcement, referred to as £ p a l - Given a formula tp 
in £ p a l , a n d  a multi-agent state model (M, w), we want to simulate checking the 
truth of tp in (M ,w ) by checking the truth of a corresponding temporal epistemic 
formula in a corresponding interpreted system. The interpreted system is based 
on (M , w) but should also encode the dynamics that is implicitly present in tp in 
the form of public announcement operators. It is therefore relative to both tp and 
(M, w). In other words, we are looking for a semantic transformation SEM and a 
syntactic translation SYN (with type: £ p a l  — ► T n t e l )  s u c h  that:
M ,w  (=sd tp iff se m ((M , w),<p) (=it sy n (</p).
The image of the actual world w under SEM (a global state sw) is entirely deter­
mined by the role of w in M. It is therefore sufficient to determine SEM(M, tp):
M, w f=sd tp iff SEM(M ,tp),sw (=¡1 SYN(v?).
5.3.1 Syntactic translation
The PAL formulas translate to NTEL formulas in the following way.
Definition 5.8 (£ pal to £ ntel)- Suppose that every action corresponds to a 
different announcement modality, we define a translation SYN from £ pal to £ ntel 
as follows:
SYN (q)










SYN (tp) -> OwSYN(^)
where action w corresponds to [tp\.
We assume that every announcement in different positions corresponds to 
a different action, so even when two announcement modalities have the same 
formula, they still get different names. For example, [</?][(/?] g cannot be translated 
to Ow Ow Q, as the first [tp] and second [tp] are in different positions and have
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different dynamic effects. For this reason, we introduce a simple procedure to 
mark the announcement modalities so that they get a unique name. We mark 
the n announcements occurring in a formula with indexes from 1 to n in the order 
of occurrence of their left ‘[’ bracket, when reading the formula from left to right. 
Then we associate each modality with index i with action wt. Note that this is 
not the only way to assign different names to different announcements.
Here is an example of the above translation method.
E xam ple 5.2. Suppose we have a formula [q A [r]K2r] C\2q A [T]-^Kiq with three 
announcements. The left bracket ‘[’ in ‘[<7 A . .. ’ comes first when reading from left 
to right. Then comes the left bracket of the announcement [r] that is a subformula 
of [q A [r\K2r\. Finally we reach the announcement [T] in the right-hand side of 
the conjunction. We add indexes to the modalities as follows [xg A [2r]/T2r] A 
[3T]^K iq, then associate them with three announcement variables as follows
w1 pg A [r]K2r] 
w2 [2r] 
w3 [3T]
The translation SYN([g A [r]K2r]Cuq A [T] —i/iTi g) then is
((q A (r —* O ^ K 2r)) -*• Q wiCi2q) A (T —» Q^^Kxq).
PAL P ro to co ls  The dynamics implicitly present in PAL formula p  can be iden­
tified with the set of all sequences of public announcements that may need to be 
evaluated in order to determine the truth of p. As this is known as a protocol 
[57], we call this the protocol of a formula p. ft can be determined from p  and is 
therefore another syntactic feature that we can address before applying it in the 
semantic transformation se m ((M , w ), p).
D efinition  5.9 (Protocol of PAL formula). The protocol of a PAL formula is 
defined by induction on the formula structure. In the last clause, w is the name 
for the announcement of p  in [p]ip, and w p r o t (ip) = (ww1 . . .  wm | w1 . . .  wm €
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PROT(ip)}, i.e. the concatenation ofw  to all sequences in the set of P R O T ^).
PROT(g) 0
prot(-x̂ ) prot(</j)
PROT(</j AV0 " =  PROT(</?) U PROT(^)
PROT ( K i<p )  ::=  prot((/?)
prot(C'b^) ::= prot(</>)
PROt ([v?]V>) ::= prot((/j) U wprot(^)
This notion of protocol is similar to the one in [57]. The difference is that in 
our case PROT(^) is not subsequence closed. The protocol of a formula would 
be subsequence closed if the last clause is changed to prot([<̂ ]?/>) ::= prot(</?) U 
wPROt(V’) U {w}. For a protocol variable we use T.
Exam ple 5.3. We have that PROT([g][r](g A r) A [r\K\r) =  {w1w2,w3}, and that 
pro t ([<7 A [r\K2r\Ci2q A \J]-^Kiq) =  {w^w ^w 3}. (See previous example.)
5.3.2 Sem antic transformation
The required semantic transformation sem in SEM(M ,< p )  is determined in two 
steps. First, we construct the forest model, F(M, prot(̂ j)) from the state model 
M  and the protocol prot(</j) of the public announcement formula ip in a similar 
way as in [77, 12]. Then we determine an interpreted system i s ( M ' )  corresponding 
to a forest model M ' . We then simply define SEm(M, <p) as IS(f (M, prot(<̂ ))).
D efinition 5.10 (Generated Forest Models). Given a state model M  = (W, ~ i 
, ...,~ n,7r), w G W , and a protocol T =  PROt (</j) generated from  PAL formula (p. 
The forest model F(M, T) is defined in three steps.
(1) Let w1 • • • wm be a sequence of actions in protocol T, and suppose that these 
actions belong to public announcement models Mi, M2, • • • , Mm respectively. Let 
Mi be a state model M  <g> Mi • • • <g> Mj, which is the result of announcing w1 to 
w* subsequently on M. Then g(M, w1 • • -wm) is a forest model M ' — (W ',~ /1 
, . . . , ~ ,n,{ ^ } ,7 r ')  such that
• W' = Wm U Wmi U • • • U ŴMm *•e- the set ° f states obtained from subsequent 
updates by announcements;
U r A , where is the epistemic relation of agent i in model M j ;
j€[l..m]
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• w (w,w) for any w ,(w ,w) £ W ;
• 7t'(w ) = 7r(to) s.t. 3Mk(w € & 7r belongs to Mk).
(2) We define a union l±) of two forest models. Given forest model M ' =
( W \  ~ i , ' . . . ,  ~'B, { - ( J ,  A  and M" =  ( W", . . . ,  tt">,
M' U M" ::= ( W'", . . . ,  tt'")
w/iere W'" = W' U U /o r all i € ¿ 0 , U /or all
w ,  and n"'(w) =  n'(w) U 7r"(w) /o r all w  £  W' C\ W ", n'"(w) — 1t'(w ) for all 
w e  W '\  W", 7t"'{w ) =  7t"(w ) for all w  £  W" \ W '.
(3) We have,
F(M,PROT(<p)) ::= WrePROT(v)g(M ,T).
The construction can be seen as repeatedly merging a model and the modal 
product of that model and a singleton ‘action model’ corresponding to an an­
nouncement. We refer to the next section for an example illustrating this proce­
dure.
Next, from such a forest model we determine an action-based interpreted 
system. This is based on a fairly intuitive idea. For each world in a forest model 
we associate it with a global state of an interpreted system. This can be achieved 
by keeping that world as the value of the environmental state and for each agent 
the set of indistinguishable worlds as the value of that agent’s local state. The 
valuation 7r remains as it was. Now for a world w in a state model M = {W, ~ i 
, . . . ,  ~ n) this recipe delivers a corresponding global state s = (w, w~x, . . . ,  w~n), 
where w~* is the ¿-equivalence class containing w, i.e. {w' £ W \ w' tc}. 
The same recipe applies, in principle, to worlds (w, w1, . . . ,  wm) in the forest 
model F(M, PROt (</5)), but here we can somewhat simplify matters by observing 
that (¿) the environment is fully determined by the w in (w, w1, . . . ,  wm) because 
all events (such as announcements) are defined relative to their combined effect 
on the agents only, and by observing that (¿¿) public announcements are fully 
observable by all agents so we can represent them as global parameters. In 
the following we use (w, w~r, . . . ,  w~n, w1, . . . ,  wm) to denote the global state 
((w, w1, . . .  ,wm), (w, w1, . . .  ,wm)~1, . . . ,  (w , vj\ .  .. ,wm)~").
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D efinition 5.11 (Generated Action-based Interpreted System). Given a forest 
model M = ( W, ~ i , ..., {—>w}, 7r), we associate M with an action-based inter­
preted system 1, also written as IS(M), which is a structure (7Z, {—>w}, tt) defined 
as follows.
Every state (w , w1, . . . ,  wm) in the forest model M corresponds to a global state 
(w , w ~ ',. . . ,  w~n, w1, . . . ,  wm), where the local state of agent i is (u/~‘, w1, . . . ,  wTO). 
We pick every state in forest model M with no —>w successors for any action w. 
A ran r GlZ is defined for each of such states. Suppose (w, w1, . . . ,  wfc) is a state 
in M , its associated run r, together with —>w and n, is defined as follows:
• r(0) =  (w, w ~ \ . . . ,  w~n);
• r(i) — (w, w~l , . . . ,  w~n, w1, . . . ,  w*) /or all 1 < i < k ; r(i) =  r( i — 1), 
otherwise;
• r(i — 1) —>wi r(i) /o r all 1 < i < k;
• The valuations correspond: n(r(i)) = it{w ), i.e. all the states in a run have 
the same valuation.
It is easy to see that each run is essentially a branch in the corresponding 
forest model. We have an example in the next section to illustrate this.
The following diagram summarizes the syntactic translation and the semantic 
transitions we made.
£ d e l
SYN
t
£ n t e l
5.3.3 Exam ple
We illustrate the transformations defined in the previous section through the 
following example.
Consider two agents 1 and 2 and two facts q and r. Agent 1 knows whether 
q but is uncertain about the truth of r, whereas agent 2 knows whether r  but is 
uncertain about the truth of q. The agents are commonly aware of each other’s
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factual knowledge and ignorance. In fact, both q and r are true. This is modelled 








We have named the four states of the model w00, w10, w01, and w11, where the 
index reveals the valuation of atoms q and r (in that order), e.g. to state w01, 
we give 7r(w01) = {r}. Agent 1 cannot distinguish states w00, w(n, therefore they 
are linked and the link is labelled with a T ’, i.e. w00 ~ i  w01. Similar for agent 2.
Suppose we want to check the truth of formula [?][r](? A r) A [r] A) r  in state 
w11 of the above model. One could associate this formula with an indexed version 
[1(?][2r](q A r) A [3r]Kir we proposed earlier, and the action variables w1, w2, and 
w3 represent the three different announcements in this formula. Note that the first 
and second announcement r are named differently. The protocol PROT([<7][r](<7 A 
r) A [r\K\r) is {w1w2,w3}.
We now apply the procedure introduced in Definition 5.10, and construct the 
forest model F(Mj„jt , PROT([</][r](g A r) A [r]Kir)) as follows.
First, consider q. An announcement of q results in a new model, Mi with two 
states (wu ,w1) and (ud^w 1). In the resulting model, agent 1 is still uncertain 
about r, but agent 2 now knows the value of q. After the announcement of q, 
given [<7][r](<? A r), atom r  is subsequently announced, resulting in another state 
model M2, which consists a single state (ud1, w1, w2). In this model, both agents 
know that q and r are true. Now we consider the second r. It is announced in 
the initial model and results in a third model M3 with two states (ry01,w3) and 
(wd1, w3). In this model, agent 2 is still uncertain about q, but agent 1 knows 
whether q. Depicting all three announcements at the same time, we get
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where Mi is in column 3, and M2 is in column 4 and M3 is in row 1 (counting 
from top to bottom).
F(Minit, w'w2) is depicted in the row 2 and 3 with seven states in total, and 
F(Mj„jt ,w3) is depicted in the column 1 and 2 with six states in total. Now 
F(Mmit, w1 w2) l+J F (Minit, w3) is the merge of above two forests which have common 
states exactly the same as the states in the initial model Mm .










w (tw11, w1, w2)
We now associate an action-based interpreted system with the forest model 
just given, following Definition 5.11. The above forest model consists of four 
trees with the roots id11, id00, id01, and id10, and five states that have no action 
successors: (id10,!«1), (id11, w1, w2), (id01,w3), and (idn ,w3) and id00.
The global state (id10, {id10, id11}, {id00, to10}) is associated with the state id10, 
and the global state (w10, {id10, id11}, {id10}, w1), (in other words:
(id10, {(id10,«/1), (id11, w1)}, {(id10, w1)})), is associated with the state (id10,!«1) 
in the forest model, etc. Write s10 for the former global state and s10w1 for the 
latter. The accessibility relations for agent 1 and 2 remain the same. Instead of 
action-labelled transitions we now have runs connecting the global states. There 
are five runs, (arbitrarily) named as
r  (s10, s 10w1) 
r' (s11, s11w1, s 11w1w2) 
r" (s01,s 01w3) 
r'" (su ,s n w3) 
r"" (s00)
5.3. THE CASE OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT 109
This interpreted system can now be depicted as
n,„l
10, „1
T ii i o------ *• Sm\N \N
S W
The translation SYN of the formula [?][r](g A r) A [r]K\r, was, as we have al­
ready seen, (q —> 0 „ i( r  —*► Ow2(? A r))) A (r —> O ^ K ir ) .  It is easy to verify 
that Minit,w u  Kd M M (?A r) A[r].Kir, as well as, ls(Miniu PROT([g][r](g A r) A 
[r]Kir)), s 11 f=it (? -* Owi(r -*■ Ow2(? A r))) A (r -> Ow3^ i0 -
5.3.4 Theoretical results
We now show, in three steps, the equivalence
M, w |=sd iff SEM(M, p), sw hit SYN(p).
The first step is to show that given a state model M  and a PAL formula p, the in­
terpretation of <p over (M, w) is equivalent to its interpretation over F(M, pro t(<£>)) 
which is the forest model built from M  and p. The second step is to show that p 
and its syntactic transformation SYN (p) are equivalent when they are both inter­
preted over the forest model F(M, pro t(</?)). The third, last, step is to show that 
the interpretation of SYN(^) over an arbitrary forest model and its corresponding 
interpreted system are equivalent. We explain these steps in three propositions: 
Proposition 5.1, Proposition 5.2, and Proposition 5.3. Before doing that, we first 
prove a lemma about some important features of the forest models.
Lem m a 5.1. Given a state model M and PAL formulas p ,if, the following equiv­
alences hold:
i. f (M, prot(<£> A ip)), w (=fd <=> f (M ,pr o t((^)), w [=fd y;
U. f (M ,p r o t([p \iP)),w f=fd p & f (M ,p r o t (p ) ) ,w (=fd <p; 
in. F(M, PROT(v? A 'Ip)), W bft SYN(<£>) F(M, PROT(</?)), W hft SYN(v3);
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iv. f(M ,p ro t([p ]iP)),w (=ft syn(</>) «=> f (M ,prot(< )̂),u; [=ft SYN(<£>);
P ro o f . Let a state model M  and PAL formulas p ,  ip be given.
Case i:
We first prove the direction =x Suppose F(M, prot(<̂  A ip)), w |=fd p,  we have 
F(M, PROT(</?) U PROt (̂ >)), w [=fd p ,  since PROT(<p Aip) =  PROT(<p) U PROT(^). 
It follows that f (M, prot(<p)) i±) f (M, prot(^)), w  (=fd p .  Suppose the domain 
of f (M, prot(</>)) is W \ ,  and that of f (M,PROt(^)) is W 2 , then according to 
the forest model construction in Definition 5.10, we have W \  fl W 2 =  W m , which 
means that the set of common states between these two forests is exactly the set 
of states in model M .
There are two cases for formula p ,  either it contains no action modalities, 
then its truth value can be solely decided by the states in M , or it contains action 
modalities that correspond only to the actions in forest model f (M, PROt (<̂ )), 
therefore its truth value can be decided solely by f(M, prot(</?)). In both 
cases, the truth value of p  can be solely decided in f (M, PROT(<p)), so we have 
f (M, prot(</?)), w  f=fd p.  The direction <= follows from a reverse reasoning.
Case ii: (assume the action corresponding to [p\ is w)
We first prove the direction =>. Suppose f(M, PROt ([<̂ ]V0), w  (=fd p ,  we have
f (M ,prot(<p)Uwprot(^)), w  |=fd p ,  since prot([</>]̂ ) =  prot(<p)U wprot(VO-
Therefore f(M, prot(<̂ )) i±)f (M, wprot(^)), vu }=fd p. Again we distinguish two 
cases of p ,  and conclude that the truth value of p  is solely decided by the forest 
f (M, PROT(<p)), s o  f (M, prot(</?)), w |=fd p. The direction •<= follows from a 
reverse reasoning.
Case in:
We first show the direction =». Suppose f ( M ,p r o t (<p  A ip)), w |=ft s y n (</?), it 
follows that F (M , p r o t (</?) U PROt (^ ) ) ,  w |=ft SYN(</?), and therefore 
F ( M ,  PROT(<p)) I±Jf (M , p r o t (^ ) ) ,  w (=ft SYN(<p). We distinguish two cases of for­
mula SYN((p), either it contains no temporal modalities, then its truth value can 
be solely decided by M ,  or it contains temporal modalities parameterized by the 
actions only in forest model f (M , p r o t (</?)), hence its value can be decided by 
F (M , p r o t (<£>)). In both case, the truth value of s y n (</?) can be decided by forest 
model f (M , PROt (</?)), s o  we have f (M , p r o t (<p )) j= f t  SYN(c^). The direction 
follows from a reverse reasoning.
Case iv:
It follows from a similar reasoning as presented in Case ii and Case in.
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□
This lemma shows a special property of the forest models built from a state 
model and a PAL formula. In the case of formula p A ip and [<p]ip, the truth value 
of ip is solely decided by the forest model f (M, PROT(cp)), which is a submodel 
of both F(M, pro t(9? A ip)) and F(M, PROT([ip]ip)).
We give the following example to explain the idea more intuitively.
E xam ple 5.4. As we show in the previous example, F P R O T ( [ g ] [ r ](5 A r) A 
[r)Kir)) is as follows,
(w11, w3)
(w11,™1) ———- (w11, w^w 2) 
1
(w10, w1)
The forest model F P R O T ( [ g ] [ r ] ( g  A r)) consists of all the states in the lower 
two rows, and the forest model F(Mj„jt , PROT([r]/sTir)) consists of all the states 
in the first and second columns. Clearly, the common states of these two forest 
models are w01,w n ,w°° and ww, which are exactly those states in model 
We evaluate the second conjunct of [?][r](<7 A r) A [r]K\r, namely [r\K\r, in the 
state ry11 of the model F(M jnjt , PROT([</][r](</ A r)) A Kir). It is easy to verify 
that r is true in w11 and there is a w3-successor (wu ,\n3) in which K \r is true. 
Since all w3-successors can only be included in the forest F(M jnjt , PROT([r]A 'ir)) 
and there are no epistemic links to the rest of the states, we conclude that the 
evaluation of [r]K\r in the state w 11 of the model F(M jnjf, PROT([r]Ari r ) )  is the 
same.
We can do a similar analysis for the evaluation of SYN([r]K\r)), i.e. r —> 
Q ^sK ir, in model F {MinU, PROT([g][r](g A r ) ) .
Here is our first result.
P ro p o sitio n  5.1. Let M be a state model and ip € £ pal-
M , w (=sd p iff f (M ,pr o t (</?)), w (=fd <P
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Proof. Given a state model M, and formula ip, we follow the procedure in Defi­
nition 5.10 and build a forest model f (M, prot(</?)). Suppose that the interpre­
tation function of M  is 7Ti and that of F(M, prot(^)) is n 2. We do an induction 
on the structure of </?.
Case q :
M ,  w  f=sd q
q € tti(w )
7Ti( w )  =  tt2(w ) by the construction of F( M ,  PROt (</?))
q € ir2( w )
f ( M , PROT(g)), W  |=fd q
Case —1“0:
M ,  w  f=sd -iip 
&
M ,  w  hsd ip
f (M ,pro t(^)), w  hfd ip 
&
F(M,PROT(->1p)),W hfd ip 
<t4>
f(M,prot(->V’))> w hfd ~I'<P
Case tpi A ip2 :
M, w  t=sd ipi A ip2 
<£>
M, u> (=sd ipi and M, iu (=sd t/>2 
O  By induction
F(M,PROT(ipl )) ,w  (=fd i>\ and f (M, prot(^ )) , w f=fd
<=> By Lemma 5.1
F(M, PROT(^i a ^2)), W hfd ipi and f (M, PROt (^i A ip2) ) ,  u> |=fd ^2
f(M, prot(^i A ^2)), w  hfd ipi A i p
By induction 
As PROT(V') =  PROT(-i^)
Case K iip :
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M, w |=sd Kitp 
\/v(w r̂ 'i =>• M, v |=sd ip)
<=> By induction
Vv(w =» f (M, prot(V')), v (=fd $)
As PROT(^) =  PROT(Aj^)
\/v(w ~i V => f(M,  PROT(Kiip)), v |=fd ip) 
f (M, PROT(Kiip)), w (=fd Kiip
Case CbiP- 
M , W |=sd Cgip
\/v(w *B v => M ,v  (=sd ip)
•<=> By induction
Wv(w V =*• F(M, PROT(^)), V (=fd ip)
<=> As prot(V0 =  prot(C'bV')
\fv(w *B v = >  F(Af, prot(C'bV')), v hfd -0)
f (M ,prot(CbV)), «/ hfd CB1p
Case [V’ijV'2: assume that [^i] corresponds to the only action w in public 
announcement model M,
M, w f=sd bPilfa 
<=>
M, w (=sd ipi => M <8> M, (w, w) |=sd ipi
<=> By induction
F(M , PROt (Vm)), W l=fd ipi =*> F(M (8) M, pr o t (^2)), O , w) f=fd ip2
By Lemma 5.1
f (M, prot([V»i]^ )), w hfd hi =► f(M (8 M, prot(V>2)), (w, w) hfd tp2
By forest model construction
F(M,PROT([^i]^)),W  hfd hi => F(M,wPROT(h2) ) , K w) hfd V>2
<t4>
f (M ,prot([-0i]^2)),^ hfd hi =» 
f (M ,wprot(^2) U prot(^i )), (iu,w) hfd h2
As WPROT('02) U PROT(V'i ) =  P ROT (hi] ip2)
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F (M ,P R O T ([^ i ] ^ ) ) ,W  Hfd b l  = > F (M ,P R O T ([b l]b 2 )) ,(u;>w ) bfd V>2 
<i=>
f (M , p r o t ([V’i ]V'2 ) ) 1 w |=fd b i  => there is (w, w) such that w —>w (w, w) 
and f (M , P R O T ([bi]b 2 )), («A w) bfd. 1P2
f (M ,PR O t ([^ i ]^ 2 ) ) ,u; bfd [Vh]b2
□
This result shows that we can either evaluate a PAL formula in a state model, 
or alternatively construct a ‘supermodel’ that already contains all future dynamic 
developments labelled by actions. Our formulation, relative to a formula p  to be 
evaluated, is slightly different from the standard purely semantic form. In Ven- 
ema’s chapter ‘Dynamic Models in their Logical Surroundings’ in [11, page 122], 
he presented a model construction by way of a ternary accessibility operator, 
based on ordinary binary epistemic accessibilities. For a description of the tech­
nique see [11], or [77, 12].
The next result says that a formula p  G £ pal and its translation SYN(cp) G 
£ ntel are equivalent when they are interpreted over the same forest model.
P roposition  5.2. Given a state model M and a PAL formula p:
f (M , PROt (<£>)), w bfd tp iff f (M , p r o t (</?)), w b ft  s y n (</?)
Proof. Given a state model M, and formula p, we follow the procedure in Defi­
nition 5.10 and build a forest model f (M , PROt (</?)). Suppose that the interpre­
tation function of F (M, p r o t (</?)) is 7r in both semantics bfd and bft • We do 
an induction on the structure of p. The cases of q, -op, Kpp and Cab are trivial, 
so we just show the following two cases.
Case i>i A ip2:
F (M , PRO T(bi A tp2)), W bfd ipi a  'ip2
F (M , PRO T(^i a  tp2)), w bfd ipi and  F (M , PRO T(bi A ip2)), w bfd V>2
By Lemma 5.1
f (M , p r o t ^ ) ) ,  w bfd and f (M , p r o t ( ^ 2)), w bfd ^ 2
By induction
f ( M , p r o t ( ^ ! ) ) , io b f t  SYN(bl) and  F ( M ,P R O T (ip2)),w  b ft SYn (V>2 )
•*=>■ By Lemma 5.1
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f ( M ,p r o t (V>i A f a ) ) ,  w  hft SYN(^i) and 
F(M , PROTEI A V2)), W  [-ft SYN( f a )
F(M , PROTEI A i p 2 ) ) ,  W  I=ft SYN(^i) a  SYN(VO
f ( M ,  prot(^i a  V0)> yj hft syn(^i a  ip2)
Case [VdlV  ̂ (assume that [V>i] corresponds to the only action w in public 
announcement model M)
We have to show that
f (M , p r o t ([^ i ]^ 2)), w [=fd [fa]fa iff f ( M , p r o t ([V>i ] ^ ) ) ,  w K  svn([fa]fa).
In other words:
F (M ,P R O T ([ fa ] fa ) ) ,W  hfd -01 => f ( M , p r o t ( [^ i ]^ 2) ) , ( w , w) hfd f a
F(M ,PROT([V>l]V0),™  h f t  SYN (VO =4> F (M , PROT([V’i ]V,2 ))! w  h f t  O w SYN(V>2)
First we show that both conditional parts are equivalent (i). Then we show that 
on the condition, both consequential parts are equivalent ( i t ) .  In the proof we 
use various times that PROTQVqjVO) — PR.OT(V'i) U wPROt (V>2 )-
(i) We show that
F ( M , PROT([V'i ]V’2)), W hfd fa  iff F (M , PRO T(hi]V ,2)), w  h f t  SYN(V̂ i)
by the following equivalence:
F ( M , P R O T ( [ f a ] f a ) ) , w  hfd f a
By Lemma 5.1
F(M,PROT(V>i)),ra hfd f a
By induction
f (M , PRO T(^ i )), W h f t  s y n ( ^ i )
<<=*•
F ( M , P R O T ( [ f a ] f a ) ) , W  h ft  SYN(V»i)
By Lemma 5.1
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(it) Next, we show that on condition of F(M, prot(?/>i )), w  |=fd tp \\
f ( M ,p r o t ([^ i ] ^ ) ) , ( w , w) hfd $2 iff F(M,PROT(['i/)1]^2)),W  h f t  O wSYN(^2)- 
f (M , p r o t ( ^ i ) U w p r o t ( ^ 2)), (w , w) [=« tp2
f (M, wprot(^2)), (w, w) f=fd 1p 2 
&
F(M 0  M, prot(^2)), («>, w) |=fd 1p2 
<*=*>
f (M 0  M, prot(^2)), (w, w) |=ft syn(^2) 
f (M,WPROT(^2)), (tw,w) |=ft SYN(^2)
(w,w) £ f (M, PROT(V’i)) 
By forest model construction 
By induction 
By forest model construction 
(w, w) £ F(M, PROT(V’i))
F(M, PROT(^l) u WPROT^)), ( w , w) |=ft SY N ^) 
f(M ,prot([^i]^2)) ,(w, w) hft syn(^2) 
f(M ,prot(['0i]V’2)) ,^  hft O wSYN(^2)
□
We now turn to the third result.
P roposition  5.3. For every executable tp € £ ntel (i-e-> a formula of the form  
SYN ftp) with tp 6 Cpm), arid forest model M :
M , w [=ft V Iff IS(M), (w, w ~\  . . . ,  w~n) h t  V
Proof. Let a forest model M  be given. We construct an interpreted system IS(M) 
according to the procedure in Definition 5.11. Let sw stand for (w, w~*,. . . ,  w~n), 
the interpretation function of M  be 7Ti, and the interpretation function of is(M) 
be 7t2. We do an induction on tp. All the cases are trivial but the following case: 
Case ipx —> O w ^:
M, w hft ipi -► Ow^2
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M, W |=ft -ipi => M , w [=ft Ow 02
(0) on condition of M, ru |= 0 i a run exists
M, w [=ft 0 i M, (w, w) |=ft 02 
IS(M), Sw ^¡t 01 ^  IS(A/), (5W, w) |=|t 02
(@) a run always exists
By induction
IS(M), Sw [=jt 01 —̂ IS(M), Sw [=|t Ow 02 
IS(M), Sw [=|t 01 ♦ Ow02
In step ft of the proof, this is guaranteed by the condition M, w f=ft 0i: as the 
announcement is true, it can be executed and there is an —>w accessible state 
from w. This is not guaranteed if 0 i is false.
In step @ of the proof the required path always exists, as runs in inter­
preted systems are infinite. In particular, if sw =  (rw, i ), the selected (su,,w) 
(i.e. (w , (ro~1 ,w ),. . . ,  w)) is of the form (r 'w, i +  1 ) where r’ is equivalent
to r  to time i. D
We emphasise that Proposition 5.3 does not hold for arbitrary formulas in our 
temporal epistemic fragment, because of the observed slight but essential differ­
ence between forest models, where action sequences are finite, and corresponding 
interpreted systems, with infinite runs. More precisely: in case p  —> Ow0 of the 
proof of Proposition 5.3 the precondition p  is essential! States in forest models 
do not necessarily have an action successor, so that in such states all formulas 
of form Ow0  are false, whereas runs in interpreted systems keep looping after a 
finite meaningful prefix, e.g. Q wq will always remain true if q is true.
We now have the main result from Propositions 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. Note that 
SEu(M ,p) is by definition is(f (M, pro t((^))).
T heorem  5.1. Given a state model M , and a PAL formula p,
M ,w  f=sd p iff SEM(M ,p ) ,sw (=it SYN(</?)
Proof. M , w |=Sd (p 
&
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f (M ,prot(</?)), w (=ft syn(v?)
Proposition 5.3
is(f (M, prot(<p))), s w  h t  syn(<̂ )
□
5.4 G eneralization
We now generalize the approach in the previous section from public announce­
ments as in [(p\rp to action models as in [M,w]^.
Definition 5.12 (£ del to /Intel) • We d e f in e  a  t r a n s l a t i o n  SYN f r o m  £ del to  
£ ntel «5 f o l l o w s :
SYN ( q )











It is easy to see that the clause for public announcement (see Definition 5.8) 
is a special case.
We then define the protocol of a DEL formula in a similar way as in Definition 
5.9.
Definition 5.13 (Protocol of DEL formula). T h e  protocol of a DEL formula i s  
d e f in e d  b y  i n d u c t i o n  o n  th e  f o r m u l a  s t r u c tu r e .  I n  th e  la s t  c la u s e ,  vPROT(ip ) =  
{vw1.. .  wm I w1. . .  wm G PROt (^)}; i . e .  th e  c o n c a t e n a t i o n  o f  v t o  a l l  s e q u e n c e s  
in  th e  s e t  o f  prot^ ) .
prot(ç) 
prot(—19?) 





=  pr o t(</?)
=  PROT(</j) u prot(^)
— pr o t(</?)
=  PROT(</?)
=  lU©(M)(PROT(pre(v) U vprot(^))
w h e r e  D(M) i s  th e  d o m a i n  o f  th e  a c t i o n  m o d e l ,  w h ic h  in c lu d e s  th e  p o i n t  w.
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The main change in this definition compared to Definition 5.9 is the last 
clause. Here we chose to take a union for all v 6 "D(M) because the truth of <p 
might be evaluated in the result of the current state model updated with action 
model M. And of course Definition 5.9 is still a special case of this one, as the 
public announcement model has a singleton domain.
Next, we generalize Definition 5.10 in a straight-forward way.
Definition 5.14 (Generated Forest Models: the General Case). Given a state 
model M = ( W, ~ i , ..., n), w G W, and a protocol T =  pr o t(</?) generated
from DEL formula ip. The forest model f (M ,T) is defined in three steps.
(1) Let w1 • • ■ wm be a sequence of actions in protocol T , and suppose that these
actions belongs to action models M1; M2, • • • , Mm respectively. Let Mi be a state 
model M (g> Mi • ■ • ® Mj, which is the result of updating Mi to subsequently 
on M . Then g(M , w1 • • • w m ) is a forest model M' =  ( W', . . . ,  {—>(„},n')
such that
• W' =  WM U WMl U • • • U WMm i-e. the set of states from subsequent updates;
• w w1 iff 3Mk(w w1 & is the relation of agent i in Mk);
• w —>w (w,w) for any w, (w, w) e W';
• n'(w) — tx(w) s.t. 3Mk(w G WMk & 7T belongs to Mk).
(2) We define a union tt) of two forest models. Given forest model M ’ —
( W', ~ i , . . . ,  ~'n, n’), and M" = ( W ”, . . . ,  { ^ f } ,  n"),
M' U M" ( W "\ . . . ,  O
where W'" =  W' U W", U for all i € Ag, U -*$ for all
w ,  and tt"'(w) =  tt'(w) U tt"(w) for all w € W' fl W ", n"'(w) — n'(w) for all 
w e W ' \  W", 7r'"(w) = n”{w) for all w G W" \  W'.
(3) We have,
f (M , PR0T(<^)) I±I7-6p r o t (v5)5,( -^ ) t )-
The transformation from the forest models to the action-based interpreted 
systems is the same as in Definition 5.11, as we do not put any special restric­
tions of forest model in that definition. The idea again is to associate every state
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(w, w1, . . . ,  wm) in the forest model with a global state (w , u/~1, . . . ,  w~n, w1, . . . ,  wm) 
in (?, where the local state of agent i is (w, w1, . . . ,  wm)~‘, and to compile runs 
out of branches of the forest model.
5.4.1 Theoretical results
We now proceed to generalize the results in Section 5.3.4.
Lem m a 5.2. Given a state model M and DEL formulas p ,^ ,  the following equiv­
alences hold:
i. f (M , p r o t (<̂  A ip)), w (=fd p &  f (M , p r o t (9?)), w (=fd <p;
i i .  f (M , p r o t ([M, w]^0 ), w  |=fd pre(w) O  f (M , PROT(pre(w))), w  (=fd pre(w);
in. f (M , p r o t (</j A ip)), w  |=ft SYN(pre(w)) <=>
F(M,PROT(<p)), w f=ft SYN(pre(w));
i v .  f ( M ,  PROt ([M, w]^ )), w f=ft SYN(pre(w)) o
f ( M ,  PROT(pre(w))), w  [=ft SYN(pre(w));
Proof. Let a state model M  and DEL formulas p, 'ip be given.
Case i: This follows from the same reasoning as in Lemma 5.1.
Case i i :  For the direction =£•, suppose f (M , p r o t ([M, w]^)), w  |=fd pre(w). 
We have F(M , (Jvg2-,(M̂ (PROT(pre(v) U vPR O T ^))), w [=fd pre(w). It is easy to see 
that F(M , PROT(pre(w))) is a sub-model of F(M , !Jv6i,(Mj(PROT(pre(v)UvPROT('0 ))).
We distinguish two cases of pre(w), i.e. either pre(w) contains no action modal­
ities, or it contains action modalities that correspond only to the actions in forest 
F(M, PROT(pre(w))). In both cases, the truth value of pre(w) is solely decided by 
the forest f (M , PROT(pre(w))), therefore we have f (M , PROT(pre(w))), w (=fd pre(w). 
The direction <= follows from a reverse reasoning.
Case in: This follows from the same reasoning as in Lemma 5.1.
Case iv: This follows from the similar reasoning as in Case ii. □
P roposition  5.4. Let M  be a state model and p  G £ del-
M , w \ =  s t  p  i f f  f ( M , p r o t ( p ) ) , w  (=fd P
Proof. Given a state model M, and formula p, we follow the procedure in Def­
inition 5.14 and build a forest model f (M, prot(^)). We do an induction on
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the structure of <p. The cases of atomic proposition, negation, knowledge and 
common knowledge are essentially the same as in the proof of Proposition 5.1. 
We only show the case with action modality.
Case [M,w]V>:
M ,  w  j=sd [M, w]^
M ,  w  f=sd pre(w) => M  0  M, ( w ,  w) |=5d ip
<=̂> By induction
f (M, PROT(pre(w))), w  l=fd pre(w) f ( M  <g> M, prot('0)), ( w , w) |=fd ip
By Lemma 5.2
f (M, prot([M, w]t/>)), w  f=fd pre(w) =*> f(M M,prot(V0), (w, w) |=fd ip
By forest model construction
f (M, prot([M, w]î/;)), w  |=fd pre(w) =>
F(M, Uv6p (m)VPROT(^)), ( w , w) |=fd ip
f (M, PROt ([M, w ] ip ) ) ,  w  (=« pre(w) =>•
f (M, Uv6p (m)VPROt (^) U PROT(pre(w))), ( w ,  w) (=fd ip
As Uv6I,(m)VPROt ('0) U PROT(pre(w)) =  prot([M, w]t/>) 
f (M, prot([M, w]V»)), w  (=fd pre(w) => 
f (M, prot([M, w]V»)), ( w , w) |=fd ip
f (M, prot([M, w]^)), w  [=« pre(w) => 3(iü, w) s.t. w  —>w (w,w) 
and f (M ,prot([M,w]^ )),(iü, w) |=fd -0
f (M ,prot([M,w]^ )),u; |=fd [M,w]^
□
Proposition 5.5. Given a state model M and a DEL formula ip:
f (M, prot(</j)), w |=fd p iff f (M, PROT(</>)), w (=ft syn(<p)
Proof. Given a state model M  and a DEL formula <p, we follow the procedure 
in Definition 5.14 and build a forest model f (M, prot(</?)). We do an induction 
on the structure of p. The cases of atomic proposition, negation, knowledge and 
common knowledge are essentially the same as in the proof of Proposition 5.2. 
We only show the case with action modality.
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Case [M,w]?/>:
We have to show that
f ( M ,  p r o t ([M, w]^ )) , w  ^=fd [M,w]^ iff f (M ,p r o t ([M ,w] '0 )) ,w; (=ft s y n ([M ,w]^).
In other words:
f (M , p r o t ([M, w]^ )) , w  f=fd pre(w) => f (M , p r o t ([M, w ] i p ) ) ,  ( w , w) f=fd ip
f (M ,p r o t ([M ,w] ^ ) ) ,w \ = f t SYN(pre(w)) =>- f (M , p r o t ([M, w ] i p ) ) ,  w  |=ft Ow sy n (^)
First we show that both conditional parts are equivalent (i). Then we show that 
on the condition, both consequential parts are equivalent (ii). In the proof we 
use various times that p r o t ([M, w]^>)) = Uv€z>(m)VPROt (^ )  U PROT(pre(w)).
(i) We show that
f (M , PROt ([M, w]^ )) , w  |=fd pre(w) iff f (M , PROt ([M, w ] i p ) ) ,  vj  |=ft SYN(pre(w))
by the following equivalence:
f (M , p r o t ([M, w]^ )) , vj  |=fd pre(w)
By Lemma 5.2
f (M , PROT(pre(w))), w (=fd pre(w)
By induction
f (M , PROT(pre(w))), w (=ft SYN(pre(w))
By Lemma 5.2
f (M , PROt ([M, w]^>)), w  ^=ft SYN(pre(w))
(ii)  Next, we show th a t  on condition of F(M , PROT(pre(w))), w |=fd pre(w): 
f (M ,p r o t ([M ,w]^ )), ( w , \ n )  }=fd 1p  iff F(M ,PRO T([M ,w ]^)),?a|=ftO w SY N ('0 ).
f (M ,p r o t ([M ,w]V»)), ( w , \ n ) [=fd Ip 
&
f (M ,U v6D(m)v p r o t (V') UPROT(pre(w ))),(w ,w) f=fd ip
O  (w , \ N ) £  f (M , PROT(pre(w)))
F(M ,U v6x>(M)VPROT(^)), ( w , w )  t=fd Ip
By forest model construction
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f (M <g> M, prot(^)), ( w , \n ) hfd ip
4 4  By induction
f (M <g> M, prot(^)), { w , w) |=ft syn(V')
<=> By forest model construction
F(M,Uvex,(M)VPROT(V0),Kw) (=ft SYN(^)
(w , w) ^ f (M, PROT(pre(w)))
F(M, UveP(M)VPROT(̂ ) UPROT(pre(w))), (ru,w) f=ft SYN(V') 
f (M,PROT([M,w]V')), (w,w) |=ft SYN('0)
f (M ,prot([M,w]^)),«; hft OwSYN(^)
□
P ro p o sitio n  5 .6 . F o r  e v e r y  executable </? € £ ntel a f o r m u l a  o f  the  f o r m
SYN( ip)  w i t h  'ip €  jCdelA and, f o r e s t  m o d e l  M :
M , w |=ft ip iff l s ( M ) , ( w , w ~ \ . . . , w ~ n) h t  <P
P r o o f .  Let a forest model M  be given. We construction an interpreted sys­
tem IS(M) according to the procedure in Definition 5.11. Let s w stand for 
( w ,  w ~ x, . . . ,  w ~ n).  We do an induction on ip. We only show the case with 
temporal modality as the other cases are essentially the same as in the proof 
of Proposition 5.3.
Case pre(w) —> Ow tp- 
M , w  l=ft pre(w) ->  OwV’
M ,  w  hft pre(w) => M , w  hft Ow
4 4  (#) on condition of M , w  f= pre(w) a run exists
M ,  w  hft pre(w) =4 M ,  (w , w ) hft V’
4 4  By induction
IS( M ) , s w hit pre(w) =4  i s ( M ) ,  ( s w , w )  hit '•P
i s ( M ) ,  s w hit prc(w) =r" IS(M), sw hit Ĉ w ip 
4 4
IS( M ) , s w hit pre(w) Qwfp
(@) a run always exists
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In step ft of the proof, this is guaranteed by the condition M, w  |=ft pre(w): as 
the precondition of w is true, it can be executed and there is an —>w accessible 
state from w. This is not guaranteed if pre(w) is false.
In step @ of the proof the required path always exists, as runs in inter­
preted systems are infinite. In particular, if sw =  (rw, i ), the selected (sw, w) 
(i.e. (w , (w, w)~1, . . ., (w, w)~n) is of the form (r'w, i +  1) where r' is equivalent 
to r  to time i.
□
Now the generalization of Theorem 5.1 also holds.
Theorem 5.2. Given a state model M, and a DEL formula p,
M , w |=sd <p iff SEM(M, p) , sw h t  SYN(fp)
Proof. It directly follows from Proposition 5.4, Proposition 5.5 and 5.6. □
5.5 Sum m ary
Theorem 5.1 and Themorem 5.2 provide a correspondence on dynamic epistemic 
framework and temporal epistemic framework. Given an epistemic state and a 
formula in dynamic epistemic logic, we constructed an action-based interpreted 
system relative to that epistemic state and that formula, that satisfied the transla­
tion of the formula into temporal epistemic logic, and vice versa. The construction 
involved the protocol implicitly present in the dynamic epistemic formula, i.e. the 
set of sequences of actions being executed to evaluate the formula.
The temporal epistemic model checkers mentioned [69, 27, 75] have all in 
common that their semantics is on interpreted systems, and that they optimize 
search by implementing ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs, see [44] for 
an introduction). This requires boolean local state variables. Our presentation so 
far has been on a rather ‘abstract’ level where local states took structured forms 
such as (uqw,v), thus providing a direct representation for the comparison with 
dynamic epistemic logics. Such abstract presentation has its value in theoretical 
investigations, but it is still open how it can be used in the context of MAS 
programs. Although the current temporal epistemic checkers do not yet support 
action-based interpreted systems, we believe that it is a possible direction to go.
Chapter 6
M odel Checking K now ledge  
D ynam ics
6.1 In troduction
In Chapter 4, we considered the verification of playability conditions for complete 
information games. In Chapter 5, we built a connection between two closely- 
related formalisms, Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) and Temporal Epistemic 
Logic (TEL), in which one can represent and reason about the dynamics of the 
agents’ knowledge. The modelling of agents’ knowledge and ignorance captures 
the essence of incomplete information. Now we turn to the verification of in­
complete information scenarios more practically, with model checking tools (also 
referred to as “model checkers”) using DEL or TEL as underlying theories.
This chapter first discusses the role of protocols in building multi-agent sys­
tems during the model checking process, then gives an introduction to three state- 
of-the-art model checkers that are going to be used: DEM O (Dynamic Epistemic 
Modelling), MCK (Model Checking Knowledge) and MCMAS (Model Check­
ing Multi-Agent Systems). The differences of modelling multi-agent systems in 
DEL and TEL with three model checkers are studied and compared through two 
detailed case studies: the Russian Cards Problem and the Sum And Product 
Problem. In the first case study, we formulate and study the properties of a 
communication protocol that solves the Russian Cards Problem, and then verify 
these properties in three model checkers. In the second case study, we investigate 
a protocol involved with agents’ knowledge and ignorance. It is specified and 
verified in DEMO. Then the complexity of this problem in DEM O is discussed.
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And we also explain the inherent difficulties to use MCK and MCMAS for this 
case.
6.2 M odel C hecking and P rotocols
As introduced in Chapter 1 and shown in Chapter 4, there are mainly three steps 
in the model checking process: (1) modelling the problem in a logical formalism 
that is accepted by a model checker, (2) translating the specification in natural 
language to its formal correspondence in the specification language of the model 
checker, and (3) running the actual verification with the model produced in the 
first step and the specification produced in the second step. The new aspect in 
this chapter is that we are dealing with models for incomplete information and 
with knowledge specifications.
In the case of DEL modelling, there are two types of models: state models, 
which represent all possible states of a multi-agent system in a particular time 
point and agents’ uncertainties about these states, and action models, which 
represent all possible actions with preconditions and agents’ uncertainties about 
these actions. State models will be drawn from (1), and action models will be 
derived in (2). In the case of TEL modelling, there is only one type of models, 
namely interpreted systems, which represent all possible states of a multi-agent 
system, agents’ uncertainties of these states, and the temporal precedence rela­
tions among these states.
Depending on the specific model checker at hand, the models and specifi­
cations in steps (1) and (2) are obtained differently. The DEL model checker 
DEMO specifies state models and action models directly in the form of math­
ematical structures, while the TEL model checkers MCK and MCMAS specify 
interpreted systems in the form of programs, hence the dynamics of interpreted 
systems are generated by such programs. To be more specific, an interpreted 
system is built from a set of initial states and a set of protocols for agents. The 
protocols basically specify the set of actions that each agent can choose in each 
state. A protocol for an agent typically consists of a set of guarded commands: 
if ip then a, where p  is a propositional formula on the local states, and a is an 
action of that agent. In each round, the preconditions of these commands are 
checked, and if the precondition of a command is true, then the agent will be able 
to choose the corresponding action. When all agents have selected an action in a 
state, then a unique outcome state will be determined. Thus a transition of the
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current state to the next state represents a change in the system. The restriction 
of ip to be propositional formulas makes these two TEL model checkers unable to 
build interpreted systems from protocols with knowledge preconditions.
Let us go back to DEL. There is no explicit representation of an agent’s 
protocol in DEL, but the actions are represented in a way very close to the guarded 
commands. Suppose w is an atomic action in DEL, and it has a precondition 
pre(w). The execution of the action w in a state w of a model M  is as follows: if 
(M, w) |= pre(w) then there is a new state (w,w). This is close to the execution 
of a guarded command: if <p then a. Yet, there are two main differences: (1) tp 
can only be a propositional formula in MCK and MCMAS, but a precondition 
pre(w) can be any DEL formulas in DEMO; (2) the atomic actions in DEL are 
either joint actions by the agents or some events happened in the environment.
So, the protocols of interpreted systems in TEL and action models in DEL are 
similar in that actions may have preconditions, but they also have differences. 
On the one hand the protocols used in TEL model checkers can have individual 
actions for agents, but restriction on the propositional preconditions, and on the 
other hand, the action models in DEL have more flexibility in preconditions but 
have more restrictions on agents’ actions, in the sense that these actions have to 
be unified as one. This will be demonstrated more concretely in the second case 
study.
6.3 T hree M odel Checkers
Recently, epistemic model checkers with dynamic facilities have been developed 
to verify properties of various multi-agent systems. In this section, we intro­
duce three state-of-the-art model checkers in this category: DEMO, MCK and 
MCMAS. This is by no means the complete list the model checkers for multi­
agent systems. There are other model checkers such as VerICS [55], but they will 
not be discussed in this chapter.
6.3.1 M odel Checker DEMO
DEM O is short for Dynamic Epistemic Modelling, developed by J. van Eijck 
[94], DEM O implements the Dynamic Epistemic Logic of [9] (see Section 2.2.4). 
It allows modelling of epistemic updates, formula evaluation, graphical display of 
models, and so on.
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DEMO is based on DEL, so it must provide data structures for state models, 
action models and DEL formulas. Written in the functional programming lan­
guage Haskell, DEM O allows users to call the pre-defined functions in Haskell. 
The state models and action models are represented in a very natural way. Here 
is a generalized definition over these two types of models in DEMO.
Mo [state][(state.formula)][(Agent,state,state)]
Mo is an indicator of model; [state] represents a list of states; [(state, formula)] 
represents a valuation or precondition function depending on the type of formula; 
and finally [(Agent, state, state)] represents accessibility relations of the agents. 
Note that '[]’ indicates a list, which is a standard data structure in Haskell. The 
elements in a list is ordered, and the elements in a set is not; but in the cases of 
state or action models, we could just treat a list as a set.
Typically pointed models, i.e. models of the form (M, w), are used in model 
checking. DEM O uses a more general version, multiple pointed models, adding 
a set of points instead of one:
Pmod [state][(state,formula)][(Agent,state,state)][state]
The only difference between Mo and Pmod is clearly the last [state].
Depending on the type of ‘formula’, there are two kinds of pointed models:
EpistM = Pmod [state] [(state, [Prop])][(Agent,state,state)] [state] 
PoAM = Pmod [state][(state, Form)] [(Agent,state,state)] [state]
Here EpistM represents pointed (epistemic) state models; PoAM represents pointed 
action models; [Prop] is a list of atomic propositions, and Form is a DEL formula. 
We proceed with a relevant part of the definition of formulas in DEM O.
Form = Top | Prop Prop | Neg Form | Conj [Form] | Disj [Form]
I K Agent Form I CK [Agent] Form | Up PoAM Form
Formula Top stands for T, Prop Prop for atomic propositional letters (the first 
occurrence of Prop means that the datatype is ‘propositional atom’, whereas the 
second occurrence of Prop is the placeholder for an actual proposition letter, 
such as P 3), Neg for negation, Conj [Form] stands for the conjunction of a list 
of formulas of type Form, similarly for Disj, K Agent stands for the individual 
knowledge operator for agent Agent, and CK [Agent] for the common knowledge
6.3. THREE MODEL CHECKERS 129
operator for the group of agents listed in [Agent]; and finally Up PoAM Form 
stands for the formula with action modal operator.
The state changes are via update product: this is a mechanism to produce a 
new state model from two given models (the current state model and the current 
action model). We have explained this mechanism in Section 2.2.4. In DEMO, 
the update operation is specified as:
upd :: EpistM -> PoAM -> EpistM
Here, EpistM is a pointed state and PoAM is a pointed action model, and the 
update generates a new pointed state model. We can also update with a list of 
pointed action models:
upds :: EpistM -> [PoAM] -> EpistM
In this chapter, the case studies can all be treated in PAL, so we just need to 
use public announcement models. The pointed and singleton action model for a 
public announcement is created by a function public with a precondition (the 
announced formula) as argument.
Finally, the following function is truth evaluation function, which takes a 
pointed state model and a DEL formula and return a Boolean value.
isTrue :: EpistM -> Form -> Bool
So far we have introduced the modelling and specification languages in DEMO, 
and we will see the use of them shortly.
6.3.2 M odel Checker MCK
MCK, for ‘Model Checking Knowledge’, is a model checker for temporal and 
knowledge specifications, developed by P. Gammie and R. van der Meyden [27]. 
The system is written in Haskell. But different from DEM O, the input language 
of M CK is a declarative language, so no Haskell functions are supported in 
the input. To address the state explosion problem, M CK uses OBDD-based 
techniques.
M CK is based on TEL (see Section 2.2.3). The overall setup supposes a 
number of agents acting in an environment. This is modelled by an interpreted 
system where agents perform actions according to a protocol i.e. a set of rules. 
The effect of actions is to change the state of the system. Actions and the
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environment may be only partially observable to agents at each instant in time. 
Knowledge may be based on current observations only, on current observations 
and clock value, and on the history of all observations and clock value. The last 
corresponds to synchronous perfect recall. We will use the later approach. In 
the temporal dimension, the specification formulas may describe the evolution of 
the system along a single computation, i.e. using linear-time temporal logic, or 
they may describe the branching structure of all possible computations, i.e using 
branching time or computation tree logic.
An input file consists of the following parts [27]:
• The environment in which the agents operate, including: the possible 
states of the environment, the initial states of the environment, the names 
of agents operating in this environment, how the agents’ actions change the 
state of the environment, (optionally) a set of fairness conditions;
• The protocol by which each of the named agents chooses their 
sequence of actions, including: the structure of local states maintained 
by the agent to make such choices and record other useful information, the 
possible initial values of the agent’s local states, and a description of what 
parts of the state are observable to the agent;
• A number of specification formulas, expressing some property of the 
way that the agent’s knowledge evolves over time.
The Figure 6.1 shows an example of input file. The scenario is that a single 
agent called Bob (running the protocol “robot”) operates in an environment of 
8 possible positions. The environment provides noisy readings of the position to 
the robot via the sensor variable, which is declared to be an observable input to 
the agent. Bob does not have the complete information of the system as he could 
not access the p o s itio n  variable. The transitions section represents the effects 
of the robot’s actions (Halt and skip) on the state, by means of a program using 
non-deterministic ‘if’ statements. This program is considered to run atomically 
in a single tick of the clock.
The specification formula spec_spr_xn indicates that the knowledge modality 
should be interpreted using synchronous perfect recall, and that the formula has 
the form X n ip, expressing that <p holds in precisely n steps after an initial state 
(n =  2 in this example). This specification expresses that Bob knows he is in the
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type Pos = {0..7} 
position : Pos 
sensor : Pos 
halted : Bool
init_cond = position == 0 A  sensor == 0 A  neg halted
agent Bob "robot" ( sensor )
protocol "robot" (sensor : observable Pos) 
begin
do neg (sensor >= 3) -> skip 





if Bob.Halt -> halted := True fi;
if neg halted -> position := position + 1 fi;
if True -> sensor := position - 1
[] True -> sensor := position
[] True -> sensor := position + 1
fi
end
spec_spr_xn = X 2 (sensor >= 3 <=> Knows Bob position in {2..4})
Figure 6.1: An example of MCK input, adapted from [27]
region {2..4} exactly when the sensor reading is larger or equal than 3. Then it 
is up MCK to verify whether this specification is true or not.
6.3.3 M odel Checker M CM AS
MCMAS, for ‘Model Checking Multi-Agent Systems’, is a model checker devel­
oped by F. Raimondi and A. Lomuscio [69, 67]. Similar to MCK, MCMAS uses 
interpreted systems as the models for multi-agent systems, and uses OBDD tech­
niques as well; but in the specification language, MCMAS allows ATL formulas 
in addition to LTL and CTL formulas. MCMAS is implemented in the program­
ming language C++. Our investigation is based on the version 0.6.0. Currently












s2 if ((AnotherAgent.Action=a7); 
s3 if Lstate=s2; 
endEv 
endAgent
Figure 6.2: An example of ISPL for MCMAS
there is a new version 0.9.61 with improved functionalities.
The input language of MCMAS is called Interpreted Systems Programming 
Language (ISPL). The basic unit is an agent, starting from Agent and ending at 
endAgent. An example is given in Figure 6.2. Each agent description consists 
of the following parts: a list of local states, and a list of green local states: 
L state  and Lgreen; a list of actions: Action = { . . .} ;  a protocol for the agent: 
‘Protocol . . . endProtocol’, which specifies a set of actions available for the 
agent; and an evolution function for the agent: ‘Ev . ..  endEv’, which specifies 
the change of the local state of the agent.
The initial condition of the system is specified in ‘In i tS ta te s  . . . end 
In i tS ta te s ’, and the execution of agents generates temporal evolutions of the 
system. The interpretation function is then defined in a construct ‘Evaluation 
end E valuation’ with entries like ‘p i f  Sm ith.Lstate = sO’. And the 
properties to be verified are specified in ‘Formulae . . . end Formulae’ with 
entries like EG (p -> K(Smith, p )), which means there exists a run (or compu­
tation) such that if p is true then agent Smith knows it.
1http://dfn.dl.sourceforge.net/sourceforge/ist-contract/mcmas-0.9.6.tar.gz
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6.4 Case Study: R ussian  Cards P rob lem
This section studies the Russian Cards Problem. We first give an analysis of 
this problem and present a communication protocol that solves this problem in 
Section 6.4.1. Then we show how to model this problem and specify the safety 
conditions that should hold after any communications, and specify them in Public 
Announcement Logic (PAL), a special case of DEL, in Section 6.4.2 and in TEL in 
Section 6.4.4 respectively. Finally, we verify the safety conditions for the protocol 
given earlier, in all three model checkers, and compare the differences.
6.4.1 The Problem
From, a pack of seven known cards two players each draw three cards 
and a third player gets the remaining card. How can the players with 
three cards openly inform each other about their cards, without the 
third player learning from any of their cards who holds it?
This Russian Cards Problem originated at the Moscow Math Olympiad 2000. 
Call the players Anne, Bill and Cath, and the cards 0, ...,6, and suppose Anne 
holds {0,1,2}, Bill {3,4,5}, and Cath card 6. For the hand of cards {0,1,2}, 
write 012 instead, for the card deal, write 012.345.6, etc. Assume from now on 
that 012.345.6 is the actual card deal. All announcements must be public and 
truthful. There are not many things Anne can safely say. Obviously, she cannot 
say “I have 0 or 6,” because then Cath learns that Anne has 0. But Anne can 
also not say “I have 0 or 3,” because Anne does not know if Cath has 3 or another 
card, and ¿/Cath had card 3, she would have learnt that Anne has card 0. But 
Anne can also not say “I have 0 or 1.” Even though Anne holds both 0 and 1, so 
that she does not appear to risk that Cath eliminates either card and thus gains 
knowledge about single card ownership (weaker knowledge, about alternatives, is 
allowed), Cath knows that Anne will not say anything from which Cath may learn 
her cards. And thus Cath can conclude that Anne will only say “I have 0 or 1” if 
she actually holds both 0 and 1. And in that way Cath learns two cards at once! 
The apparent contradiction between Cath not knowing and Cath knowing is not 
really there, because these observations are about different information states: it 
is merely the case that announcements may induce further updates that contain 
yet other information.
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Whenever after Anne’s announcement it is (at least) not common knowledge 
to Anne, Bill, and Cath, that Cath remains ignorant of any of Anne’s or Bill’s 
cards, this may be informative to Cath after all. A typical example is when Anne 
says that she either holds 012 or not any of those cards, after which Bill says 
that Cath holds card 6. For details, see [88]. Indeed, a solution requirement is 
that Cath’s ignorance remains public knowledge after any announcement. Such 
announcements are called safe. In next section, a safety condition will be defined 
precisely.
A Solution A solution to the Russian Cards Problem is a sequence of safe an­
nouncements after which it is commonly known to Anne and Bill (not necessarily 
including Cath) that Anne knows Bill’s hand and Bill knows Anne’s hand. This 
(instance of a) five hands protocol is a solution [88]:
Anne says “My hand of cards is one of 012, 034, 056, 135, 246,” after
which Bill says “Cath has card 6. ”
Note that Bill’s announcement is equivalent to “My hand of cards is one of 345, 
125, 024.” After this sequence, it is even publicly known that Anne knows Bill’s 
hand and Bill knows Anne’s hand. If we extend Anne’s announcement with 
one more hand, namely 245, and if it is public knowledge that the protocols 
used by Anne and Bill are of finite length (so may consist of more than two 
announcements), then it is ‘merely’ common knowledge to Anne and Bill that 
they know each other’s hand, but (disregarding further analysis) Cath considers 
it possible that they do not know each other’s hand of cards. This is a useful 
security feature for Anne and Bill, as Cath plays the role of the eavesdropper. A 
further postcondition is that all safe announcements by Anne ensure at least one 
safe response from Bill, and vice versa. This recursive requirement results in a 
more complex condition. See [89]. We will verify this five hands protocol indeed 
meets safety conditions.
6.4.2 M odelling in Public Announcem ent Logic
We now model the Russian Cards Problem in public announcement logic. Given 
a stack of known cards and some players, the players blindly draw some cards 
from the stack. In a state where cards are dealt in that way, but where no game 
actions of whatever kind have been done, it is commonly known what the cards
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are, that they are all different, how many cards each player holds, and that players 
only know their own cards. From the last it follows that two deals are the same 
for an agent, if she holds the same cards in both, and if all players hold the same 
number of cards in both. This induces an equivalence relation on deals.
A (epistemic) state model encodes the knowledge of the players Anne, 
Bill and Cath (a, b, c). It consists of Q  (g)(J) =  140 deals. Each deal is repre­
sented as aaa.bbb.c, where aaa represents three cards for Anne, bbb three cards 
for Bill, and c one card for Cath. For each player, access between states is induced 
by the equivalence above, for example, 012.345.6 ~ a 012.346.5 says that Anne 
cannot tell these two card deals apart as her hand is 012 in both. Facts about 
card ownership written as qi, for ‘card q is held by player i \  The valuation V0a 
of fact 0a (Anne holds card 0) consists of all 60 deals where 0 occurs in Anne’s 
hand, etc. We select 012.345.6 as the actual deal, thus the initial condition is 
captured by this pointed state model, (Mras, 012.345.6).
After a sequence of announcements that is a solution of the Russian Cards 
Problem, it should hold that Anne knows Bill’s cards, and that Bill knows Anne’s 
cards:
a_knows_bs ::= f \ q=0..6( K a qb \ /  K a^ q b) 
b_knows_as A 9=o..6 (Kbqa Y K b̂ q a)
Moreover, it needs to satisfy that Cath does not know any of Anne’s or Bill’s 
cards:
cJgnorant ::= / \ q=0„6( - ' K cqa A -iKcqb)
We suggested in the previous section that these conditions are too weak. This 
can be exemplified by the observation that, e.g.,
M m s, 012.345.6 h= [(012o V (--0a A -d a A -i2a))][cJgnorant]-.c_ignorant
After Anne says that her hand is 012 or that she does not hold any of those 
cards, c_ignorant is true, but a further update with that (in other words: 
when Cath can assume that this is true) makes Cath learn some of Anne’s 
cards, so that c-ignorant is false. The actually required postconditions avoid­
ing such complications are: after every announcement of an executed protocol, 
it is publicly known that Cath is ignorant, and after the execution of the en­
tire protocol it is commonly known to Anne and Bill that: Anne knows that 
Bill knows her hand of cards, and Bill knows that Anne knows his hand of 
cards. Also using that Cai)(A6a_knows_bs A Aab_knows_as) is equivalent to
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Ca6 (a_knows_bs A b_knows_as). The correct solution condition and the safety 
condition are formalised as
Cab (a_knows_bs A  b_knows_as)
CobcC Jgnorant
The solution given in Section 6.4.1 consists of the successive announcements
a_announce 012a V  034a V  056a V  135a V  246a 
b_announce 6C
To verify whether this is indeed a solution, it amounts to the DEL model 
checking problems in Figure 6.4.2. Note that the safety condition should hold 
after any announcements.
i. M™, 012.345.6 h  [a_announce][b_announce]C'aja_knows_bs
ii. Mrus, 012.345.6 f= [a_announce][b_announce]Ca&b_knows_as
iii. Mrus, 012.345.6 [= [a_announce] C abcc  Jgnorant
iv. M^s, 012.345.6 (= [a_announce] [b_announce] C^cC-ignorant
Figure 6.3: DEL model checking for solutions of Russian Cards Problem
6.4.3 Russian Cards in DEMO
In DEMO, one is restricted to propositional letters starting with lower case p, q 
and r, so we cannot write, for example, 0a for the atomic proposition that Anne 
holds card 0, as in Section 6.4.1. Instead, we use atoms {p,. . . ,  p6, q , . . . ,  q6, 
r , . . . ,  r6} to represent such atomic propositions, for example proposition p i 
stands for ‘Anne holds card 1’.
An implementation of Russian Cards Problem is given in DEM O in Figure 
6.4. We explain this implementation as follows.
The Models The initial state model mrus can be specified in a natural way. 
The set of card deals, i.e. deals in Figure 6.4, is a collection of elements in the 
form of (dO, dl, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6) where dO, dl, d2 represents three cards for agent 
Anne, d3, d4, d5 for agent Bill and d6 for Cath. The elements in d eals  are then 
associated with numbers in [0.. 139] by function zip,











ideals * zip [0..139] deals
mrus:: EpistM
mrus - (Pmod [0..139] val acc [0]) 
where











a.announce -public( K a (Disj[
Conj[Prop (P 0), Prop (P 1), 
Conj[Prop (P 0), Prop (P 3), 
Conj[Prop (P 0), Prop (P 5), 
Conj [Prop (P 1), Prop (P 3), 
Conj[Prop (P 2), Prop (P 4),
b_announce= public (K b (Prop (R 6)))
a_knows_bs * Conj[Disj[K a (Prop (Q i)),
b_knows_as - Conj[Disj[K b (Prop (P i)),
c_ignorant * Conj[Conj[Neg (K c (Prop (P
Prop (P 2)], 
Prop (P 4)] , 
Prop (P 6)] , 
Prop (P 5)], 
Prop (P 6)]]))
K a (Neg(Prop (Q i)))] I i<-[0..6]]
K b (Neg(Prop (P i)))] I i<-[0..6]] 





isTrue mrus (Up a_announce (Up b_announce (CK [a,b] a_knows_bs))) 
isTrue mrus (Up a_announce (Up b.announce (CK [a,b] b_knows_as))) 
isTrue mrus (Up a_announce (CK [a,b,c] c_ignorant)) 











(K b (Prop (R 6))))
(CK [a,b] b_knows_as))
Figure 6.4: Russian Cards in DEMO
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ideals = zip [0..139] deals
The ideals represents the 140 different deals. Each deals is associated with seven 
propositional letters -  the valuation of facts in that state. The first two deals 
correspond to the valuations
( 0 , [P 0,P 1,P 2,Q 3,Q 4,q 5,R 6]),
(l , [P 0,p 1,P 2,q 3,q 4,q 6 ,r 5])
The deal numbered 0 stands for actual deal 012.345.6. A pair of two integers is 
in the accessibility relation for an agent i, if that agent holds the same cards in 
both deals. Two such pairs for Anne are (a, 0,0), (a, 0,1) where a is short for 
Anne.
Anne’s public announcement a_announce corresponds to the following sin­
gleton action model named a_announce, which is produced by the function 
public.
public( K a (Disj[Conj [p,pi,p2],Conj [p,p3,p4],Conj[p,p5,p6],
Conj[pi,p3,p5],Conj[p2,p4,p6]] ))
Similarly, we have an action model b_announce for Bill’s announcement b_announce.
The Specifications The postcondition that Anne knows Bill’s hand of cards, 
a_knows_bs, is represented as
aknowsbs = Conj [ Disj [K a q, K a (Neg q) ] ,
Disj[K a ql, K a (Neg ql) ],
Disj[K a q2, K a (Neg q2) ],
Disj[K a q3, K a (Neg q3) ],
Disj[K a q4, K a (Neg q4) ],
Disj[K a q5, K a (Neg q5) ],
Disj [K a q6, K a (Neg q6) ] ]
Similarly for b_knows_as and c.ignorant.
In the last part, we present the model checking problems. The first one is:
checki=isTrue mrus (Up a_announce (Up b_announce (CK [a,b] a_knows_bs)))
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Here checki is just the name that refers to this problem, serving as a shortcut; 
mrus corresponds to the initial pointed model (M™ ,̂ 012.345.6); and the rest 
part corresponds to [a_announce][b_announce]C^a-knows-hs. The checki, 
checkii, checkiii and checkiv correspond to four model checking problems 
(i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) in Figure 6.4.2 respectively. The last three, checki, check2 
and check3, check that “After Anne’s announcement Bill knows Anne’s card”, 
“After Anne’s announcement Bill knows that Cath’s card is 6” , and “After Bill’s 
announcement it becomes common knowledge among Anne and Bill that Bill 
knows Anne’s card” respectively.
These problems are verified in DEMO, and we get all confirmative results, 
which are desired. The performance of DEM O is compared with other model 
checker in Section 6.4.7.
6.4.4 M odelling in Temporal Epistem ic Logic
The Russian Cards Problem is now studied in TEL. We have two main tasks: (1) 
model this problem as an interpreted system, and (2) specify solution conditions 
and safety conditions in temporal epistemic formulas.
We use the interpreted system introduced in Chapter 2, not the action-based 
interpreted system in Chapter 5, because the action-based interpreted system is 
not yet supported by MCK and MCMAS. We need to specify an interpreted 
system T ^  = (7Z, 7r) with IZ a set of runs and 7r an interpretation function. 
A run consists a sequence of global states, and each global state consists of an 
environment state and a local state for each agent. The representation of global 
states and local states is different in MCK and MCMAS. In MCK, a system 
has a set of variables, and agents have access to a subset of these variables; an 
instance of these variables represents a global state, and a local state of an agent 
is then an instance of the variables that it can access. In MCMAS, agents’ local 
states are atomic objects, and a global state is simply a tuple of all agents’ local 
states. The runs are generated by agents’ protocols and the system transition 
program in MCK, but in MCMAS runs are generated by agents’ protocols and 
their own evolution programs. The interpretation function is specified naturally.
The solution conditions and safety conditions should be expressed as temporal 
epistemic formulas. As we have shown in Chapter 5, an action modality in DEL is 
associated with an action-labelled next-time modality in NTEL. We make a simi­
lar analogy without action labels, so [a_announce] [b_announce] (7a&a_knows Jbs
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is associated with O  O  Ca&a-knows-bs. Of course, they are not the same, as 
the modality [a_announce] certainly holds more information than just Qr, but 
under certain interpreted systems, they can express the same meanings. We will 
discuss it in the next section.
We now proceed to specify and verify the Russian Cards Problem in MCK 
and MCMAS in the next two sections respectively.
6.4.5 Russian Cards in MCK
In MCK, we have to reinterpret the dynamic epistemics of Section 6.4.1 in tem­
poral epistemic terms. An implementation is presented in rus.mck2. We now 
explain this implementation.
We introduce environmental variables and initialize those; we create three 
agents A, B, and C with corresponding protocols "anne", " b i l l"  and "cath"; the 
main part of the program specifies the (temporal) transitions, induced by card 
dealing and the announcements, that relate different information states for these 
players; finally r u s . mck contains various properties to be verified.
A hand of cards of an agent is encoded by a list of seven booleans, for example 
a_hand : Bool [7] specifies for all of the cards 0, ..., 6 whether they are held 
by Anne or not, such that anne cards [0] is true when Anne holds card 0, etc. 
Initially, such variables are set to false.
Agent A, for Anne, is created by
agent A "anne" (a_hand, a_announce, b_announce, stage)
The name of the agent is A. It uses protocol "anne". It can interact with, and 
potentially observe the variables between parentheses. The first of those is, ob­
viously, only observable by Anne, the others will reappear in the other agent 
definitions, as they are publicly observable. The variable stage is the ‘clock 
tick’.
The t r a n s i t io n s  part of rus.mck specify what happens in different stages of 
the execution of the protocol. We distinguish stages (clock ticks) 0, 1,2, and 3. 
In stage 0 the cards are dealt to the players, in the order 0, ..., 6. We show it up 
to the dealing of card 0.
stage == 0 ->
2Available to download: http://ac.jiruan.net/thesis
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begin if
na < 3 -> begin a_hand[0]:=True; na:= na+1 end []
nb < 3 -> begin b_hand[0]:=True; nb:= nb+1 end []
nc == 0 -> begin c_hand[0]:=True; nc:= 1 end
fi;
Variables na, nb, and nc are counters to record how many cards agents have, and 
[] means nondeterministic choice. In this part of the transitions, 140 different 
deals are created, represented as 140 different timelines.
In stage 1, Anne announces that her hands is one of 012, 034, 056, 135, and 
246. This is done indirectly by executing the protocol "anne", that contains a 
condition corresponding to these five deals, which causes the action Announce to 
%  be executed. This then results in the atom a_announce becoming true.
stage == 1 A  A.Announce -> a_announce := True
In stage 2, Bill announces that Cath holds card 6. Alternatively, one can 
model that Bill announces Cath’s card -  whatever it is. Bill’s announcement is 
by way of an action B. Announce, and results in the variable b_announce to become 
true. This is the transition to stage 3, the final stage. We can imagine that the 
whole system consists of 140 different runs. Whether variables a_announce and 
b_announce are true in stage 2 and stage 3, respectively, depends on the deal in 
that run.
The protocol for Anne is:
protocol "anne" (cards: observable Bool[7],
a_announce: observable Bool, b_announce: observable Bool, 
stage : observable Counter) 
begin
skip; if
( (cards[0] A cards[1] A cards[2]) V
(cards[0] A cards[3] A cards[4]) \/
(cards[0] A cards[5] A cards[6]) V
(cards[1] A cards[3] A cards[5]) V
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The ‘begin-end’ part of this protocol specifies for each of the stages 0, 1, and 2 
what happens in that stage. In stage 0 nothing happens: skip. In stage 1, the 
action Announce -  that is, whatever is found between «  and »  -  is executed. 
Actually, the value or instance of cards for Anne is a.cards; see above, where 
Anne is created. Alternatively to five actual hands, a much longer protocol creates 
five arbitrary hands of cards based on Anne’s actual hand. Nothing is specified 
for stage 2: this is therefore skip again by default. Bill has a similar protocol but 
his protocol starts with skip ; skip, as his announcement is in stage 2. And 
Cath does not act at all, which carries the protocol skip ; skip ; skip.
The knowledge of the agents evolves with every stage, via the agents’ limited 
access to the environment. Initially, they only observe their own hand of cards, 
and Anne’s and Bill’s public announcement is accessed by all agents. Anne cannot 
distinguish two states iff her observations are the same in those states. For 
example, in stage, 1 Anne cannot distinguish the timelines for deals 012.345.6 and 
012.346.5, because: both have the same a_hand values (for all seven variables), 
a_announce is true in both cases, and b_announce is false is both cases. But in 
stage 3, Anne can distinguish these timelines, since b_announce is true for the 
former and false for the latter.
A final part of r u s . mck lists various temporal epistemic properties to be 
checked. They are translated from the solution and safety conditions in Figure 
6.4.2. For example, we want to translate and verify that
M ^ s , 012.345.6 |= [a_announce][b-announce] Cai,a_knows_bs.
The latest version of MCK does not support common knowledge operators for 
specifications in the perfect recall module. Therefore we verify instead that in 
stage 3, a_knows_bs is valid in the model. This corresponds to the following in 
DEL semantics
Myus <g> a_announce <g> b_announce f= a_knows_bs
which ensures that
® a_announce ® b_announce, 012.345.6 |= Ca^a-knows-hs.
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And in this specific model
C^aJcnows-bs *-* Ca5caJinows_bs
is also valid.
spec_spr_xn = X 3 ( (a_announce /\ b_announce) =>
( (((Knows A b_hand[0]) \/ (Knows A neg b_hand[0]))) /\
(...)
(((Knows A b_hand[6]) \/ (Knows A neg b_hand[6]))) ))
The part spec_spr_xn means that we are using the perfect recall module of MCK, 
and X 3 is the triple ‘next state’ temporal operator, counting from stage 0. There­
fore, the formula bound by the operator is checked in stage 3. Similarly, other 
conditions for the five hands protocol are verified.
6.4.6 Russian Cards in M CM AS
We implement the Russian Cards Problem in MCMAS (see rus.mcmas3). In 
MCMAS, the global state is represented as a tuple of the local states of the 
agents. Let agents Anne, B ill ,  and Cath represent players, and let an agent 
Env (the environment) represent the card deal. The local state of agent Anne 
requires five components, that can be seen as variables; three represent her hand 
of cards, and two the status quo and outcome of the two announcements. The 
version 0.6 of MCMAS, which is being used here, does not support variables in 
the description of agents’ local states, but the newer version 0.9.6 has addressed 
this issue and does support variables. Therefore we encode the variable parts in 
a single string. For example, one local state for Anne is a012tf. This means that 
Anne holds cards 0,1, and 2, that Anne’s announcement a_announce has been 
(truthfully) made in the global state of which this local state is a component, 
and that Bill’s announcement b_announce could not be made (was false) in 
that global state. Similarly, we have five variables for Bill, and three variables for 
Cath. The local state of the agent Env has seven variables, because it represents 
a card deal. An example is eO 123456. This stands for the actual deal 012.345.6.
The information changes take the usual steps: (1) the cards are revealed to the 
agents, (2) Anne announces a_announce, and (3) Bill announces b_announce.
3Available to download: http://ac.jiruan.net/thesis
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All reachable global states will be included in the next stage. An example initial 
global state is (annnnn, bnnnnn, cnnn, e0123456); an ‘n’ essentially means 
that the agent has no information on the value of corresponding variable, mod­
elled by giving the variable that value n. So, bnnnnn means that Bill’s local state 
is that he does not know his cards yet (the first three n’s), that Anne has not 
made her announcement yet (the fourth n) and that Bill has not made his an­
nouncement yet (the last n). The above global state (annnnn, bnnnnn, cnnn, 
e0123456) then transits to (a012nn, b345nn, c6nn, e0123456), where each 
agent knows what cards it holds. Anne’s a_announce is then made, causing 
the transition to (a012tn, b345tn,c6tn, e0123456) and b_announce finally 
results in (a012tt, b345tt,c6tt, e0123456) -  this time, Bill’s announcement 
is successful. These state transitions are specified in the program. For example, 
for agent Anne, the transition for step one is as follows; Lstate is the local state 
of (current) agent Anne, and Env.Lstate is the local state of Env.
a012nn if (Lstate=annnnn and
( Env.Lstate=e0123456 or Env.Lstate=e0123465 or 
Env.Lstate=e0123564 or Env.Lstate=e0124563 ));
The environment Env does not change during transitions, but this has to be made 
explicit as
e0123456 if Lstate=e0123456;
In the ‘valuation’ part of an MCMAS program we define what can be seen as 
(the denotation of) atomic propositions. For example, the following
ab_d0123456 if (Anne.Lstate=a012tt and Bill.Lstate=b345tt and 
Cath.Lstate=c6tt and Env.Lstate=e0123456);
is an atom that is (uniquely) true in the global state (a012tt, b345tt,c6tt, 
e0123456). Similarly, atoms expressing card ownership such as 0o for ‘Anne 
holds card 0’ are defined by enormous expressions starting as (and consisting of 
60 alternative card deals)
aO if (Env.Lstate=e0123456 or Env.Lstate=e0123465 or ...
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Groups of agents can be named too. This is useful when checking com­
mon knowledge. For example, expression “ABC={Anne, Bill, Cath;}” gives the 
group consisting of Anne, Bill, and Cath the label ABC. The common knowledge 
formula Cabc(Oa —> Ka0a) is then represented as GCK(ABC,aO->K(Anne,aO)). We 
conclude this short exposition with the postcondition C'a6Cc_ignorant that veri­
fies that Cath remains ignorant after both announcements have been made -  T 
stands for negation.
ab_d0123456 -> GCK(ABC,(
( !K(Cath,aO) and !K(Cath,bO) ) and 
( !K(Cath,al) and !K(Cath,bl) ) and 
( !K(Cath,a2) and !K(Cath,b2) ) and 
( !K(Cath,a3) and !K(Cath,b3) ) and 
( !K(Cath,a4) and !K(Cath,b4) ) and 
( !K(Cath,a5) and !K(Cath,b5) ) and 
( !K(Cath,a6) and !K(Cath,b6) ) ));
6.4.7 Experim ental R esults and Comparison
The experiments were made with these three model checkers in two different 
system configurations. The first system, SYSA, is configured with GNU/Linux 
2.4.30 i686, 800Mhz Pentium 4 CPU and 2GB RAM, and the second, SYSB, is 
configured with GNU/Linux 2.6.20 1686, 2.13Ghz Core 2 CPU and 3GB DDR 
RAM.
Model Checkers SYSA SYSB Number of States
DEMO 9 seconds 5 seconds 163
MCK 109 seconds 50 seconds 420
MCMAS 117 seconds 52 seconds 420
Figure 6.5: Experimental Results for Russian Cards Problem
Rough performance for the implementations in previous sections, are pre­
sented in Figure 6.5. It takes around half of the time to finish the checking tasks 
for all three model checkers in the faster system, i.e. SYSB. This shows that the 
improvement of hardware does help.
These results cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as indicative of the rel­
ative performance of the model checkers, as they are based on rather different
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modellings and model checking questions. One clear difference is the number of 
states in the models. The column “Number of States” indicates the number of 
states that will be produced by each model checker. The DEMO will have 163 
different states, because the original state model has 140 states, and after Anne’s 
announcement, there are 20 states left, and after Bill’s announcement, there are 
only 3 states left. The MCK and MCMAS both have 420 states because they 
are based on an interpreted system which has 140 different runs, and in each run 
there are essentially three different time points.
Another difference is in the time measured by model checkers. The time 
measure for MCK and MCMAS is from the whole model checking process, i.e., 
both model construction and formula checking. DEMO operates on slightly 
different principles: first, the Haskell interpreter compiles RUS.hs and related 
modules DPLL and DEMO; only then, DEMO check individual formulas; we 
measured the combined autogeneration, compilation and checking steps.
6.5 Case Study: Sum  A nd P roduct P rob lem
This section studies the Sum And Product Problem. We first model this problem 
in PAL and solve it using model checker DEMO. We then study different vari­
ations of this problem, and discuss the complexity issues involved. Finally, we 
discuss the inherent difficulties to specify this problem in MCK and MCMAS.
6.5.1 The Problem
The following problem, or riddle, was first stated in the Dutch-language mathe­
matics journal Nieuw Archief voor Wiskunde in 1969 by H. Freudenthal [25] and 
subsequently solved in [26]. A translation of the original formulation is:
A says to S  and P: I have chosen two integers x, y such that 1 < x < y 
and x + y < 100. In a moment, I will inform S  only of s = x + y, 
and P only of p — xy. These announcements remain private. You are 
required to determine the pair (x , y).
They act as said. The following conversation now takes place:
i. P says: ;I do not know it .”
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iii. P says: “I now know it.”
iv. S says: “I now also know it.”
Determine the pair (x, y ).
The announcements by the agents appear to be about ignorance and knowledge 
only. But actually the agents learn numerical facts from each other’s announce­
ments. For example, the numbers cannot be 2 and 3, or any other pair of prime 
numbers, nor for example 2 and 4, because in all those cases Product would 
immediately have deduced the pair from their product. As a somewhat more 
complicated example, the numbers cannot be 14 and 16: if they were, their sum 
would be 30. This is also the sum of the prime numbers 7 and 23. But then, 
as in the previous example, Product (P) would have known the numbers, and 
therefore Sum (5)—if the sum had been 30—would have considered it possible 
that Product knew the numbers. But Sum said that he knew that Product didn’t 
know the numbers. So the numbers cannot be 14 and 16. Sum and Product learn 
enough, by elimination of which we gave some examples, to be able to determine 
the pair of numbers: the unique solution of the problem is the pair (4,13).
The knowledge that agents have about mental states of other agents and, 
in particular, about the effect of communications, can be important for solv­
ing problems in multi-agent systems, both for cooperative and for competitive 
groups. Dynamic epistemic logic was developed to study the changes brought 
about by communication in such higher-order knowledge of other agent’s and of 
group knowledge [10, 29]. The Sum And Product Problem presents a complex 
illustrative case of the strength of specifications in dynamic epistemic logic and 
of the possibilities of automated model checking, and both can also be used in 
real multi-agent system applications.
6.5.2 Sum And Product in Public A nnouncem ent Logic
We give a specification of the Sum And Product Problem in PAL. Modulo inessen­
tial differences, explicitly mentioned below, this specification was first suggested 
by Plaza in [63], and in this section we elaborate on his results.
First we need to determine the set of atomic propositions and the set of agents. 
In the formulation of the problem, x, y are two integers such that 1 < x < y and 
x +  y < 100. Define I  ::= {(x ,y)  € N2 | 1 < £ < ?/ &: x +  y < 100}.
Consider the variable x. If its value is 3, we can represent this information as the
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(truth of) the atomic proposition ‘z =  3’. Slightly more formally we can think 
of ‘x =  3’ as a propositional letter x3. Thus we create a (finite) set of atoms 
{Xi | (i , j )  <E 1} U {yj | (i , j ) € I}.
Concerning the agents, the role of the announcer A is to guarantee that the 
background knowledge for solving the problem is commonly known among Sum 
and Product. The announcer need not be introduced as an agent in the logical 
modelling of the system. That leaves {S', P} as the set of agents. Agents S  and 
P will also be referred to as Sum and Product, respectively.
The proposition ‘Sum knows that the numbers are 4 and 13’ is represented 
as Ks(x4 A  7/i 3 ) . The proposition ‘Sum knows the (pair of) numbers’ is described 
as Ks{x ,y ) : : =  V ( j j ) € /  Ks(xi  A  yj). Similarly, ‘Product knows the numbers’ is 
represented by KP(x ,y ) : : =  V ( t , j ) e /  KP(xi A  yj). Furthermore, note that the 
‘knew’ in announcement ii, by Sum, refers to the truth of K s ^ K P(x, y) in the 
initial epistemic state, not in the epistemic state resulting from announcement i, 
by Product.
Because of the property that all known propositions are true (‘K ip  —► p ' is 
valid), announcement i is entailed by announcement ii. Because of that, and as 
Product’s announcement in  is a response to Sum’s ii, and Sum’s iv to Product’s 
Hi, the initial announcement i by Product is superfluous in the subsequent anal­
ysis. 4 This is sufficient to formalise the announcements made towards a solution 
of the problem:
i. P says: “I do not know it” : ->KP(x , y)
ii. S  says: “I knew you didn’t” : Ks~'KP(x, y)
iii. P says: “I now know it” : KP(x, y)
iv. S  says: “I now also know it” : Ks(x, y)
We can interpret these statements on a state model SV(Xty) ::= V) con­
sisting of a domain of all pairs (x ,y) € I  (as above), with accessibility rela­
tions ~ s  and such that for Sum: (x, y) ~ s  (x', y') iff x +  y = x' + y', and 
for Product: (x ,y) ~ P (x ',y ') iff xy =  x'y'-, and with valuation V  such that 
Vm = {(z, y) e I  \ x = i} and VVj = {(z, y) 6 I  \ y = j} .
4Additional to this justification that announcement i is superfluous, we cannot formalise 
that announcement ii follows announcement i in our logical language, as we cannot refer to 
the past. In dynamic epistemic logic with assignment one can indirectly model such past tense 
epistemic statements [101].
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We can describe the solution of the problem as the truth of the statement5
S V (x,yh (4,13) h  (Ks -iKP(x, y))(KP(x, y))(K s (x, y))T
This expresses that, if (4,13) is the initial state, then it is possible to publicly 
announce ii, iii, and iv , in that order. This statement does not express that 
(4,13) is the only solution. We can express more properly that (4,13) is the only 
solution (and from here on our observations go beyond [63] again) as the model 
validity
SV{x,y) (= [Ks ->KP(x, y)][KP(x, y)][Ks (x, y)](x4 A yu )
This expresses that in all other points of the model than (4,13) the sequence 
of three announcements cannot be truthfully made. Technically this relates to 
the well-known modal property that formulas of form □</? are true for all in 
all worlds where there are no accessible worlds. If all announcements are true, 
three consecutive epistemic state transformations result in a final epistemic state 
(M, w) (namely (SV  (Xiy)\ii\in\iv, w)) wherein x4 A yi3 should hold. Clearly, this 
is only the case when w = (4,13). In all other states of the domain /  of model 
SV (Xty), at least one announcement cannot be truthfully made; but that means 
that any postcondition of the dynamic ‘necessity-type’ modal operator corre­
sponding to that announcement, even ‘false’, is true in that state.
For example, we observed that in state (7, 23) Product would know the num­
bers (as they are both prime). Therefore, ~-̂ KP(x, y) is false in (SV(x>y), (7,23)), 
and therefore Ks~>KP(x, y) (announcement ii) is also false in (S V (XtV), (7,23)). 
The semantics gives us
57>(*,»)»(7>23) h  [Ks^KP(x,y)\{ [KP(x, y)][Ks (x,y)\(x4 A y13) ) 
and SV (x,y), (7,23) |= [Ks ^ K P(x, y)]L.
6.5.3 Sum And Product in DEM O
We implement the Sum And Product Problem in DEM O (see Figure 6.6) and 
show how the implementation finds the unique solution (4,13).
5Modality (ip) is the dual of [y>\.





pairs = [(x,y)|x<-[2..100], y<-[2..100], x<y, x+y<=upb] 
numpairs * llength(pairs) 
llength [] =0
llength (x:xs) ■ 1+ llength xs 
ipairs = zip [0..numpairs-1] pairs
msnp :: EpistM
msnp = (Pmod [0. .numpairs-1] val acc [0. .numpairs-1]) 
where
val = [(w,[P x, Q y]) I (w,(x,y))<- ipairs]
acc = [(a,w,v)| (w,(xl,yl))<-ipairs, (v,(x2,y2))<-ipairs, xl+yl**x2+y2 ]++ 
[(b,w,v)| (w,(xl,yl))<-ipairs, (v,(x2,y2))<-ipairs, xl*yl==x2*y2 ]
fmrsle = K a (Conj [Disj[Neg (Conj [Prop (P x),Prop (Q y)]),
Neg (K b (Conj [Prop (P x),Prop (Q y)]))]| (x,y)<-pairs]) 
amrsle = public (fmrsle)
fmrp2e = Conj [(Disj[Neg (Conj [Prop (P x),Prop (Q y)]),
K b (Conj [Prop (P x),Prop (Q y)]) ] )I(x,y)<-pairs] 
amrp2e = public (fmrp2e)
fmrs3e = Conj [(Disj[Neg (Conj [Prop (P x),Prop (Q y)]),
K a (Conj [Prop (P x),Prop (Q y)]) ] )I(x,y)<-pairs] 
amrs3e * public (fmrs3e)
solutione = showM (upds msnp [amrsle, amrp2e, amrs3e])
fmrsl = K a (Neg (Disj [ ( K b  (Conj [Prop (P x),Prop (Q y)]))l (x,y)<-pairs])) 
amrsl - public (fmrsl)
fmrp2 * Disj [K b (Conj [Prop (P x),Prop (Q y)])I(x,y)<-pairs] 
amrp2 - public (fmrp2)
fmrs3 = Disj [K a (Conj [Prop (P x),Prop (Q y)])I(x,y)<-pairs] 
amrs3 = public (fmrs3)
solution ■ showM (upds msnp [amrsl, amrp2, amrs3])
Figure 6.6: The DEM O program SNP.hs. The last part, starting from fm rsl, 
implements a less efficient variant.
Representing the state models
The set I  ::= {(m, y) G N 2 \ 1 < x < y & x + y < 100} is realized in DEM O as 
upb = 100
p a irs  = [ (x ,y ) | x< -[2 . . 10 0] ,  y<-[2 . . 100] ,  x<y, x+y<=upb]
upb is the maximal sum considered, in this case upb=10 0 ; p a irs  is a list of pairs: 
a list is a standard data structure in Haskell, unlike a set. Thus, { and } are 
replaced by [ and ], E is replaced by <-, and instead of /  we name it p a irs . A 
pair such as (4,18) is not a proper name for a domain element. In DEM O, 
natural numbers are such proper names. Therefore, we associate each element in 
p a irs  with a natural number and make a new list.
ip a irs  = z ip  [0 . .num pairs-1 ] p a irs
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Here, numpairs is the number of elements in p a irs , and the function z ip  pairs 
the ¿-th element in [0 . .num pairs-1 ] with the ¿-th element in p a irs , and makes 
that the ¿-th element of ip a irs . For example, the first element in ip a ir s  is 
(0 , (2 ,3 )). The initial model of the Sum And Product Problem is
msnp = (Pmod [0..numpairs-1] val acc [0..numpairs-1]) 
where
val = [(w,[P x, Q y]) I (w,(x,y))<- ipairs]
acc = [(a,w,v)|(w,(xl,yl))<-ipairs, (v,(x2,y2))<-ipairs, xl+yl==x2+y2 ]++ 
[(b,w,v)I(w,(xl,yl))<-ipairs, (v,(x2,y2))<-ipairs, xl*yl==x2*y2 ]
Here, msnp is a pointed state model, that consists of a domain [0 . . num pairs-1 ] , 
a valuation function val, an accessibility relation function acc, and [0 . . num pairs-1 ] 
points. As the points of the model are the entire domain, we may think of this 
initial epistemic state as the state model underlying it.
The valuation function val maps each state in the domain to the subset of 
atoms that are true in that state. This is different from Section 2.2.4, where the 
valuation V was defined as a function mapping each atom to the set of states 
where it is true. The correspondence q G val(w) iff w £ V(q) is elementary.
An element (w, [P x, Q y ] ) in va l means that in state w, atoms P x and Q y 
are true. For example, given that (0, (2 ,3 )) is in ip a irs , P 2 and Q 3 are true 
in state 0, where P 2 stands for ‘the smaller number is 2’ and Q 3 stands for 
‘the larger number is 3’. These same facts were described in Section 6.5.2 by 
2>2 and 7/3, respectively, as that gave the closest match with the original problem 
formulation. In DEM O, names of atoms must start with capital P, Q, R, but 
the correspondence between names will be obvious.
The function acc specifies the accessibility relations. Agent a represents Sum 
and agent b represents Product. For (w ,(x l ,y l) )  and (v ,(x 2 ,y2 )) in ip a irs , 
if their sum is the same: xl+yl==x2+y2 , then they cannot be distinguished by 
Sum: (a,w ,v) in acc; and if their product is the same: xl*yl==x2 *y2 , then 
they cannot be distinguished by Product: (b,w ,v) in acc. Function ++ is an 
operation merging two lists.
Representing the announcements
Sum and Product’s announcements are modelled as singleton action models, gen­
erated by the announced formula (precondition) tp and the operation public. 
Consider K $-' \/(i j)ei Kp(xi A j/j), expressing that Sum says: “I knew you didn’t.”
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This is equivalent to Ks /\( i j)e l ~'Kp(xi A yj). A conjunct ~'KP{xl A y3) in that 
expression, for ‘Product does not know that the pair is (i , j ) \  is equivalent to 
(xi A yj) —» -iKp(xi A yj).e The latter is computationally cheaper to check in the 
model, than the former: in all states but ( i,j)  of the model, the latter requires a 
check on two booleans only, whereas the former requires a check in each of those 
states of Product’s ignorance, that relates to his equivalence class for that state, 
and that typically consists of several states.
This justifies why the check on Ks~> V(i,y)e/ can be replaced by one
on Ks A(j A y3) —> -iKp(xi A yj)). Similarly, using a model validity, the
check on V(i y)e/ ^ p ( xi A yj) (Product knows the numbers) can also be replaced, 
namely by a check A (ij)ei((xi A Vj) —> KP(xl A yj)).7 Using these observations, 
and writing an implication <p —► ip as -up V ip (because DEM O does not support 
implication directly), we represent the three problem announcements ii, in, and 
iv listed on page 146 as fm rsle, fmrp2e, and fmrs3e, respectively, as listed in 
Figure 6.6. The corresponding singleton action models are obtained by applying 
the function public , e.g. amrsle = pub lic  (fm rsle). This is also shown in the 
figure. The line with so lu tio n e  abbreviates the computation of the successive 
model restrictions. In other words, (upds msnp [am rsle, amrp2e, am rs3e]) 
stands for state model SV \ii\iii\iv . The final part of Figure 6.6 encodes the 
less efficient version of the public announcements discussed above, e.g., fm rsl 
stands for Ks~<\J^ j^eI Kp(xi A y}). In Section 6.5.4 we will discuss the precise 
computational properties of the different versions.
D E M O ’s interaction w ith the implemented model
We continue by showing a relevant part of DEM O interaction with this imple­
mentation8.
The riddle is solved by updating the initial model msnp with the action models 
corresponding to the three successive announcements. Below, showM (upds msnp 
[amrsle, amrp2e, amrs3e] ) is user input and the lines from ==> [0] is the 
system response to that input.
*SNP> showM (upds msnp [am rsle, amrp2e, amrs3e])
6We use the T -validity -•Kip «-> ((p  —* - 'K ip ), that can be shown as follows: -<K ip iff 
( ip V -up) —► - 'K ip  iff (ip —> - 'K ip ) A (-Kp  —> -•Kip) iff {ip —* ~>Kip) A ( K ip  —» ip) iff (in T!) 
( tp -* -> K < p ). _
7We now use that ipVip—where V is exclusive disjunction—entails that ( K i p W  K ip  iff 
(ip —> K ip) A (tp —> K ip ) ).
8The full (three-page) output of this interaction can be found on, http://ac.jiruan.net/thesis
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—> [0]
[0]
(0, [p 4 ,q l3 ])
( a , [[0 ]])
( b , [[0 ]])




[< a c c e ss ib il ity  re la t io n s  represen ted  as equivalence classes>]
The list [p4,ql3] represents the facts P 4 and Q 13, i.e., the solution pair (4,13). 
Sum and Product have full knowledge (their access is the identity) on this single- 
ton domain consisting of state 0. That this state is named 0 is not a coincidence: 
after each update, states are renumbered starting from 0.
For another example, (upds msnp [am rsle,am rp2e]) represents the model 
that results from Product’s announcement (in) “Now I know it.” Part of the 
shouM results for that model are
*SNP> showM (upds msnp [amrsle, amrp2e])
==> [0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24
(...)
( 0 , [P2 ,q9]) ( 1 , [P2 ,q25]) ( 2 , [p2,q27]) ( 3 , [p3,q8]) ( 4 , [p3,q32])
( 5 , [P3,q38]) ( 6 , [p4 ,q7])(7 ,[P4 ,q l3 ]) ( 8 , [P4 ,q l9 ]) ( 9 , [P4,q23])
(...)




(b, [[0] , [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] ,
(...)
After two announcements, 86 pairs (x, y ) remain possible. All remaining states 
are renumbered, from 0 to 85, of which part is shown. Product’s (b) access 
consists of singleton sets only, of which part is shown. That should be obvious, 
as he just announced that he knew the number pair. Sum’s (b) equivalence 
class [0 ,3 ,6] is that for sum 11: note that (0 ,[p 2 ,q 9 ]), (3 ,[p 3 ,q 8 ]), and
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(6, [p4,q7]) occur in the shown part of the valuation. Sum’s access has one 
singleton equivalence class, namely [7]. That corresponds to the state for pair 
(4,13): see (7, [p4 ,q l3 ]) in the valuation. Therefore, Sum can now truthfully 
announce to know the pair of numbers, after which the singleton final epistemic 
state (that was already displayed) results.
Versions of the riddle in DEMO
How versatile the model checker DEMO is, may become clear by showing how 
easily the program SNP .hs in Figure 6.6 can be adapted to accommodate different 
versions of the riddle. The least upper bound for the Freudenthal version is 65. 
This we can check by replacing upb = 100 in the program SNP.hs by upb = 
65. More precisely we then also have to run the program for upb = 64 after 
which it will appear that the model computed in so lu tione  = showM (upds 
msnp [am rsle, amrp2e, amrs3e] ) is now empty. The McCarthy version of the 
riddle can be checked by replacing
p a irs  = [ ( x ,y ) |x < - [2 ..1 0 0 ], y< -[2 ..1 0 0 ], x<y, x+y<=upb]
by
p a irs  = [ ( x ,y ) |x < - [ 2 . .100], y< -[2 ..1 0 0 ], x<=y, x<=upb, y<=upb]
Of course, the additions x<=upb, y<=upb are now superfluous, but, for another 
example, it is also easy to check that the least upper bound for which the Mc­
Carthy version has a solution (and now we can not remove x<=upb, y<=upb) is 
upb = 62. This we find when also changing the upper bound from 100 into 62 
(and checking that upb = 61 gives an empty model).
The interpreted system version of the model can be implemented by construct­
ing the domain differently, namely as
p a irs  = [ (v ,w ) |x < -[2 ..100 ],y < -[2 ..100],x<y,x+y<=upb,v=x+y,w=x*y]
and now, accessibility, later on, is simply defined as correspondence in the first 
argument for Sum and in the second argument for Product:
acc = [(a ,w ,v ) | (w ,(x l ,y l) ) < - ip a ir s , (v ,(x 2 ,y 2 )) < -ip a irs ,x l= = x 2 ]++ 
[(b ,w ,v ) | (w ,(x l,y l))< - ip a irs ,(v ,(x 2 ,y 2 ))< - ip a irs ,y l= = y 2 ]
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In principle, one can also check that, when increasing the upper bound, more 
solutions or different solutions from (4,13) may emerge. One is then likely to run 
quickly into complexity problems; for that see the next section. The Plaza version 
with an unlimited model cannot be checked, as DEM O requires models to be 
finite. Also, as already mentioned, the epistemic formulas would be infinitary, 
which is not allowed either.9
Other epistemic riddles consisting of public announcements being made in 
some initial epistemic state, such as the Muddy Children problem, are similarly 
implemented by adapting the domain construction and the announcement for­
mulas. For many examples, see [94],
6.5.4 Com plexity
In this section, we analyse the complexity of finding solutions using our DEMO 
implementation. We first cover the theoretical boundaries, and then we present 
our experimental results. Computational complexity of epistemic model check­
ing is currently a focus of the research community; for temporal epistemic model 
checking we refer to [84, 83, 48, 80]. These results are as such inapplicable to our 
setting, because even apart from the different logical (namely temporal) setting, 
they also focus on other modelling aspects, e.g. [48] is not based on actual epis­
temic models but on succinct descriptions of such models in concurrent programs, 
and [84] is more concerned with the complexities involved when reformulating 
planning problems in a model checking context.
Theoretical analysis
The Sum And Product Problem is solved by updating the initial model with a 
sequence of three public announcements, i.e. by upds msnp [am rsle, amrp2e, 
amrs3e]. Each such update requires determining the set {w € V( M)  \ M,  w f= 
p}. Given a model M,  a state w, and a formula ip, checking whether M , w \= p 
can be solved in time 0(\ M\ x |ip|), where \ M\ is the size of the model as measured 
in the size of its domain plus the number of pairs in its accessibility relations, 
and where \tp\ is the length of the formula p. This result has been established 
by the well-known labelling method [36, 23]. This method is based on dividing 
p  into subformulas. One then orders all these subformulas, of which there are at
9Obviously, Plaza used some finite approximation of the problem, but although [63] mentions 
‘a program’, it gives no details.
156 CHAPTER 6. MODEL CHECKING KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS
most \<p\, by increasing length. For each subformula, all states are labelled with 
either the formula or its negation, according to the valuation of the model and 
based on the results of previous steps. This is a bottom-up approach, in the sense 
that the labelling starts from the smallest subformulas. So it ensures that each 
subformula is checked only once in each state.
In DEM O vl.02, the algorithm for checking whether M, w \= ip does not 
employ the bottom-up approach described above. Instead, it uses a top-down 
approach, starting with the formula ip and recursively checking its largest sub­
formulas. For example, to check whether M ,w  |= Kaip, the algorithm checks 
whether M, w' \= ip for all w' such that w ~ a w', and then recursively checks the 
subformulas of ip. This algorithm is 0{\M\^'), since each subformula may need 
to be checked \M\ times, and there are at most |<p| subformulas of <p. So, in the 
worst case, D EM O ’s algorithm is quite expensive.
In practice it is less expensive, because the Haskell language and its com­
piler and interpreter support a cache mechanism: after evaluating a function, it 
caches some results in memory, for reuse. For a study on the cache mechanism in 
Haskell programs we refer to [56]. Since it is hard to predict what results will be 
cached and for how long, we cannot give an estimate how much the cache mecha­
nism influences our experimental results. But we can still show some meaningful 
experimental results on the DEM O algorithm.
Experimental results
Our experimental results were based on a system configured with Windows XP, 
AMD CPU 3000+ (1.8Ghz), 1GB RAM. We used DEM O vl.02, and the Glasgow 
Haskell Compiler Interactive (GHCi) version 6.4.1, enabling the option “:set +s” 
to display information after evaluating each expression, including the elapsed time 
and number of bytes allocated.10
Formula efficiency In Section 6.5.3 we observed that checking a formula such 
as Ks  A(t j ) € / ( ( 2'» A yj) —♦ -*Kp(xi A yj)), fm rsle in Figure 6.6, is computationally 
cheaper than checking its (in T) logically equivalent form Ks~<\J(¿¿)€/ KP(xi A 
yj), fm rsl in Figure 6.6. Our experiments confirm this result. In Table 6.1
10The allocation figure is only accurate to the size of the storage manager’s allocation area, 
because it is calculated at every garbage collection. The RAM occupation is normally 60 
Mbytes for GHCi when loading the SNP.hs and DEMO modules. For evaluating a particular 
expression, the figure might be quite large, for example in table 1, in the case of upb=80 and 
fmrsle, the result is around 3219 Mb, due to the repeated garbage collection.
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fm rsle fm rs l
upb time(secs) space(bytes) time(secs) space(bytes)
20 0.66 13,597,832 3.13 14,430,216
40 75.30 141,967,304 954.41 172,666,424
60 714.80 858,501,572 21,389.60 1,074,424,452
80 7,232.69 3,374,852,696 not available not available
Table 6.1: Experimental results on formula checking
upb 1 msnp 1 time(secs) space(bytes)
65 23,367 1,609.03 1,325,890,048
80 43,674 7,288.08 3,150,903,744
86 54,298 10,636.03 3,905,964,300
94 70,936 20,123.02 6,048,639,068
100 85,406 34,962.38 9,047,930,216
Table 6.2: Experimental results on the trend of time-space consumption
we show the results for time and space consumption of function upds msnp 
[p ub lic(fm rsle)] and upds msnp [pub lic(fm rsl)] for different upper bounds 
upb in the initial model msnp: namely for upb 20, 40, 60 and 80. It is easy to see 
that checking with fm rsle is substantially less costly than checking with fm rsl 
in terms of time, and slightly less costly in terms of space. We estimate that it 
may take more than a week to run the case fm rsl with upb=80. Cases 80 and 
100 are only feasible for the more efficient form fm rsle. Our next experiment is 
based on the more efficient fm rsle,fm rp2e,fm rs3e only.
Trends for tim e and space consumption The smallest upb for which the 
Freudenthal version of the problem has a solution is 65. We investigated the 
trend of time-space consumption between upb=65 and upb=100, as this relates 
to the size of the initial model msnp. The results for running so lu tione  (see 
Figure 6.6) are shown in Table 6.2. In this table, | msnp | is the size of the model 
msnp, measured as the number of states in the domain plus the number of pairs in 
the accessibility relations (for Sum and for Product). The proportional increase 
of the figures in Table 6.2 is clearer in Table 6.3, wherein they are normalised 
to the case upb=65. Note that time consumption increases faster than space 
consumption when the size of the model increases.
Finally, we also investigated the computational differences between the stan-
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upb | msnp |/N time/N space/N
65 1 1 1
80 1.87 4.53 2.38
86 2.32 6.61 2.95
94 3.04 12.51 4.56
100 3.65 21.73 6.82
Table 6.3: Normalisation of the experimental results in Table 6.2.
dard ‘smaller/larger number’ modelling of the puzzle (Section 6.5.2) and the ‘in­
terpreted system’ modelling of the puzzle. In this case we did not find significant 
results.
6.5.5 Other M odel Checkers
As mentioned in the introduction of Section 6.3.1, other epistemic model checkers 
with dynamic features include MCK [27] and MCMAS [69]. The question is 
whether we could also implement this problem in those model checkers. For the 
latest versions of these model checkers in both case the answer appears to be ‘no’.
In MCK, a state of the environment is an assignment to a set of variables 
declared in the environment section. These variables are usually assumed to 
be partially accessible to the individual agents, and agents could share some 
variables. The change of the state of a multi-agent system is either made by 
agents or the environment, in the form of changing these variables. There are two 
ways to make such changes. One is to send signals to the environment using the 
action construct by agents in conjunction with the transitions construct by the 
environment, which provides a way to describe how the environment variables 
are updated. The other is a specialised form for actions from the perspective 
that environment variables are shared variables, by providing read and write 
operations on those shared variables. In both cases, we need guarded statements 
to make the change. For example, a simple deterministic statement has the form:
if cond —» C [otherwise —»• C70 ] fi
where command C is eligible for execution only if the corresponding condition 
cond evaluates to true in the current state. Otherwise, the command CQ will be 
executed. If we would like to model the Sum And Product Problem in M CK, the
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effect of a public announcement should be recorded in a variable which is acces­
sible to all agents. Suppose the effect of P ’s public announcement : “I now know 
it” (Kp( x , y)) is recorded in variable v. Then in a state just after this announce­
ment, the variable v will be set to True if KP(x, y) holds in the previous state, 
and otherwise to False. Clearly, we need that statement in the above epistemic 
form, with cond involving knowledge checking. Unfortunately, even though in 
M CK we can check epistemic postconditions, the current version of MCK does 
not support checking epistemic formulas as preconditions, as in cond. Similarly 
to MCK, MCMAS also does not support actions with knowledge-based precon­
ditions to transit from one global state to another global state. The difficulty of 
enabling knowledge-based preconditions in MCK and MCMAS might be related 
to the interpretation issues of knowledge-based programs in terms of interpreted 
systems (see [23]).
6.6 Sum m ary
In this chapter, we first discussed the role of protocols in building multi-agent 
systems during the model checking process. In TEL model checking the protocols 
are specified in the construction of interpreted systems. In DEL model checking, 
the protocols are specified in DEL formulas. Then we introduced three state- 
of-the-art model checkers for multi-agent systems verification: DEMO, MCK 
and MCMAS. We studied and compared the differences of modelling multi­
agent systems in DEL and TEL through two detailed case studies: the Russian 
Cards Problem and the Sum And Product Problem. In the first case study, we 
formulated the properties of a communication protocol that solves the Russian 
Cards Problem, and then verified these properties in three model checkers. We 
also showed that how dynamic epistemic requirements can be reformalised in 
temporal epistemic terms. In the second case study, we investigated a protocol 
involved with agents’ knowledge and ignorance. It was specified and verified 
only in DEM O because only DEMO supports knowledge-based protocols. We 
presented the complexity of model checking with DEM O and the experimental 
results. Finally, we discussed the inherent difficulties to use MCK and MCMAS 
for this case.
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C hapter 7
Looking Backward and Forward
We are coming to the end of this thesis. It is a good time to reflect upon what 
we have done, and give some thoughts on what we could do in the future, just 
like any reflexive agents would do.
7.1 Looking Backward
Looking backward, I have, with the collaboration of my colleagues, built two 
one-way bridges: one is from GDL to ATL, and the other is from DEL to TEL. 
Let me again start from the motivations and then give a summary of our main 
contributions.
W hy logic? Why did I get interested in the logical formalisms in the first 
place? Apart from the reasons given in Section 1.2,1 give a more personal account 
here. Through the years, I observed and learned that there were already many 
formalisms modelling multi-agent systems. I was particularly interested in logic- 
based approaches because I thought they provided an easy, yet profound way 
of understanding multi-agent systems. For instance, in the Sum And Product 
Problem, all possible combinations of two numbers are encoded in states; the 
agents’ knowledge and ignorance can be naturally encoded in their accessibilities 
of these states, and expressed in succinct formulas (e.g. Ks~iKp{x ,y ) for “Mr. 
Sum knew Mr. Product did not know the two numbers”); the solution can be 
computed by updating the initial state model with agents’ announcements in a 
sequence. The actual computation might be tedious, but the logic formalisms, 
DEL in this case, really give us a high-level grasp of the key information flow
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going through agents’ interactions. Since we have powerful computers, we do 
not need to be bothered by the tedious computation anyway, except studying its 
complexity in order to avoid possible endless waiting.
W hy building bridges? So why building the bridges for these particular 
frameworks, and why just one-way? First, we study GDL because it is a well- 
defined language for a serious multi-agent research area: the General Game Play­
ing (GGP) Competition, which is supported by AAAI. Games have been an 
important part of different cultures. For instance, both Chess and Chinese Chess 
were invented to mimic the conflict scenarios to provide entertainment, as well 
as to develop players’ strategic reasoning abilities, without them getting into 
bloody physical conflicts. The games also provide well-defined settings to study 
multi-agent interactions, as they typically consist of a set of rules, an initial con­
figuration, and the goals for players. The GGP systems have to be more flexible 
than dedicated chess-playing systems like Deep Blue, and hence will have greater 
potential to be used in building more adaptable multi-agent systems. There are 
logic-based formalisms developed for reasoning about games. In particular, ATL 
can reason about agents’ strategic abilities, and has a complete set of tools from 
logical theory to model checking tools. To enable these assets to be reused, we 
decided to investigate the possible connections between GDL and ATL, and sub­
sequently built a concrete link between them. The link is only one-way because 
GDL is a language for representing games, not for reasoning about the powers 
of the coalitions.
Second, we study the connections between DEL and TEL because they both 
are capable of modelling multi-agent systems with incomplete information, yet in 
different ways. They are very similar in terms of modelling knowledge, but are 
different in dealing with the dynamics in the systems. In DEL the dynamics of 
the system is solely expressed in the logical language with actions, but in TEL the 
dynamics are realized in the semantic model and expressed in the language as well. 
Due to such differences, we created a variant of TEL, namely NTEL. The bridges 
we built, i.e. the syntactic translation syn, and the semantic transformation 
SEM, are only from DEL to NTEL, and hence it can be seen as an embedding. 
The reason is that the temporal changes modelled in DEL correspond to a special 
class of temporal changes modelled in NTEL; hence in TEL.
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S um m ary  of C o n tribu tions Here we give a summary of the main contribu­
tions of this thesis made in separate chapters.
In Chapter 3, we studied the axiomatisation of games in GDL. We first 
formalised a propositional GDL and associated each GDL description with a 
game model. Then we provided a semantics of GDL rules over such game mod­
els. Next, GDL was understood as a specification language of ATL models, i.e. 
AATSs. Given a GDL description, on the one hand we built an AATS us­
ing a semantic transformation Tsem, on the other hand, we translated the GDL 
description in to an axiom expressed in ATL using a syntactic translation Tsyn. 
We showed, in Theorem 3.4, that any AATS that satisfies the translated axiom 
is alternating-bisimilar to the AATS built from the GDL description seman­
tically. This means that our axiomatic characterization of GDL descriptions 
did capture the agents’ strategic powers completely. As a corollary, we proved 
that the complexity of model checking ATL formulas over GDL descriptions are 
EXPTIM E-Complete (Theorem 3.5).
In Chapter 4, we studied the verification of games defined in GDL more prac­
tically. There were two main contributions. First, in Section 4.2, using ATL, we 
characterised a class of game properties that should be held in general: coherence 
properties ensure the game has a “sensible” interpretation; fair playability condi­
tions characterise the strategic abilities of coalitions of agents. Then we proposed 
another class of properties that characterise different games. Second, in Section 
4.3, we developed an automated tool that transforms a GDL description into an 
RML specification that is accepted by the ATL model checker, MOCHA. Then, 
in Section 4.4, we did a detailed case study on game Tic-Tac-Toe and showed the 
feasibility of our approach.
In Chapter 5, we studied a correspondence between DEL and NTEL, a variant 
of TEL. Given a state model and a formula in dynamic epistemic logic, we con­
structed an action-based interpreted system relative to that epistemic state and 
that formula by using a semantic transformation SEM, that satisfied a syntactic 
translation SYN of the formula into temporal epistemic logic, and vice versa. The 
SEM involved the protocol implicitly present in the dynamic epistemic formula, 
i.e. the set of sequences of actions being executed to evaluate the formula. We 
first showed this correspondence for PAL, a special case of DEL, in Theorem 5.1, 
and then generalized the case to full DEL in Theorem 5.2.
In Chapter 6, we studied model checking knowledge dynamics for multi-agent 
systems both in DEL and TEL. We started with a general discussion of protocol
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and multi-agent system building, and introduced three model checkers DEM O, 
MCK and MCMAS. Next, we modelled the Russian Cards Problem both in DEL 
and TEL, specified the safety conditions needed for solutions, and verified such 
conditions in three model checkers for a specific solution of this problem. Then 
we modelled the Sum And Product Problem in DEL, specified it in DEM O and 
then found the correct solution; in addition, we studied the complexity related 
to DEM O model checking. In the end, we explained the difficulties of modelling 
the Sum And Product Problem in the current versions of MCK and MCMAS.
7.2 Looking Forward
Looking forward, I would like to give four possible directions for further research, 
some of which have been discussed in the relevant chapters.
• Extending GDL for incomplete information games
The current GDL specification studied in Chapter 3 is only suitable for 
describing complete information games, in which agents are fully aware 
of the current state of the games. In games like Chess, for instance, the 
players know exactly what is on the game board. But there is another large 
class of games in which agents can only have incomplete information of the 
system. For example, in Poker, agents typically do not know what cards 
their opponents hold initially, as they can only observe their own cards. In 
reality, incomplete information access for agents is more ubiquitous, due to 
their limited observation powers or memories. So an extension of GDL for 
incomplete information games seems to be called for.
Meanwhile, there has been already some progress on modelling incomplete 
information games using logics. In, [78] van Benthem gave a modelling 
of games in DEL. In [86, 45], van der Hoek, Wooldridge and Jamroga 
developed epistemic extensions of ATL. In [40], Herzig and TYoquard took 
another approach based on STIT logic, which is another important temporal 
logic. So this topic has certainly attracted many logicians. And after we 
have the epistemic extension of GDL, it would be interesting to study its 
connections with the above logical frameworks.
• Investigating DEL and Knowledge-based Protocols in TEL
In Chapter 5, we noticed that there is a relation between the protocol
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generated from a DEL formula with the interpreted system built from a 
state model with this protocol. Such a protocol is similar to the knowledge- 
based protocols proposed in [23]. A further investigation on this relation 
will likely reveal more connections between DEL and TEL.
• Improving M odel Checkers
In Chapter 6, we compared three state-of-the-art model checkers. Despite 
the fact that DEM O had certain advantages when dealing with the Russian 
Cards Problem, its scalability is not very promising witnessed by the re­
sults in the Sum And Product Problem. It might be a good idea to explore 
the possibility to extend DEMO with OBDD techniques which are already 
employed in both MCK and MCMAS. As for M CK and MCMAS, we 
find that they have difficulties in dealing with the Sum And Product Prob­
lem because the model specification language does not support knowledge 
preconditions. This is related to knowledge-based protocols again, and I 
believe it is worthwhile to explore this connection.
• Playing GDL Games via Model Checking
In Section 4.4.3, we briefly explained the possibility of playing Tic-Tac- 
Toe via model checking. This might be not very promising due to the 
E X P T I M E - C o m p l e t e  complexity for such reasoning, but with the rapid 
advancement of computational powers it might be still possible to address 
games with not too many states. The tasks will likely be exploring the 
playability conditions to build agents’ strategy, reducing the variables in the 
presentation, and improving the efficiency of the model checker MOCHA.
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